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INTRODUCTION
The year 2018 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1968.1 The year dramatized the contrast
between the United States Supreme Court’s continued reluctance to
engage with the problem of partisan gerrymandering and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s deployment of its independent authority
under the Pennsylvania Constitution to dispatch the flamboyantly
gerrymandered map of Pennsylvania’s congressional districts.2 It
occasioned the first time that members of the Pennsylvania Legislature
moved for the wholesale impeachment of a majority of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court over the exercise of its power of judicial review under the
state constitution.3
1. The Pennsylvania Constitution “as amended by referenda of May 17, 1966,
November 8, 1966, May 16, 1967 and April 23, 1968 and as numbered by proclamation of
the Governor . . . shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Constitution of 1968.’” 1 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 906(b) (1972).
2. Compare Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1923 (2018) (denying relief in Wisconsin
for allegedly unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering on grounds of standing), and
Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942, 1943–44 (2018) (per curiam) (denying relief in
Maryland on equitable grounds), with League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth,
175 A.3d 282, 284 (Pa. 2018) (per curiam) (order announcing forthcoming opinion of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court), League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d
737, 741 (Pa. 2018) (invalidating 2011 congressional map for violating the state
constitution), and League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 181 A.3d 1083,
1087 (Pa. 2018) (per curiam) (adopting reapportionment plan). The United States Supreme
Court has rejected attempts to reverse these decisions. See Turzai v. League of Women
Voters of Pa., 138 S. Ct. 1323 (2018) (mem.).
For an image of the florid nature of Pennsylvania’s gerrymander, see, e.g., Aaron
Blake, Name that District Contest Winner: ‘Goofy Kicking Donald Duck,’ WASH. POST (Dec.
29, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/name-that-district-contestwinner-goofy-kicking-donald-duck/2011/12/29/gIQA2Fa2OP_blog.html; see also League of
Women Voters of Pa., 181 A.3d at 1110 (containing images of districts); League of Women
Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 750 (same).
3. See Memorandum from Cris Dush, Representative, Pa. House of Representatives,
to
Members
of
the
Pa.
House
of
Representatives
(Feb.
5,
2018),
http://www.legis.state.pa.us//cfdocs/Legis/CSM/showMemoPublic.cfm?chamber=
H&SPick=201%2070&cosponId=25163; Katie Meyer, Pennsylvania Chief Justice
Criticizes
Impeachment
Moves,
NPR
(Mar.
22,
2018,
5:58
PM),
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The year 2018 saw, as well, the retirement of Justice Anthony
Kennedy and the appointment of Justice Brett Kavanaugh, portending
a shift in the trajectory of the constitutional sensibility of the working
majority of the United States Supreme Court. The inflection of federal
constitutional law that accompanied the appointments of Chief Justice
Warren Burger and Justices Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, William
Rehnquist, and John Paul Stevens between 1969 and 1975 generated a
surge of interest in independent state constitutional protection of
individual rights abandoned or slighted in federal jurisprudence that
became known as the “New Judicial Federalism.”4 We can expect
https://www.npr.org/2018/03/22/596172829/pennsylvania-chief-justice-criticizesimpeachment-moves; Mark Scolforo, GOP Plan to Impeach 4 Pennsylvania Justices
Remains in Limbo, WESA (Apr. 22, 2018), http://www.wesa.fm/post/gop-plan-impeach-4pennsylvania-justices-remains-limbo#stream/0. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court consists
of seven justices. PA. CONST. art. V, § 2.
There was one precursor. In 1805, Pennsylvania’s Republican legislators tried to
impeach and convict three Federalist Justices—Shippen, Yeates, and Smith—who served
on the four-member Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The precipitating claims regarded their
treatment of a litigant in a non-constitutional case. The impeachment failed to achieve the
requisite two-third majority. See Elizabeth K. Henderson, The Attack on the Judiciary in
Pennsylvania, 1800–1810, 61 PA. MAG. OF HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 113, 113–14 (1937); RICHARD
E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC
165–70 (1971). Justice Yeates referenced the possibility of impeachment three years later
in Emerick v. Harris:
Every one can readily see that the judges may be thrown into a delicate situation
by the exercise of this constitutional right [to judicial review]. They are subjected
to the lawmaking power by impeachment . . . . [T]he constitution of this state
contemplates no wilful perversion of the power of impeachment or removal; and it
is to be hoped, for the honour of human nature, that such instances will seldom
occur. Whenever it does happen, the judge must derive consolation from the
integrity of his own mind, and the honest feelings that he has discharged his duty
with fidelity to the government. When he accepted his commission he knew the
tenure of his office; and it is much better that individuals should suffer a private
inconvenience, than the community sustain a public injury. Posterity sooner or
later will do him complete justice.
1 Binn. 416, 421 (Pa. 1808).
4. The fountainhead of the movement was Justice Brennan’s call for independent state
constitutional adjudication in William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 502 (1977) (“[T]he decisions of the
Court are not, and should not be, dispositive of questions regarding rights guaranteed by
counterpart provisions of state law. . . . [S]tate court judges and the members of the bar
seriously err if they so treat them.”). See also Louise Weinberg, The New Judicial
Federalism, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1191, 1235–44 (1977); G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial
Federalism in Perspective, 72 N OTRE DAME L. REV. 1097, 1112 (1997). For a recent
thoughtful overview and appreciation of the New Judicial Federalism from the California
bench, see Goodwin Liu, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights: A
Reappraisal, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1307, 1312–13 (2017), and from the Pennsylvania bench,
see Thomas G. Saylor, Prophylaxis in Modern State Constitutionalism: New Judicial
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renewed interest in independent state constitutional interpretation in
the coming decade.
The time seems ripe, therefore, to explore the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court’s exercise of judicial review under the 1968 Pennsylvania
Constitution. This Article constitutes—so far as I can determine—the
first such comprehensive exploration.5
This Article begins with an historical overview of the evolution of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, culminating in the Constitution of 1968, and
of Pennsylvania’s practice of independent judicial review. It then
presents a census of the cases in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has deployed independent state constitutional review under the
Constitution of 1968. The core of the census was a review of the 1586
reported Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases in the fifty years since the
adoption of the 1968 Constitution referring to claims of
unconstitutionality under the Pennsylvania Constitution.6 This Article
analyzes the 373 identified cases in which the supreme court has
vindicated distinctive Pennsylvania constitutional rights.7
Federalism and the Acknowledged, Prophylactic Rule, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 283,
289–91 (2003). See also Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 895 n.6 (Pa. 1991) (“The
term ‘New Federalism’ has been used increasingly to define the recent emphasis on
independent state constitutional analysis.”).
5. The collections of essays edited by Ken Gormley and John Hare provide valuable
resources. THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION: A TREATISE ON RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES (Ken
Gormley et al. eds., 2004); THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA: LIFE AND LAW IN THE
COMMONWEALTH, 1684–2017 (John J. Hare ed., 2018). The important collection of materials
at the Pennsylvania Constitution webpage, see PA CONSTITUTION: DUQ. U. SCH. L., https:/
/www.paconstitution.org (last visited Nov. 1, 2018) (follow “Periodical Summaries”
hyperlink), the constellation of articles on specific provisions of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, and the galaxy of commentary on the New Judicial Federalism also provide
valuable resources. Readers interested in exploring this galaxy are encouraged to input
“New Judicial Federalism” or “Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights” (or “Robert F. Williams” and “state constitution”) into their favorite
research engine.
But no author has undertaken a comprehensive census of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court’s work of independent constitutional review under the 1968 Constitution.
6. Lexis searches of [(“Pennsylvania constitution” or “constitution of Pennsylvania” or
“state constitution”) and (“unconstitutional” or violat!)] in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
file covering cases decided between the adoption of the 1968 Pennsylvania Constitution
yielded 1586 cases. This sample was supplemented by Shepardizing those cases in which
judicial review invalidated or limited government actions. For details, see infra
App. A.
7. It does not analyze cases in which the court concluded that the action under review
was wholly consistent with the Pennsylvania Constitution; nor does it analyze the set of
cases in which the superior court or commonwealth court has engaged in independent state
constitutional review, but the supreme court has not expressly evaluated that
determination.
As to the first limitation, while the “ratifying function” of judicial review can be
important, it does not generate either the independent analysis or the degree of controversy
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The first contribution of the project is descriptive, undertaken in the
spirit of the young Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. He wrote:
History must be a part of the study, because without it we cannot
know the precise scope of rules which it is our business to
know. . . . When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain
and in the daylight, you can count his teeth and claws, and see
just what is his strength. But to get him out is only the first step.
The next is either to kill him, or to tame him and make him a
useful animal.8
To begin the process of taming the dragon, Appendix C sets forth the
census of cases in a form that provides lawyers, judges, and scholars with
a resource that can be deployed in research, advocacy, and analysis.9 The
Article proceeds to analyze those cases and place their exercises of
judicial review into historical context. It concludes with reflections on the
nature of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s judicial review under the
Constitution of 1968. The Pennsylvania Constitution is not, as the late
Justice Scalia would have it, “dead, dead, dead.”10 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has engaged in a continuing process of judicial
statesmanship that looks to text, history, structure, and ongoing
doctrinal elaboration to bring evolving constitutional traditions and
values to bear on the issues confronting the Commonwealth. The process
has not always been unanimous, or without contention. But it is precisely
what the people of the Commonwealth had reason to expect when they
adopted the amendments that constitute the 1968 Constitution.
accompanying the invalidation or modification of the work of other branches of government.
As to the second, while these cases are often consequential, e.g., Mixon v. Commonwealth,
759 A.2d 442, 451 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000), aff’d, 783 A.2d 763 (Pa. 2001) (striking down
disenfranchisement of ex-offenders); Peake v. Commonwealth, 132 A.3d 506, 521 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2015) (invalidating lifetime employment disqualification of ex-offenders), life
is short, and this Article is already long.
By way of full disclosure, readers should be aware that I was part of the counsel
team that litigated Peake and its predecessor, Nixon v. Commonwealth, 839 A.2d 277 (Pa.
2003). I was also part of the plaintiffs’ counsel team in Fischer v. Department of Public
Welfare, 502 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1985), and wrote amicus briefs in support of the plaintiffs in
William Penn School District v. Pennsylvania Department of Education, 170 A.3d 414 (Pa.
2017), In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002), and Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co. v. Insurance Comm’r of Commonwealth, 482 A.2d 542 (Pa. 1984).
8. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
9. An earlier ten-year version of Appendix C was presented to a conference
commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Pennsylvania Constitution, sponsored by
the Pennsylvania Commission on Judicial Independence on March 18, 2018. It proved
welcome among the judges and attorneys attending the conference.
10. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, A Fool for the Original Constitution, 130 HARV.
L. REV. F. 24, 27 (2015) (quoting Justice Scalia’s characterization of the U.S. Constitution).
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION AND OF
PENNSYLVANIA JUDICIAL REVIEW
Between 1701 and 1776, Pennsylvania’s pre-Revolutionary
governments functioned under a series of Frames of Government, and a
Charter of Privileges established by William Penn as Proprietor and his
successors. The first independent and popular Pennsylvania
Constitution was promulgated in July 1776 by an extralegal
constitutional convention, elected in the shadow of the American
Declaration of Independence by an electorate of 6,000, from which both
loyalists and Quakers were excluded.11 The 1776 Constitution enacted a
Declaration of Rights, which included the lineal predecessors of much of
the current Declaration of Rights.12 Judges of the supreme court were
appointed for seven-year terms by a popularly elected executive council,13
and an elected Council of Censors was responsible for determining
“whether the constitution has been preserved inviolate,” recommending
repeal of unconstitutional statutes and convening subsequent
Conventions by a two-thirds vote.14
In 1789, the Council of Censors received a petition from eighteen
thousand persons seeking adoption of a new constitution. When the
Censors failed to achieve the two-thirds majority required by the existing
constitution for amendment, a majority of the Pennsylvania Assembly
issued an extralegal call for a constitutional convention.15 Delegates were
popularly elected pursuant to that call, and in September of 1790, the
convention proclaimed a new constitution without popular ratification.16
The 1790 Constitution retained much of the Declaration of Rights of the
1776 Constitution.17 It added the declaration “[t]hat elections shall be
11. See ROSALIND L. BRANNING, PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 12–13
(1960).
12. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. I; PA. CONST. of 1968, art. I.
13. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. II, § 19 (executive council elected, president chosen by
council and general assembly); id. art. II, § 20 (appointment of judges by president and
council); id. art. II, § 23 (seven-year terms for judges); id. art. II, § 24 (judges have powers
“usually exercised by such courts”).
14. Id. art. II, § 47 (Censors “shall be to enquire whether the constitution has been
preserved inviolate in every part . . . . [T]hey shall have authority to pass public censures,
to order impeachments and to recommend to the legislature the repealing such laws as
appear to them to have been enacted contrary to the principles of the constitution.”); id.
(establishing a two-third quorum requirement to call for Convention).
15. BRANNING, supra note 11, at 18–19.
16. Id. at 19–20.
17. Compare PA. CONST. of 1776, art. I, with PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX. The
Declaration of Rights was placed at the conclusion of the document as Article IX, where the
“inherent rights” provision (article I, section I of the 1776 Constitution) eliminated
reference to “natural” and “inalienable” rights and replaced it with a declaration of
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free and equal” and prohibited infliction of “cruel punishments”18 It
abolished the Council of Censor and provided for lifetime gubernatorial
appointment of judges and justices to serve on good behavior, but it did
not otherwise address issues of constitutional enforcement.19
Justices appointed under the 1790 Constitution asserted power to
declare legislation inconsistent with the Pennsylvania Constitution and
hence void well before Justice Marshall exercised authority under the
Federal Constitution in Marbury v. Madison in 1803.20 In 1808, having
survived an impeachment effort, Justice Yeates declaimed, “until lately
there was but one opinion on this subject; it being uniformly conceded by
the bar, and held by the bench, that the courts of justice must necessarily
possess and exercise the power of judging of the constitutionality of all
laws, brought before them judicially.”21
In 1825 Chief Justice William Tilghman wrote for a majority in Eakin
v. Raub, that “when a judge is convinced, beyond doubt, that an act has
been passed in violation of the constitution, he is bound to declare it
void.”22 By contrast, Justice John Bannister Gibson’s dissent in Eakin
argued at length that judicial review of legislative determinations under
the Pennsylvania Constitution was an improper usurpation of the
authority of the people of Pennsylvania.23
“indefeasible” rights that recognized a right to “protecting . . . reputation” and eliminated
reference to a right of “pursuing and obtaining . . . safety.” PA. C ONST. of 1776, art. I, § 1;
PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 1.
18. PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 5 (free and equal elections); id. art. IX, § 13 (cruel
punishments).
19. Id. art. II, § 8 (appointment); id. art. V, § 2 (good behavior).
20. Compare Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803), with Austin v. Trs. of Univ.
of Pa., 1 Yeates 260, 261 (Pa. 1793) (“The plaintiff’s claim then must be chiefly founded on
the act of the 6th August 1784, which it is said vested the real estate of his brother in him.
But the act was repealed . . . and I have no difficulty in declaring for the same reasons, that
the former act was unconstitutional.”), and Hubley’s Lessee v. White, 2 Yeates 133, 147 (Pa.
1796) (dictum) (per curiam) (“We possess also the power of declaring a law to be
unconstitutional, and such power has heretofore been exercised. . . . [A] very clear case only
can warrant it.”), and Respublica v. Duquet, 2 Yeates 493, 501 (Pa. 1799) (dictum) (“As to
the constitutionality of these laws, a breach of the constitution by the legislature, and the
clashing of the law with the constitution, must be evident indeed, before we should think
ourselves at liberty to declare a law void and a nullity on that account.”).
21. Emerick v. Harris, 1 Binn. 416, 422–23 (Pa. 1808).
22. Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 339 (Pa. 1825) (Tilghman, C.J.); accord id. at
381 (Duncan, J.) (“Under this view of the judicial department, it is surely the best, the
safest, and in our republic, can be the only mediation between a citizen and an
unconstitutional act of the legislature.”).
23. Id. at 355 (Gibson, J., dissenting) (“I am of opinion, that it rests with the people, in
whom full and absolute sovereign power resides, to correct abuses in legislation, by
instructing their representatives to repeal the obnoxious act. What is wanting to plenary
power in the government, is reserved by the people, for their own immediate use; and to
redress an infringement of their rights in this respect . . . .”).
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After an unsuccessful legislative call for a constitutional convention
in 1825 and a decade of popular dissatisfaction with the 1790
Constitution, in 1835, the Pennsylvania Legislature passed a statute
submitting a call for a constitutional convention to a popular
referendum.24 Upon approval by the voters, the Legislature provided for
popular election of convention delegates, and the delegates framed a
revised constitution, which retained the Declaration of Rights from the
1790 Constitution.25 The convention debated objections to judicial review
but rejected calls for popular election of judges. The compromise adopted
limited the terms of the supreme court justices to fifteen years.26 In 1838,
the electorate of Pennsylvania ratified the new constitution by a closely
divided vote.27 This was the first electoral ratification of a Pennsylvania
constitution.28
In the aftermath of the 1837 constitutional debate over judicial
review and elections, and the compromise reached and ratified in 1838,
Justice Gibson—who had become Chief Justice in 1827—receded from
his prior skepticism regarding judicial review. He viewed the new
constitution as an acquiescence by the People in the exercise of judicial
review and adopted as his own the concern that constitutional rights
would otherwise be insecure.29
24. See generally BRANNING, supra note 11, at 22; John L. Gedid, Pennsylvania
Constitutional Conventions¾Discarding the Myths, 82 PA. B. ASS’ N Q. 151, 157 (2011).
25. See Gedid, supra note 24, at 156.
26. BRANNING, supra note 11, at 24–25, 30; see Harry L. Witte, Judicial Selection in the
People’s Democratic Republic of Pennsylvania: Here the People Rule?, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1079,
1106–11 (1995) (discussing debates over judicial selection and judicial review).
27. BRANNING, supra note 11, at 31.
28. See generally Gedid, supra note 24, at 157–59 (discussing the 1837 convention’s
adoption of procedures for calling future constitutional conventions and for electoral
ratification of future amendments).
29. See, e.g., Menges v. Wertman, 1 Pa. 218, 222 (1845) (Gibson, C.J.) (“My theory,
however, seems to have been tacitly disavowed by the late convention, which took no action
on the subject, though the power had notoriously been claimed and exerted. But experience
has taught me the futility of mere theory. There must be some independent organ to arrest
unconstitutional legislation, or the citizen must hold his property at the will of an
uncontrollable power. It would be useless for the people to impose restrictions on legislation,
if the acts of their agents were not subject to revision.”); see Norris v. Clymer, 2 Pa. 277,
281 (1845) (in the course of argument, Chief Justice Gibson observed: “I have changed that
opinion for two reasons. The late Convention, by their silence, sanctioned the pretensions
of the courts to deal freely with the acts of the legislature; and from experience of the
necessity of the case.”); Norman v. Heist, 5 Watts & Serg. 171, 173 (Pa. 1843) (Gibson, C.J.)
(addressing statute retroactively allowing inheritance by illegitimate offspring: “We dare
not say that more was intended, and by that accuse the Legislature of an attempt to break
their promise in the presence of Almighty God, to support the Constitution, which declares
that no citizen shall be deprived of his life, liberty or property, unless by the judgment of
his peers or the law of the land. . . . The design of the convention was to exclude arbitrary
power from every branch of the government; and there would be no exclusion of it, if such
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In 1850, the Pennsylvania Constitution was amended to provide for
popular election of judges.30 During the ensuing generation, Justice
Gibson31 and his colleagues continued to wield state constitutional
authority to invalidate an array of legislation that they determined to be
tyrannical interferences with vested rights.32
In the decades following the Civil War, industrial development,
urbanization, political corruption, and the rise of corporate manipulation
rescripts or decrees were allowed to take effect in the form of a statute. The right of property
has no foundation or security but the law; and when the Legislature shall successfully
attempt to overturn it, even in a single instance, the liberty of the citizen will be no more.”);
see also Brown v. Hummel, 6 Pa. 86, 89–91 (1847) (Coulter, J.) (“The act of 1846 makes
important alterations in the will of the testator. . . . The bill of rights, which is for ever
excluded from legislative invasion, declares that the trial by jury shall remain as heretofore,
and the right thereof be inviolate; that all courts shall be open, and that every man shall
have redress by the due course of law, and that no man can be deprived of his right, except
by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land. . . . [T]he talismanic words, I am a citizen
of Pennsylvania, secures to the individual his private rights, unless they are taken from
him by a trial . . . according to the laws and customs of our fathers, and the securities and
safeguards of the constitution.”).
30. BRANNING, supra note 11, at 31–32; Witte, supra note 26, at 1112.
31. After the change to popular election of the judiciary, Chief Justice Gibson was the
only sitting justice elected to stay on the bench. However, he no longer served as Chief
Justice, and was replaced by Chief Justice Jeremiah S. Black in 1851. Thaddeus Stevens,
Address and Jeremiah S. Black, Chief Justice, Eulogy (May 9, 1853), reprinted in THOMAS
P. ROBERTS, MEMOIRS OF JOHN BANNISTER GIBSON, LATE CHIEF JUSTICE OF PENNSYLVANIA
102, 106 (1890).
32. See, e.g., In re Wash. Ave., 69 Pa. 352, 363 (1871) (invalidating paving assessment,
holding: “There is a clear implication from the primary declaration of the inherent and
indefeasible right of property, followed by the clauses guarding it against specific
transgressions, that covers it with an ægis of protection against all unjust, unreasonable
and palpably unequal exactions under any name or pretext.”); Craig v. Kline, 65 Pa. 399,
413–14 (1870) (determining that log owners were entitled to notice and an opportunity to
show that they did not set the logs afloat contrary to law); Reiser v. William Tell Sav. Fund
Ass’n, 39 Pa. 137, 144–46 (1861) (declaring retroactive removal of usury prohibition
unconstitutional); Menges v. Dentler, 33 Pa. 495, 495 (1859) (holding that an act declaring
a sheriff’s sale of mortgaged property as valid was unconstitutional); McCabe v. Emerson,
18 Pa. 111, 112 (1851) (invalidating legislative interference with plaintiff’s $400 judgment
as unconstitutional); De Chastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Pa. 18, 20 (1850) (“It is idle to say the
authority of each branch is defined and limited in the constitution, if there be not an
independent power able and willing to enforce the limitations. Experience proves that it is
thoughtlessly but habitually violated; and the sacrifice of individual right is too remotely
connected with the objects and contests of the masses to attract their attention.”); cf.
Commonwealth ex rel. Roney v. Warwick, 172 Pa. 140, 143–44 (1895) (citations omitted)
(“It was unavoidable, in their earlier administration, that conflict should have arisen
between the legislative and judicial branches of our government. The form of
government was new, and the exact limitations of duty and power were imperfectly
understood. . . . [T]he feeble resistance offered by the judiciary naturally encouraged
encroachments by the legislature. The mischief which resulted became so great that this
court was compelled to take a stand in assertion of the power which the constitution had
conferred.”).
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generated an array of legislative and political abuses that precipitated
calls for another constitutional convention.33 In 1871, the Pennsylvania
Legislature authorized a referendum on a constitutional convention,
which prevailed by a margin of greater than four to one.34 The enabling
legislation in 1872 decreed that delegates to the convention were to be
elected by a combination of elections by senatorial districts, elections by
33. See Gedid, supra note 24, at 159–60; Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional
Limits on Legislative Procedure: Legislative Compliance and Judicial Enforcement, 48 U.
PITT. L. REV. 797, 810–11 (1987) [hereinafter Williams, State Constitutional Limits on
Legislative Procedure] (“Legislative abuses led to the specific limitations on legislative
procedure inserted into the Pennsylvania Constitution in 1874.”); see also Washington v.
Dep’t of Pub. Welfare of Pa., 188 A.3d 1135, 1145 (Pa. 2018) (“By the time of the Civil War,
large corporations, particularly the railroads, and other wealthy special interest groups and
individuals had acquired such influence over the General Assembly that they routinely
secured the passage of legislation which exclusively served their narrow interests to the
detriment of the public good. As a result, during the decade after that conflict ended, the
populace became increasingly dissatisfied with the manner in which the General Assembly
was functioning, such that the people lost confidence in the legislature’s ability to fulfill its
most paramount constitutional duty of representing their interests.” (citation omitted));
Nextel Commc’ns of the Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 171 A.3d 682, 694 (Pa. 2017)
(“[A] larger package of constitutional provisions the people of the Commonwealth approved
in adopting the ‘Reform Constitution’ of 1874 for the purpose of altering certain legislative
practices which had become commonplace during the 19th century, but which, by the latter
part of that century, had fallen into serious disfavor with the populace, who rightly
perceived that these practices were intended to advance private or personal interests at the
expense of the public’s welfare.”); William Penn Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ.,
170 A.3d 414, 423 n.13 (Pa. 2017) (“This Court previously has observed that the
1874 Constitution ‘was drafted in an atmosphere of extreme distrust of the
legislative body and of fear of the growing power of corporations,’ and reflected a ‘prevailing
mood . . . of reform.’” (alteration in original)); Mount Airy #1, LLC v. Pa. Dep’t of Revenue,
154 A.3d 268, 273 (Pa. 2016) (“This Court long has recognized that the Constitution of 1874
sought ‘to correct the evil of unwise, improvident and corrupt legislation which had become
rampant at the time of its passage.’”(quoting Consumer Party of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 507
A.2d 323, 333 (Pa. 1986))); Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v.
Commonwealth, 877 A.2d 383, 394 (Pa. 2005); In re Commonwealth, Dep’t of Transp., 515
A.2d 899, 901 (Pa. 1986) (quoting BRANNING, supra note 11, at 37); accord Stilp v. Hafer,
718 A.2d 290, 295 (Pa. 1998) (“[O]vershadowing all else, reform of legislation [was] to
eliminate the evil practices that had crept into the legislative process. Legislative reform
was truly the dominant motif of the convention and that purpose is woven into the very
fabric of the constitution.” (quoting BRANNING, supra note 11, at 56)).
Proponents concluded that constitutional amendments in 1864 restricting bills to a
single subject and requiring identification of the purpose of a bill in its title had not
sufficiently addressed opportunities for corruption. See BRANNING, supra note 11, at 32.
34. See Gedid, supra note 24, at 160 n.66 (332,119 in favor to 62,738 against). Branning
says 328,000 to 70,000. BRANNING, supra note 11, at 56. For the most valuable and thorough
exploration of the historical sources regarding the pathologies that precipitated the 1874
Constitution that I have found in the legal literature, see Donald Marritz, Making Equality
Matter (Again): The Prohibition Against Special Laws in the Pennsylvania Constitution, 3
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 161, 185–94 (1993), which includes the striking statistic that in the
seven years preceding the 1873 constitutional convention, the Pennsylvania Legislature
adopted 475 general laws and 8755 special or private laws. See id. at 187 n.124.
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counties, and large elections that preserved representation for minorities
in each constituency.35
The convention was not authorized by its enabling legislation to
“alter in any manner” the Declaration of Rights, though ultimately the
convention marginally strengthened several of its provisions.36 The
delegates debated and rejected the substitution of appointive for elective
judges but increased the term of service for supreme court judges from
fifteen to twenty-one years.37
The convention generated substantial revisions to the rest of the
governmental structure that were “decisively” ratified by popular vote in
December of 1873 and became effective January 1, 1874.38
The new constitution lengthened the term of the governor,
strengthened the governor’s veto authority by providing a line item veto
over appropriation bills, and established the office of lieutenant governor
and an independent Superintendent of Common Schools.39 It also
reformed municipal governance, required cumulative voting in corporate
elections, required railroads to act as common carriers, and imposed
barriers to corporate collusion.40 Further, the new constitution
established a legislative duty to “provide for the maintenance and
support of a thorough and efficient system of public schools, wherein all
the children of this Commonwealth above the age of six years may be
educated, and shall appropriate at least one million dollars each year for
that purpose.”41
But the bulk of the new provisions were prohibitive. By one count,
the new constitution added more than sixty “thou shalt nots” in one

35. See BRANNING, supra note 11, at 56–57; cf. Appeal of Woods, 75 Pa. 59, 66–67 (1874)
(rejecting a challenge to this method of choosing delegates as inconsistent with “free and
equal” elections).
36. 1872 Pa. Laws 53, 55; see Harry L. Witte, Rights, Revolution, and the Paradox of
Constitutionalism: The Processes of Constitutional Change in Pennsylvania, 3 WIDENER J.
PUB. L. 383, 463 n.322 (1993) (“[The convention] added the prohibition on civil or military
interference with the right of suffrage, PA. CONST. of 1874, art. I, § 5; somewhat
strengthened the protection of the press, id. § 7; required that the ‘just compensation’ for
private property taken for public use be ‘made or secured’ prior to the taking, id. § 10; and
prohibited the legislature from ‘making irrevocable any grant of special privileges or
immunities,’ id. § 17.”).
37. PA. CONST. of 1874, art. V, § 2; see BRANNING, supra note 11, at 82–84.
38. See BRANNING, supra note 11, at 122 n.49 (reporting that the constitution was
adopted by a vote of 253,560 to 109,198); ROBERT E. WOODSIDE, PENNSYLVANIA
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 577–78 (1985).
39. PA. CONST. of 1874, art. IV, §§ 1, 3, 15, 20.
40. Id. art. XV; id. art. XVI, §§ 2, 4; id. art. XVII, § 1.
41. Id. art. X, § 1.
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legislative article alone.42 Among other limits, the 1874 Constitution
prominently originated the constitutional prohibitions on “special
legislation” in twenty-six specified areas,43 and the requirement that
“taxes shall be uniform.”44
The 1874 prohibitions laid the groundwork for decades of judicial
review.45 Looking back from the turn of the century, Justice Mitchell
observed:
The constitution of 1873 was a new departure in the history of
the law. Instead of being confined, in accordance with the
traditions of American institutions, to the framework of the
government as composed of general and fundamental principles,
it was converted into a binding code of particulars and details,
which had previously been left to the province of ordinary
legislation. And the ruling motive with which we are now
specially concerned was profound distrust of the legislature. As
pointed out by our Brother Dean in Perkins v. City of
42. See Perkins v. City of Philadelphia, 27 A. 356, 360 (Pa. 1893) (“Article 3 is almost
wholly prohibitory. It enjoins very few duties, but the ‘thou shalt nots’ number more than
60 . . . .”).
This profusion of prohibitions was on occasion cited to suggest a limit on judicial
review. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Elkin v. Moir, 49 A. 351, 352, 359 (Pa. 1901) (“The
fact that the action of the state towards its municipal agents may be unwise, unjust,
oppressive, or violative of the natural or political rights of their citizens is not one which
can be made the basis of action by the judiciary. . . . [The constitutional detail is]
incontrovertible evidence that the constitution is the result of a full, detailed, exhaustive
consideration of the subject of legislative control over merely local affairs is of itself a
conclusive argument against any further additions by the courts to its 60 and more
expressed prohibitions. There is no sounder or better settled maxim in the law than,
‘Expressio unius, exclusion est alterius.’”).
43. PA. CONST. of 1874, art. III, § 7, amended by PA. CONST. of 1968, art. III, § 32. The
provision also prohibited enactment of “special or local law by the partial repeal of a general
law” or “any law . . . granting powers or privileges in any case where the granting of such
powers and privileges shall have been provided for by the general law.” Id.
44. PA. CONST. of 1874, art. IX, § 1, amended by PA. CONST. of 1968, art. VIII, § 1.
45. See, e.g., Appeal of Ayars, 16 A. 356, 364 (Pa. 1889) (“It has also been suggested
that the question of necessity for classification, and the extent thereof, as well as of what
are local or special laws, is a legislative, and not a judicial, question. The answer to that is
obvious. The people, in their wisdom, have seen fit, not only to prescribe the form of enacting
laws, but also, as to certain subjects, the method of legislation, by ordaining that no local
or special law relating to those subjects shall be passed. Whether, in any given case, the
legislature has transcended its power, and passed a law in conflict with that limitation, is
essentially a question of law, and must necessarily be decided by the courts. To warrant a
conclusion that the people, in ordaining such limitations, intended to invest their lawmakers with judicial power, and thus make them final arbiters of the validity of their own
acts, would require the clearest and most emphatic language to that effect. No such
intention is expressed in the constitution, and none can be inferred from any of its
provisions.”).

300

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:287

Philadelphia, article 3 contains 60 specific prohibitions of
legislation, besides other restrictions and regulations not
absolutely prohibitory. Through these the pathway for honest
and desirable and necessary laws even yet is not always clear,
and it was inevitable that there should be some uncertainty and
even divergence in the views of judges thus forced to enter on an
untrodden and difficult field.46
These limits chafed,47 but over the next eight decades, efforts to
revisit the Constitution of 1874 comprehensively proved unsuccessful.48
A referendum seeking to hold a constitutional convention was approved
by the legislature but rejected by the electorate in 1891. The failure of
efforts to reform the constitution by convention repeated itself five more
times in the next seventy years, though particular provisions of the
constitution were amended more than seventy times.49
Ultimately, a comprehensive revision was achieved over the period
between 1963 and 1968 by seriatim constitutional amendments
legislatively proposed and electorally ratified in 1966 and 1967, followed
by a convention approved by referendum in 1967, with the convention’s
revisions electorally ratified in 1968.50 The result has been legislatively
anointed the “Constitution of 1968.”51
46. Commonwealth ex rel. Fell v. Gilligan, 46 A. 124, 125–26 (Pa. 1900) (citation
omitted); see Perkins, 27 A. at 361 (“[I]t is a fact that notwithstanding the respect which, as
citizens of a free commonwealth, we all have for the fundamental law, since 1874 more than
300 bills have been passed by the legislature, which four governors have vetoed because
they were unconstitutional, nearly 100 of these because they violated section 7, art. 3,
prohibiting local and special laws. In the same time, 33, which received executive approval,
have been pronounced unconstitutional by this court, most of them because violative of the
same section 7, art. 3.”)
47. Cf. Perkins, 27 A. at 365 (Mitchell, J., dissenting) (“Article 3, on
‘Legislation,’ . . . . is a barbed-wire fence around all legislative action, bristling with points
of danger even to the most honest and desirable and essential laws.”).
48. For a full account of the maneuvering, see Robert Sidman, Constitutional Revision
in Pennsylvania—Problems and Procedures, 71 W. VA. L. REV. 306, 306 (1969); BRANNING,
supra note 11, at 127–55; Gedid, supra note 24 at 165.
49. See PA. BAR ASS’N, PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION: 1966 HANDBOOK, at
viii–ix (1966) (describing failed referenda of 1891, 1921, 1924, 1935 1953, and 1963);
WOODSIDE, supra note 38, at 579–81 (identifying six electoral rejections of conventions
between 1891 and 1963, followed by seriatim amendments electorally ratified in 1966 and
1967 and a convention electorally called in 1967, with revisions electorally ratified in 1968);
Gedid, supra note 24, at 165 (discussing the failed attempts to revise the 1874 Constitution
and how the referendum to hold another convention was approved by the voters in 1967);
Sidman, supra note 48, at 307–10 (detailing failed referenda in 1921, 1924, 1935, 1953, and
1963);.
50. For details regarding the series of successful and unsuccessful revisions see
Sidman, supra note 48, at 307–19.
51. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 906(b) (2018).
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For purposes of this Article, several elements of the rather baroque
process that generated the Constitution of 1968 are particularly salient.
First, provisions of the Declaration of Rights of 1776 and 1790, which
were retained by the 1838 and 1874 constitutions, contained neither
express “due process” nor “equal protection” provisions.52 The
Pennsylvania Bar Association’s “Project Constitution,” at the outset of
the process that led to the Constitution of 1968, proposed an amendment
to section 10 of the Declaration of Rights to include wording similar to
the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment: “No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor be
denied the equal protection of the laws.”53 No such addition made it
through the legislative process.
Second, “Project Constitution” proposed two amendments to article I,
section 8, which bars unreasonable searches and seizures. One of these
proposals would have added to the right to security “from unreasonable
searches and seizures and other invasions of privacy.”54 The second would
have provided: “Except as proof in a suit or prosecution for the violation
of this provision, no evidence obtained as a result of a violation of this
provision shall be admissible in any judicial or quasi-judicial or
administrative proceeding.”55 These proposals also were never adopted.56
Third, “Project Constitution” declared that “the extent to which
private citizens of the Commonwealth shall be prohibited or discouraged
52. “Equal” appears in article I, section 1 (“All men are born equally free and
independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of
enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property
and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness.”), which originated in 1776, and
implies some protection for life, liberty, property and reputation rights. PA. CONST. art. I, §
1; PA. CONST. of 1776, art. I, §1. “Equal” also appears in article I, section 5 (“Elections shall
be free and equal”), which originated in 1790. PA. CONST. art. I, § 5; PA. CONST. of 1790, art.
IX, § 5.
The protections of article I, section 9 (“In all criminal prosecutions the
accused . . . cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself, nor can he be deprived of
his life, liberty or property, unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land.”),
which originated in 1790, make reference to the Magna Carta’s “law of the land” provision
from which the due process clause is derived, but by their terms apply only to criminal
prosecutions. PA. CONST. art. I, § 9; PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 9; see THE TEXT OF THE
MAGNA CARTA, in A.E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT AND COMMENTARY 33, 45
(1964).
And, the requirements of “uniformity of taxation” and the prohibition of “special
legislation” from 1874 impose limitations on unequal treatment. PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1;
id. art. III, § 32; PA. CONST. of 1874, art. IX, § 1; id. art. III, § 7.
53. Pa. Bar Ass’n, Project Constitution: A Revised Pennsylvania Constitution, 34 PA. B.
ASS’N Q. 147, 226 (1963) [hereinafter Pa. Bar Ass’n, Project Constitution].
54. Id. at 246.
55. Id.
56. Cf. Commonwealth v. Murray, 223 A.2d 102, 109–10 (Pa. 1966) (locating a right to
privacy in article I, section 1 and article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution).
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from discriminating against other persons on the basis of race is a
question for the legislature,” but proposed a new “express and
unequivocal” provision barring official discrimination on the basis of
race: “Neither the Commonwealth nor any political subdivision thereof
shall deny to any person the enjoyment of any civil right, nor discriminate
against any person in the exercise of any civil right, because of race, color,
or national origin.”57 This language was embedded in the proposals for
amendment initially introduced into the Pennsylvania Senate in 1965.58
It was amended by the House to prohibit discrimination because of “race,
creed, color, sex, or national origin.”59 The Senate refused to concur in the
amendment on the basis of disagreement with the insertion of protection
against sex discrimination.60 Ultimately, the conference committee
reported article I, section 26 in its current form, stating that public actors
may not “deny to any person the enjoyment of any civil right, nor
discriminate against any person in the exercise of any civil right,” and
remitting the definition of prohibited denials of civil rights and
discrimination to future constitutional construction.61 The voters of
Pennsylvania, faced with the question of whether to adopt an
amendment summarized on the ballot to the people of Pennsylvania as
“Prohibit discrimination or denial of any person of his civil rights,”
ratified article I, section 26 on May 16, 1967 by a vote of 1,232,575 to
638,365.62
Fourth, at the May 1967 election, the voters faced a ballot question
seeking approval of a wholesale amendment of the limits on the
57.
58.

Pa. Bar Ass’n, Project Constitution, supra note 53, at 249.
S.B. 530, no. 551, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1965); see also PA. ECON.
LEAGUE, INC., COMPARISON OF PROPOSED NEW CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS WITH
PENNSYLVANIA’S CURRENT CONSTITUTION 10 (1965); Robert F. Williams, Pennsylvania’s
Equality Provisions, in THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION: A TREATISE ON RIGHTS AND
LIBERTIES, supra note 5, at 744 (“[R]ace, color, or national origin”).
59. S.B. 530, no. 1281, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1965); Williams, supra note
58, at 744. A prior effort to introduce protection against sex discrimination had failed in the
Senate. See S. JOURNAL, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 723–25 (Pa. 1965) (amendment
of Sen. Staisey).
60. S. JOURNAL, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 937 (Pa. 1965) (Senator McGregor,
quoting Elizabeth Johnson, former Director of the Pennsylvania Bureau of Women and
Children: “To insert sex into the pending Constitutional Civil Rights Amendment would be
to harness ourselves with Constitutional blinders to reality”).
61. PA. CONST. art. I, § 26; S. JOURNAL, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 1372 (Pa.
1965); see PA. BAR ASS’N, supra note 49, at 16–17 (reporting legislature “broadened” the
initial proposal); PA. BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PROJECT
CONSTITUTION 5–6 (Jan. 1966) (reporting language of 1965 Senate Bill 530).
62. PA. GEN. ASSEMB., BALLOT QUESTIONS AND PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION: A COMPILATION WITH STATISTICS FROM 1958 TO 1997,
at 13 (1998), http://jsg.legis.state.pa.us/resources/documents/ftp/publications/1998-75BALLOT%20QUESTIONS%20REPORT.pdf.
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legislature adopted by the Constitution of 1874. The descriptive question
that faced the ratifying voters was even more opaque than the description
of the prohibition of “discrimination.”63
Among other changes, the text of this omnibus amended article
broadened the constitutional prohibition of “special laws.” The 1874
Constitution had prohibited the adoption of “special laws” regarding
twenty-six specified subjects.64 The new provision, article III, section 32,
reduced the number of specified subjects to eight, but prefaced the list
with a command applicable to all statutes adopted by the Pennsylvania
Legislature: “The General Assembly shall pass no local or special law in
any case which has been or can be provided for by general law . . . .”65
Voters ratified the proposal by a vote of 1,233,709 to 621,381.66
Fifth, a ballot question presented in the May 1967 election sought
authority to convene a constitutional convention, limited to addressing
proposals to amend the structural articles of the constitution including
the Judiciary, Reapportionment, State Finance, and Local Government
Articles, but specifically excluding the Tax Uniformity Clause.67 The
63. According to a record of the questions, it read as follows:
Shall articles three, ten and eleven of the Constitution relating to legislation be
consolidated and amended to modernize provisions relating to the powers, duties
and legislative procedures of the legislature; removing the limitation on the
classification of municipalities; establishing a system of competitive bidding on
State purchases; restricting the legislative power on special and local legislation;
incorporating an unnumbered section relating to land title registration and
repealing duplicate provisions made obsolete by this consolidation?
INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL AND SOC. RESEARCH, REFERENDA AND
PRIMARY ELECTION MATERIALS: PART 10: REFERENDA ELECTIONS FOR PENNSYLVANIA 3–4
(2002),
https://cdn.ballotpedia.org/images/f/f2/Referenda_Elections_for_Pennsylvania_
1967-1990.pdf. The Pennsylvania General Assembly’s 1998 Ballot Questions and Proposed
Amendments Compilation gives the summary as “[s]treamline legislative process of
competitive bidding for State purchases where possible.” PA. GEN. ASSEMB., supra note 62,
at 14.
64. PA. CONST. of 1874, art. III, § 7.
65. See PA. CONST. art. III, § 32; PA. BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON
PROJECT CONSTITUTION, supra note 61, at 8 (reporting on 1965 Senate Bill 532: “In view of
the broad prohibition with which the section begins it would be unnecessary to specify any
special subjects on which local or special legislation should not be enacted.”); Marritz, supra
note 34, at 203.
66. PA. GEN. ASSEMB., supra note 62, at 14.
67. See 1967 Pa. Laws 7, § 7(b) (“The convention shall not consider or include in its
recommendations any proposal which clearly permits or prohibits the imposition of a
graduated income tax by the Commonwealth or any of its political subdivisions nor shall
that part of Article IX, Section 1 of the Constitution providing that: ‘All taxes shall be
uniform, upon the same class of subjects, within the territorial limits of the authority
levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general law . . .’ be modified, altered
or changed in any respect whatsoever . . . .” (alteration in original)).
The ballot question asked voters to approve a convention tasked with:
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electorate approved the proposal by a vote of 1,140,931 to 703,576.68 The
amended judiciary article proposed by the convention and ratified by
voters on April 23, 1968, retained a modified system for the contested
election of judges for ten-year terms, followed by uncontested retention
elections.69 A subsequent proposed amendment that would have provided
for merit selection of judges was narrowly defeated on May 29, 1969, by
a vote of 643,960 to 624,453.70
The flowering of constitutional revision of the late 1960s closed with
the electoral approval on May 18, 1971, of two amendments introduced
during the 1969–1970 Legislative session: the Equal Rights Amendment,
approved by a vote of 783,441 to 464,882;71 and the Environmental Rights
Amendment, approved by a vote of 1,021,342 to 259,979.72

[P]repar[ing] for submission to the electorate proposals for the revision of the
subject matter of any amendment proposed, but not approved, at the May 1967
Primary and for the revision of Sections 16, 17 and 18 of Article II and of Articles
V, XIII, XIV, and IX (excluding Section 18 and the Uniformity Clause of Section 1
of Article IX as provided in Section 7 (b) of this Act).
INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL AND SOC. RESEARCH, supra note 63, at 1–2;
see Amidon v. Kane, 279 A.2d 53, 58 (Pa. 1971) (“Legislative proposals to amend the
Uniformity Clause were rejected by the electorate in 1913 and 1928, and the May, 1967
referendum . . . specifically provided that the convention would not revise that portion of
the constitution.” (footnote omitted)).
68. PA. GEN. ASSEMB., supra note 62, at 13.
69. PA. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1967–1968, PROPOSALS FOR REVISION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA ADOPTED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
1967–1968, at 32–33 (1968), https://www.duq.edu/Documents/law/pa-constitution/_pdf/
conventions/1967-68/constitutional-prop.pdf;
INTER-UNIVERSITY
CONSORTIUM
FOR
POLITICAL AND SOC. RESEARCH, supra note 63, at 15–16; PA. GEN. ASSEMB., supra note 62,
at 19.
70. PA. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1967–1968, supra note 69, at 31; PA. GEN.
ASSEMB., supra note 62, at 21.
71. PA. GEN. ASSEMB., supra note 62, at 23 (Question 2 on the ballot). It can now be
found at PA. CONST. art. I, § 28 (“Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of the sex of the individual.”).
72. PA. GEN. ASSEMB., supra note 62, at 23 (Question 3 on the ballot). It can now be
found at PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (“The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to
the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment.
Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of all the people,
including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.”); see Robinson Township v.
Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 961–62 (Pa. 2013) (“[T]he proposed Environmental Rights
Amendment received the unanimous assent of both chambers during both the 1969–1970
and 1971–1972 legislative sessions. Pennsylvania voters ratified the proposed amendment
of the citizens’ Declaration of Rights on May 18, 1971, with a margin of nearly four to one,
receiving 1,021,342 votes in favor and 259,979 opposed.” (citation omitted)); cf.
Commonwealth v. Nat’l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d 588, 596 n.1 (Pa. 1973)
(Jones, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the amendment received more affirmative votes than
any candidate seeking election to statewide office that same day).
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II. FIFTY YEARS OF INDEPENDENT JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION OF 1968
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court is bound by the Supremacy Clause
to apply the provisions of the Federal Constitution as the United States
Supreme Court construes them. But it has long recognized that it is free
to apply the Pennsylvania Constitution to provide independent rights
and impose independent obligations. The classic formulation is that the
United States Constitution provides a “floor” but not a “ceiling.”73 Over
the first half-century of adjudication under the Constitution of 1968, the
Court has regularly engaged in independent constitutional review in
ways that change rights and obligations from the federal baseline.
Analysis of these cases leads to three conclusions:
i. Exercise of independent constitutional review is not a
once-in-a-lifetime or once-in-a-decade experience under the 1968
Constitution. Over half a century, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has exercised independent review on average in seven cases
a year. It has invalidated or modified statutes in light of the
demands of the Pennsylvania Constitution at an aggregate rate of
more than twice a year. Independent review is not the province of
an idiosyncratic group of jurists. Thirty-two justices have
authored opinions undertaking independent constitutional
review, and twenty-five have deployed the 1968 Constitution to
review statutes.74 Among the sitting justices, only Justice Mundy
has not yet authored such an opinion.
ii. Pennsylvania’s constitution contains provisions that parallel the
wording of federal guarantees, provisions that address similar
norms in congruent wording, and provisions that are wholly
disanalogous to federal provisions. Independent review of actions
by prosecutors, courts, and law enforcement officers in the area of
criminal procedure has focused on provisions whose text directly
parallels federal provisions, prominently Pennsylvania’s
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures,75 and its
guaranties regarding the rights of the accused in criminal
The electorate also approved an amendment that allowed a verdict, in a civil case,
to be rendered by no less than five-sixths of the jury. PA. CONST. art. I, § 6; PA. GEN.
ASSEMB., supra note 62, at 23 (Question 1 on the ballot).
73. E.g., Thomas G. Saylor, Fourth Amendment Departures and Sustainability in State
Constitutionalism, 22 WIDENER L.J. 1, 2 (2012) (quoting Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., The New
Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 KY. L.J.
421, 425–26 (1974)).
74. See infra App. B.
75. PA. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“Security from Searches and Seizures”).
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prosecutions.76 By contrast, independent constitutional review of
statutes rests mainly on state constitutional provisions that are
congruent with federal provisions but not precisely parallel, and
on provisions that have no federal counterparts.
iii. The Pennsylvania Constitution is not, as the late Justice Scalia
would have it, “dead, dead, dead.”77 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has engaged in a continuing process of judicial
statesmanship that looks to text, history, structure, and ongoing
doctrinal elaboration to bring evolving constitutional traditions
and values to bear on the issues confronting the Commonwealth.78
This process is not always unanimous, or without contention, but
it is exactly what the people of the Commonwealth had reason to
expect when they reenacted the constitution in 1968.
A. The Frequency of Independent Constitutional Review: The Size of the
Dragon
In half a century of adjudication under the 1968 Constitution, judicial
review under the Pennsylvania Constitution has been a regular feature
of the work of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The 373 cases in which
independent Pennsylvania judicial review has occurred have been spread
out over the five decades. In the aggregate, the current court is neither
abnormally assertive, nor abnormally deferential compared to its recent
predecessors.79
76. Id. art. I, § 9 (“Rights of Accused in Criminal Prosecutions”).
77. See Prakash, supra note 10, at 27 (quoting Justice Scalia referring to the Federal
Constitution).
78. Compare Saylor, supra note 4, at 309–12 (“[C]ourts should at the outset identify the
constitutional value or norm at issue . . . [and determine] whether the salient, constitutional
value is, in some way, under-protected by the application of the prevailing rule or standard,”
and follow an “exercise [in] practical judgment,” involving “a predictive comparison of
possible outcomes from the application of various candidate doctrinal forms”), with id.
at 325 (“Many constitutional questions lack answers that can be proved correct by
straightforward chains of rationally irresistible arguments.”). See, e.g., In re Bruno, 101
A.3d 635, 660 n.13 (Pa. 2014) (quoting Saylor with approval); Robinson Township v.
Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 944–50 (2013) (same).
79. On the other hand, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) has been
cited ten times in the last twelve years by majority or concurring opinions after a decade of
hiatus since its citation in Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 898 n.10 (Pa. 1991).
See Commonwealth v. Derhammer, 173 A.3d 723, 733 (Pa. 2017) (Wecht, J., concurring);
William Penn Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 170 A.3d 414, 418 (Pa. 2017); Commonwealth
v. Donahue, 98 A.3d 1223, 1243 n.3 (Pa. 2014) (Castille, C.J., concurring); Robinson
Township, 83 A.3d at 927; Hosp. & Healthsystem Ass’n of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 77 A.3d
587, 596 (Pa. 2013); Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 38 A.3d 711, 734
(Pa. 2012) (per curiam); Jefferson Cty. Court Appointed Emps. Ass’n v. Pa. Labor Relations
Bd., 985 A.2d 697, 707 (Pa. 2009); Commonwealth v. Judge, 916 A.2d 511, 524 (Pa. 2007);
Glen-Gery Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 907 A.2d 1033, 1037 (Pa. 2006); Stilp v.
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Chart 1: Independent Judicial Review by Year, 1968–201880
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Commonwealth, 905 A.2d 918, 971 (Pa. 2006). This may suggest a somewhat more
aggressive approach to judicial review in the last decade. Or simply a resurgent fondness
for Chief Justice Marshall.
80. The data in Chart 1, and subsequent charts includes decisions in the fifty years
between electoral ratification on April 23, 1968, and April 23, 2018. Thus the 1968 entry
represents eight months, and the 2018 entry represents four months.
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Table 1: Pennsylvania Independent Judicial Review by Year,
1968–2018

1968
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

1
2
8
1
8
17
10
9
8
9
9
8
8
7
8
4
6
9
7
5
8
7
12
7
7

1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
Total

6
6
6
5
9
13
8
3
12
11
10
7
11
3
2
7
5
10
10
12
4
9
18
1
373

Independent state constitutional review has addressed each of the
branches of state government under the 1968 Constitution, as well as
municipal decision makers. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
deployed the Pennsylvania Constitution to review statutes, criminal trial
procedure, the actions of law enforcement officials, state executive
officers, and municipal governments. Review of statutes is by far the
most frequent posture.

2018]

STILL LIVING

309

Chart 2: Actions Reviewed
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Table 2: Actions Reviewed
Statute
Criminal Trial
Law enforcement
Municipal Action
Administrative Action

138
89
51
38
29

Judicial Action
Ballot
Grand Total

26
2
373

In two-thirds of these cases, the state constitutional violation was
fully independent—the action under review did not transgress federal
constitutional constraints. The pattern differs greatly, however, among
the subjects of review.
In the area of criminal trials, only a minority (37%) of the
Pennsylvania constitutional decisions were fully independent; most
overlapped with federal violations, and the opinions found both state and
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federal violations. Half of the cases involving actions by law enforcement
(51%) found state but no federal violations. By contrast, the proportion of
fully independent state constitutional violations rose to 80% with respect
to review of statutes, 90% in review of actions by state executive officials
and agencies, and 92% in review of municipal actions.
Table 3A: Federal Violation as well as State Violation
Federal Violation
No
Yes
Remand
Total

Cases
254
117
2
373

Table 3B: Federal Violation by State Action
Statute
138
No
111
Yes
27
Criminal Trial
89
Yes
54
No
33
Remand
2
Law enforcement
51
Yes
26
No
25
Municipal action
38
No
35
Yes
3
Administrative Action
29
No
26
Yes
3
Judicial Action
26
No
21
Yes
5
Ballot
2
No
2
Total
373
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The most contentious exercise of review, the most frequent, and the
one that recently occasioned threat of wholesale impeachment,81
is invalidation of the work of the Pennsylvania Legislature. While the
current court has been active in constitutional review of statutes, the
level of deference to legislative determination does not fall outside of the
bounds of historical norms, whether judged by all reviews of statutes or
by reviews under independent Pennsylvania norms.
Chart 3: Statutory Review by Year
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Chart 4: Statutory Review by Year Without a Federal
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court can avoid direct confrontation with
other branches of government by construing statutes, rules, and
regulations to avoid conflict with state constitutional norms, or
remanding cases for further determination in light of constitutional
constraints. The court adopts this strategy in roughly 20% of cases
reviewed in the past fifty years. In roughly a quarter of cases involving
81. For more on the recent threat of impeachment due to the court’s exercise of judicial
review, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.

312

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:287

statutory review, the court has deployed constitutional norms as
occasions for statutory construction, trimmed statutes to avoid
constitutional violations, or remanded for further adjudication rather
than invalidating them outright.
Table 4A: Invalidation and Avoidance—All State Action
Invalidation
293
82
Statutory construction
51
Remand
29
Total
373
Table 4B: Invalidation and Avoidance—Statutes
Invalidation
100
Statutory construction
32
Remand
6
Total

138

B. Teeth and Claws: The Constitutional Claims
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has exercised independent judicial
review under the Constitution of 1968 in 373 cases. Of these, 138 involved
statutory review. The tables that follow illustrate the relative frequency
of different types of claims.
In the aggregate sample of 373, claims under provisions constraining
the criminal process (147) accounted for the most exercises of review,
followed by cases vindicating provisions requiring uniform taxation and
equal treatment (47),83 cases limiting oppression under article I, section
1 (42), and cases protecting judicial autonomy (38).
Among the 138 cases reviewing statutes, successful claims involving
equal treatment and tax uniformity (31) were most common, followed by
protection of judicial autonomy (23), and claims involving criminal
process (11).

82. This category refers not only to construction of statutes but also to municipal
codes and state regulations.
83. Between 1971 and 1979, Pennsylvania’s Equal Rights Amendment (“ERA”) was
deployed successfully almost twice a year. The pace of ERA cases abated in 1979 with the
adoption of a statutory presumption of gender symmetry. See George v. George, 409 A.2d
1, 2 (Pa. 1979) (quoting 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2301 (1978): “where in any statute heretofore
enacted there is a designation restricted to a single sex, the designation shall be deemed to
refer to both sexes unless the designation does not operate to deny or abridge equality of
rights under the law of this Commonwealth . . . .”).
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Table 5: Total Cases by Provision
Criminal Process

313

147

Art. I, § 9
Art. I, § 8
Art. I, § 10
Art. I, § 14
Art. I, § 6
Judicial Autonomy and Administration

74
57
14
1
1
38

Art. V, § 10
Art. V, § 18
Art. V, § 16
Art. V, § 1
Art. V, § 13
Art. V, § 9
Separation of Powers
Art. V, § 12
Art. IV, § 9
Art. V, § 5
Substantive Limits on Undue Oppression Art. I, § 1

18
4
3
3
3
2
2
1
1
1
24

Tax Uniformity Art. VIII, § 1

20

Art. VIII, § 1
Art. VIII, § 2
ERA Art. I, § 28

17
3
14

Equal Treatment Art. III, § 32

13

Reputation and Privacy Art. I, § 1

12

Limits on Municipal Action

12

Art. III, § 27
Art. IX, § 2
Art. VI, § 7
Separation of Powers
Art. III, § 14
Art. IX, § 10
Cruel Punishment Art. I, § 13

4
3
2
1
1
1
10

Remedies Art. I, § 11

9
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Non-Delegation

9

Art. II, § 1
Art. VI, § 7
Freedom of Expression Art. I, § 7

8
1
8

Taking Art. I, § 10

8

Limits on Legislative Process

8

Art. III, § 9
Art. IV, § 8
Separation of Powers
Art. VI, § 7
Art. III, § 11
Art. II, § 2
Art. II, § 15
Impairment of Contracts Art. I, § 17

2
1
1
1
1
1
1
7

Single-Subject Rule

6

Art. III, § 3
Art. XI, § 1
Procedural Limits Art. I, § 1

5
1
6

Jury Trial Art. I, § 6

5

Ex Post Facto Art. I, § 17

4

Limits on Executive Action

4

Art. VI, § 1
Art. IV, § 16
Art. II, § 2
Art. IV, § 15
Elections

1
1
1
1
3

Art. I, § 5

2

Art. II, § 17
Environmental Art. I, § 27

1
3

Religious Freedom Art. I, § 3

2

Education Art. III, § 14
Total

1
373
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Table 6: Statutory Review by Provision
Judicial Autonomy and Administration
Art. V, § 10
Art. V, § 1
Art. V, § 16
Art. V, § 13
Separation of Powers
Art. IV, § 9
Art. V, § 12
Equal Treatment Art. III, § 32, Art. I, § 1
Criminal Process
Art. I, § 9
Art. I, § 8
Art. I, § 10
ERA Art. I, § 28
Non-Delegation
Art. II, § 1
Art. VI, § 7
Tax Uniformity Art. VIII, § 1
Art. VIII, § 1
Art. VIII, § 2
Reputation and Privacy Art. I, § 1
Substantive Limits on Undue Oppression Art. I, § 1
Impairment of Contracts Art. I, § 17
Remedies Art. I, § 11
Limits on Legislative Process
Art. III, § 9
Art. II, § 15
Art. VI, § 7
Art. II, § 2
Art. III, § 11
Single-Subject Rule
Ex Post Facto Art. I, § 17
Freedom of Expression Art. I, § 7
Taking Art. I, § 10

23
14
3
2
1
1
1
1
12
11
5
5
1
10
9
8
1
9
8
1
8
7
7
6
6
2
1
1
1
1
5
4
4
3
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Elections Art. I, § 5
Art. I, § 5
Art. II, § 17
Jury Trial Art. I, § 6
Limits on Municipal Action
Art. III, § 27
Cruel Punishment Art. I, § 13
Environmental Art. I, § 27
Education Art. III, § 14
Religious Freedom Art. I, § 3

3
2
1
3
2
2
2
2
1
1

III. PARALLEL, CONGRUENT, AND SKEW PROVISIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
There is a lively debate among academic jurisprudes about the degree
to which state constitutional analysis should give primary attention to
the language of the commands embodied in text when state courts
interpret their constitutions.84 In the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
constitutional text exerts substantial claims as a “touchstone” or
“polestar”.85 In thinking about Pennsylvania’s approach to the New
Judicial Federalism under the Constitution of 1968, it seems useful to
84. E.g., James A. Gardner, The Positivist Revolution That Wasn’t: Constitutional
Universalism in the States, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 109, 121–22, 129 (1998); James
A. Gardner, Whose Constitution Is It? Why Federalism and Constitutional Positivism Don’t
Mix, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1250–52 (2005); Liu, supra note 4, at 1321–28.
85. In the last decade, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court opinions have echoed the
proposition that “[o]ur ultimate touchstone is the actual language of the Constitution itself.”
Washington v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare of Pa., 188 A.3d 1135, 1149 (Pa. 2018) (alteration in
original) (quoting Stilp v. Commonwealth, 905 A.2d 918, 939 (Pa. 2006) (quoting Firing v.
Kephart, 353 A.2d 833, 835–36 (Pa. 1976))); see also League of Women Voters of Pa. v.
Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 802 (Pa. 2018) (“The touchstone of interpretation of a
constitutional provision is the actual language of the Constitution itself.” (citing Ieropoli v.
AC & S Corp., 842 A.2d 919, 925 (Pa. 2004))); Yocum v. Commonwealth Gaming Control
Bd., 161 A.3d 228, 239 (Pa. 2017) (quoting Buckwalter v. Borough of Phoenixville, 985 A.2d
728, 730 (Pa. 2009)); Sprague v. Cortes, 145 A.3d 1136, 1154 (Pa. 2016) (Wecht, J.,
concurring) (“[O]ur ‘ultimate touchstone is the actual language . . . .’ [W]e may consider,
inter alia, the ‘text; history (including constitutional convention debates, the address to the
people, [and] the circumstances leading to the adoption of the provision); structure;
underlying values; and interpretations of other states.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 944 (Pa. 2013))); Zauflik v. Pennsbury
Sch. Dist., 104 A.3d 1096, 1124 (Pa. 2014) (“[T]he polestar of constitutional analysis
undertaken by the Court must be the plain language of the constitutional provisions at
issue.” (quoting In re Bruno, 101 A.3d 635, 659 (Pa. 2014))).
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divide constitutional provisions into three groups on the basis of the
relation between the wording and import of the state provisions and
those contained in the Federal Constitution: parallel provisions,
congruent provisions, and skew provisions. Each type raises distinct
interpretive issues.
Parallel provisions track86—or provide the template for—federal
provisions. Thus, for example, the terms of article I, section 8—initially
adopted in 1790, and largely prefigured in 1776—and those of the Fourth
Amendment are virtually identical.87 It is here that the gravitational pull
of federal jurisprudence is strongest.
Congruent provisions govern issues and embody norms that are also
addressed by the Federal Constitution but utilize distinctive wording and
often have distinctive history. Pennsylvania’s protections of free
expression, which antedate the free expression protections of the First
Amendment, address the same issues in similar though not identical

86. Cf. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 237 n.4 (1984) (“The Court has
previously determined that abstention is not required for interpretation of parallel state
constitutional provisions.” (citing Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 598
(1976))).
87. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.”), with PA. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The people shall be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant
to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without describing them as
nearly as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed
to by the affiant.”), and PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. I, § X (“[T]he people have a right to hold
themselves, their houses, papers, and possessions free from search and seizure . . . .”).
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terms.88 Its equality provisions diverge substantially in wording from
their federal counterparts, but embody cognate norms.89
Finally, like most state constitutions, the Pennsylvania Constitution
of 1968 is well endowed with what might be described as disanalogous or
skew provisions.90 These constitutional constructions have no parallel in
the federal structure; they go off in another direction entirely. Thus,
Pennsylvania constitutional provisions such as the Single Subject Rule,
adopted in 1864;91 the definition of the authority of the supreme court
over judicial administration, adopted in 1968;92 and its Environmental
Rights provision, adopted in 1971,93 have neither parallel nor correlate
in the federal canon. Charts 5 and 6 illustrate the distribution of these
types of provisions in the census.

88. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.”), with PA. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“The printing
press shall be free to every person who may undertake to examine the proceedings of the
Legislature or any branch of government, and no law shall ever be made to restrain the
right thereof. The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable
rights of man, and every citizen may freely speak, write and print on any subject, being
responsible for the abuse of that liberty. No conviction shall be had in any prosecution for
the publication of papers relating to the official conduct of officers or men in public capacity,
or to any other matter proper for public investigation or information, where the fact that
such publication was not maliciously or negligently made shall be established to the
satisfaction of the jury; and in all indictments for libels the jury shall have the right to
determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the court, as in other cases.”), and
id. art. I, § 20 (“The citizens have a right in a peaceable manner to assemble together for
their common good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of government for
redress of grievances or other proper purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance.”). See
generally Seth F. Kreimer, The Pennsylvania Constitution’s Protection of Free Expression,
5 J. CONST. L. 12 (2002).
89. See discussion of equality provisions infra Section III.B.2.
90. Those, like the author, for whom geometry is a somewhat distant memory can
refresh their recollections regarding lines that are neither parallel nor intersecting at Skew
Lines, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Skew_lines (last visited Dec. 30, 2018).
91. PA. CONST. art. III, § 3; PA. CONST. of 1874, art. III, § 3; PA. CONST. of 1838, art. XI
§ 1, amended by 1864 Pa. Laws 1054.
92. PA. CONST. art. V, § 10.
93. PA. CONST. of 1968, art. I, § 27 (1971).
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Chart 5: Judicial Review by Provision Type—All Action
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Chart 6: Judicial Review by Provision Type—Statutes
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A. Parallel Provisions
Parallel provisions accounted for almost half (47%) of the cases
construing the 1968 Constitution, but only 31% of cases which find
violations of state but not federal constitutions. Over half (54%) of the
cases involving these provisions also find federal violations. Parallel
provision cases are concentrated in judicial control of the criminal justice
system: criminal trials and searches. They involve only a handful of
provisions of the Declaration of Rights.94
Invocations of parallel provisions comprise all but two of the 147
cases involving criminal process, but account for only 20% of the cases in
which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court confronts the legislature by
exercising judicial review over statutes.

94. PA. CONST. art. I, § 8 (search and seizure); id. art. I, § 9 (rights of accused); id. art.
I, § 10 (double jeopardy and taking); id. art. I, § 13 (cruel punishments); id. art. I, § 17 (ex
post facto and impairment of contracts).
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Table 7: Constitutional Review Under Parallel Provisions
Criminal Process Art. I, §§ 8, 9, 10
Cruel Punishment Art. I, § 13
Taking Art. I, § 10
Impairment of Contracts Art. I, § 17
Ex Post Facto Art. I, § 17

145
10
8
7
4

Total

174

Table 8: Finding State but No Federal Violation Under
Parallel Provisions
Criminal Process
Art. I, § 8
Art. I, § 9
Art. I, § 10
Impairment of Contracts Art. I, § 17
Taking Art. I, § 10
Cruel Punishment Art. I, § 13
Total

62
31
29
2
6
5
5
78

Table 9: Statutory Review Under Parallel Provisions
Criminal Process
Art. I, § 8
Art. I, § 9
Art. I, § 10
Impairment of Contracts Art. I, § 17
Ex Post Facto Art. I, § 17
Taking Art. I, § 10
Cruel Punishment Art. I, § 13
Total

11
5
5
1
7
4
3
2
27
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The canonical modern codification of the “factors to be briefed and
analyzed by litigants in each case hereafter implicating a provision of the
Pennsylvania constitution” was set forth by Justice Cappy in
Commonwealth v. Edmunds, a case explicating the Pennsylvania Court’s
divergence from federal jurisprudence in the constitutional adjudication
of searches and seizures:
The recent focus on the “New Federalism” has emphasized the
importance of state constitutions with respect to individual rights
and criminal procedure. . . . [I]t is important that litigants brief
and analyze at least the following four factors:
1) text of the Pennsylvania constitutional provision;
2) history of the provision, including Pennsylvania case-law;
3) related case-law from other states;
4) policy considerations, including unique issues of state and
local concern, and applicability within modern Pennsylvania
jurisprudence.95
While the application of Edmunds has regularly occasioned debate
on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the practice of looking to the
Edmunds factors in criminal procedure cases involving parallel state
constitutional provisions has become deeply entrenched.96 And, as Chief
Justice Saylor has observed, in crafting state prophylactic rules for
governance of the criminal process that may diverge from federal
doctrine, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court can draw on the explicit
authority given to that court by the 1968 Constitution to establish rules
for the governance of the judicial system.97
95. 586 A.2d 887, 895 (Pa. 1991). The Edmunds Court applied the four factors and
concluded that “a ‘good faith’ exception to the exclusionary rule would frustrate the
guarantees embodied in Article I, Section 8 of our Commonwealth’s constitution.” Id.; cf. id.
at 898 (“During the first decade after Mapp, our decisions in Pennsylvania tended to
parallel the cases interpreting the 4th Amendment. However, beginning in 1973, our
case-law began to reflect a clear divergence from federal precedent. . . . [T]his Court began
to forge its own path under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, declaring
with increasing frequency that Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution
embodied a strong notion of privacy, notwithstanding federal cases to the contrary.”).
96. A LEXIS search of Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases reveals fifty-four references
to Edmunds and article I, section 8; fourteen references to Edmunds and article I, section
9; and nine references to Edmunds and article I, section 10. For an enumeration of criminal
procedure cases involving independent constitutional interpretation, see infra App. C.
97. Saylor, supra note 4, at 284, 309 (citing PA. CONST. art. V, § 10).
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Competent attorneys who practice criminal law in the Pennsylvania
courts are well aware of the potential to argue for variant readings of
identical constitutional language. As a result, they raise the arguments;
in response the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has elaborated an
extensive fabric of Pennsylvania case law interpreting protections
regarding searches, seizures, and criminal trials. The Pennsylvania
justices are equally aware of the potential to push evolution of federal
interpretation while holding the possibility of independent interpretation
as a backup.98
B. Congruent Provisions
Congruent provisions embody norms analogous to those found in
federal constitutional law but diverge from the text of the federal models.
Claims brought under these provisions account for 105 (28%) of the 373
cases exercising review over government actions under the 1968
Constitution, and 84 (33%) of the 253 cases which find violations of state
but not federal constitutional provisions. They constitute 54 (39%) of the
138 cases exercising judicial review over statutes. The most prevalent
grounds for judicial review in this group involve article I, section 1’s
protection of “inherent and indefeasible rights” (41 cases) and cases
under Pennsylvania’s constitutional variant equality protections,
embodied in the mandates of tax uniformity, the equal rights
amendment, and the prohibitions on special legislation and
discrimination (47 cases).99
98. E.g., Commonwealth v. Fulton, 179 A.3d 475, 479 & n.3 (Pa. 2018) (granting relief
for opening cell phone under emerging federal constitutional analysis, but noting “[b]ecause
of the manner by which we decide this case, we need not address Fulton’s claim under
Article I, Section 8.”); cf. Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189, 1193, 1223 (Pa. 2017)
(finding federal violation, then performing an Edmunds analysis to find the state ex post
facto clause affords greater protections than its federal counterpart, and that SORNA’s
registration provisions (Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act) constituted
punishment and violated both federal and state ex post facto clauses); Kuren v. Luzerne
Cty., 146 A.3d 715, 751 (Pa. 2016) (upholding cause of action for constitutionally inadequate
funding under Federal Constitution, but finding a potential violation of article I, section 9
nonetheless); id. at 732 n.6 (“We do not provide a separate discussion of the right to counsel
enshrined in Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. It is now well-settled
that the right to counsel recognized in Article I, Section 9 and in the Sixth Amendment of
the United States Constitution are jurisprudentially coextensive.”).
99. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in earlier decades pushed beyond the federal
floor in protecting rights of free expression. See, e.g., DePaul v. Commonwealth, 969 A.2d
536, 546 (Pa. 2009) (protecting political contributions: “This Court has found that Article I,
Section 7 provides broader protections of expression than the related First Amendment
guarantee in a number of different contexts. See [Pap’s A.M. v. City of Erie, 571 Pa. 375,
408–11, 812 A.2d 591, 611–12 (2002)] (nude dancing entitled to greater protection under
Pennsylvania Constitution); Commonwealth, Bureau of Prof’l & Occupational Affairs v.
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Table 10: Constitutional Review Under Congruent
Provisions
Substantive Limits on Undue Oppression Art I, §1
Tax Uniformity Art. VIII, § 1
ERA Art. I, § 28
Equal Treatment Art. III, § 32, Art. I, § 26
Reputation and Privacy Art. I, § 1
Freedom of Expression Art. I, § 7
Jury Trial Art. I, § 6
Procedural Limits Art. I, § 1
Religious Freedom Art. I, § 3
Criminal Process Art. I, § 14
Total

24
20
14
13
12
8
5
5
2
2
105

State Bd. of Physical Therapy, 556 Pa. 268, 728 A.2d 340, 343–44 (1999) (commercial speech
in form of advertising by chiropractors entitled to greater protection so long as not
misleading); Ins. Adjustment Bureau v. Ins. Comm’r, 518 Pa. 210, 542 A.2d 1317, 1324
(1988) (Article I, Section 7 does not allow prior restraint or other restriction of commercial
speech by governmental agency where legitimate, important interests of government may
be accomplished in less intrusive manner); Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158, 432 A.2d
1382, 1391 (1981) ([enforcement of private prohibition of political leafleting on college
campus violated Article I, Section 7 where First Amendment posed no bar]); Goldman
Theatres v. Dana, 405 Pa. 83, 173 A.2d 59, 64 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 897, 82 S.Ct.
174, 7 L.Ed.2d 93 (1961) (statute providing for censorship of motion pictures, while not
necessarily violative of First Amendment, violates Article I, Section 7).”).
But it seems unlikely in the near future that the Pennsylvania justices will exceed
the speech-protective enthusiasm of the current majority of the United States Supreme
Court. Cf. e.g., Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501 (2018) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (“The majority overthrows a decision entrenched in this Nation’s law—and in
its economic life—for over 40 years. . . . by weaponizing the First Amendment, in a way that
unleashes judges, now and in the future, to intervene in economic and regulatory policy.”);
Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2382 (2018) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“In the name of the First Amendment, the majority today treads into territory
where the pre-New Deal, as well as the post-New Deal, Court refused to go.”).
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Table 11: Finding State but No Federal Violation Under
Congruent Provisions

Substantive Limits on Undue Oppression Art. I, § 1
Tax Uniformity Art. VIII, § 1
ERA Art. I, § 28
Reputation and Privacy Art. I, § 1
Equal Treatment Art. III, § 32
Jury Trial Art. I, § 6
Freedom of Expression Art. I, § 7
Religious Freedom Art. I, § 3
Procedural Limits Art. I, § 1
Criminal Process Art. I, § 14
Total

22
17
12
11
7
5
4
2
2
2
84

Table 12: Statutory Review Under Congruent Provisions
Equal Treatment Art. III, § 32, Art. I, § 26
ERA Art. I, § 28
Tax Uniformity Art. VIII, § 1
Reputation and Privacy Art. I, § 1
Substantive Limits on Undue Oppression Art. I, § 1
Freedom of Expression Art. I, § 7
Jury Trial Art. I, § 6
Religious Freedom Art. I, § 3
Total

12
10
9
8
7
4
3
1
54
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1. Article I, Section 1: Liberty, Property, Reputation, and “Due
Process” Without Benefit of Text
a. Procedure Without Due Process
Since 1776, the Pennsylvania Constitution has recognized the
“inherent” rights of “life,” “liberty” and “property”; a protection for
“reputation” dates from 1790.100 Unlike the Federal Constitution, the text
of the Pennsylvania Constitution contains no generally applicable
procedural guaranties; the words “due process of law” are entirely absent.
Yet by the middle of the nineteenth century, well before adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court extended
constitutionally based procedural protections against State action,
declaring:
The whole clauses in our constitutions on the subject were
established for the protection of personal safety and private
property. These clauses address themselves to the common sense
of the people, and ought not to be filed away by legal subtleties.
They have their foundations in natural justice, and, without their
pervading efficacy, other rights would be useless. . . . The great
principle is, that a man’s property is his own, and that he shall
enjoy it according to his pleasure (injuring no other man) until it
is proved in a due process of law that it is not his, but belongs to
another.101

100. See PA. CONST. of 1776, art. I, § 1 (“That all men are born equally free and
independent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are,
the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property,
and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.”); PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 1 (“That
all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible
rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness.”).
101. Ervine’s Appeal, 16 Pa. 256, 263–64 (1851). At some points, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court rooted protections in the “law of the land” provision (originating in PA.
CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 9), eliding its textual limitation to “criminal prosecutions.” See,
e.g., Palairet’s Appeal, 67 Pa. 479, 485 (1871) (“If, however, an Act of Assembly . . . operates
retroactively to take what is, by existing law, the property of one man, and, without his
consent, transfer it to another, with or without compensation, it is in violation of that clause
in the Bill of Rights, Const., Art. IX., sect. 9, which declares that no man ‘can be deprived
of his life, liberty or property, unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land.’ If
this is true of a person accused of crime, to whom literally the words are applied, à fortiori
is it so as to one against whom no accusation is made.”); Craig v. Kline, 65 Pa. 399, 413
(1870) (“If . . . a forfeiture can take place without notice . . . and without an opportunity of
being heard . . . then it seems to us to be contrary to the provision in the bill of rights, that
no one shall be deprived of his property unless by the judgment of his peers, or the law of
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Under the 1968 Constitution, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
imposed procedural protections that exceed the floor laid by
contemporary U.S. Supreme Court doctrine, though it has provided no
comprehensive account of the means of discerning the parameters of
these protections.102
b. “Inherent and Indefeasible Rights”: “Acquiring, Possessing
and Protecting Property”
Pennsylvania’s recognition of “inherent and indefeasible rights,
among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of
acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of
the land. The law of the land means by due process of law . . . . The design of the
Convention . . . was to exclude arbitrary power from every branch of the government . . . .”);
City of Philadelphia v. Scott, 81 Pa. 80, 90 (1876) (finding that statute “does not furnish
due process of law, within the protection of the 9th section of the Declaration of Rights . . . .
[T]he law must furnish some just form or mode, in which the duty of the citizen shall be
determined before he can be visited with a penalty for non-performance of the alleged
duty.”).
Current doctrine limits “law of the land” protection under section 9 to criminal
prosecutions in accordance with its text. See R. v. Commonwealth, 636 A.2d 142, 146 (Pa.
1994) (“Section 9 of Article I . . . . is explicitly addressed to ‘criminal prosecutions.’ However,
R. was not criminally prosecuted . . . .”); id. at 152 n.10 (“[I]ts guarantees only apply to
criminal proceedings.”). Modern decisions discern Pennsylvania’s general procedural
protections in the “emanations” of article I, section 1. See id. at 152 (“Even though the term
‘due process’ appears nowhere in those sections, due process rights are considered to
emanate from [article I, section 1].”); Pa. Game Comm’n v. Marich, 666 A.2d 253, 255 n.4
(1995) (“Due process rights emanate from Article I, Section I of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.”); cf. Lyness v. Commonwealth, 605 A.2d 1204, 1207 (1992) (“The guarantee
of due process of law, in Pennsylvania jurisprudence, emanates from a number of provisions
of the Declaration of Rights, particularly Article I, Sections 1, 9 and 11 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.”).
102. See Pittman v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 159 A.3d 466, 467–68, 474 (Pa. 2017)
(construing the Parole Code in light of the constitutional right to appeal from an
administrative agency granted in article V, section 9 to require that the Parole Board must
“articulate the basis for its decision to grant or deny a [convicted parole violator] credit for
time served at liberty on parole”); In re J.B., 107 A.3d 1, 12, 16 n.26, 19–20 (Pa. 2014) (“[T]he
Commonwealth fails to speak to the Pennsylvania Constitution’s inclusion of reputation as
an inherent right under Article I, Section[] 1 . . . . Given that juvenile offenders have a
protected right to reputation encroached by SORNA’s presumption of recidivism, where the
presumption is not universally true, and where there is a reasonable alternative means for
ascertaining the likelihood of recidivating, we hold that the application of SORNA’s current
lifetime registration requirements upon adjudication of specified offenses violates juvenile
offenders’ due process rights by utilizing an irrebuttable presumption.”); City
of Philadelphia v. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 5 (Breary), 985 A.2d 1259, 1262,
1270–71 (Pa. 2009) (holding that arbitrator’s unfair exclusion of critical evidence violated
Pennsylvania procedural rights); Lyness, 605 A.2d at 1209 (“What our Constitution
requires, however, is that if more than one function is reposed in a single administrative
entity, walls of division be constructed which eliminate the threat or appearance of bias.”).
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pursuing their own happiness”103 provides a stronger textual basis for
substantive protection of important interests than do the federal due
process clauses. By the middle of the nineteenth century, well before the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment applied federal protections of
liberty and property to the states, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had
interpreted the Pennsylvania Constitution to limit the substantive
authority of government to infringe on property and liberty rights. Some
opinions relied on the a fortiori argument from the criminal “law of the
land” clause to strike down interferences with vested property rights.104
Others looked to the implicit presuppositions of the constitution.105 And
others invoked the “inherent and indefeasible right” of “acquiring,
possessing and protecting property” as part of a constitutional tapestry
protecting property to strike down interventions judged excessive or
tyrannical.106
103. PA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
104. E.g., Reiser v. William Tell Sav. Fund Ass’n, 39 Pa. 137, 145–46 (1861) (relying on
“law of the land” provision to hold retroactive removal of usury prohibition unconstitutional,
noting that “[t]his section of the Bill of Rights is violated when civil and criminal rights are
not both alike tried by due course of law”); Menges v. Dentler, 33 Pa. 495, 497 (1859) (statute
validating sheriff’s sale held unconstitutional) (“The bill of rights, §§ 9, 11, declares that no
man shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, unless by the judgment of his peers, or
the law of the land: and that the courts shall be always open to every man, so as to afford
remedy by due course of law for all invasions of rights . . . . [T]hey most plainly forbid both
the act and the decision.”); Shoenberger v. Sch. Dirs., 32 Pa. 34, 39 (1858) (invalidating
statute appointing trustees to dispose of property under named will, declaring that “if the
property of a citizen who had forfeited the protection of society, could not be taken from him
except in due course of law, much less could theirs, for their claims to protection had never
been forfeited or impaired”); Brown v. Hummel, 6 Pa. 86, 91 (1847) (holding that legislative
interference with execution of will was unconstitutional: “the talismanic words, I am a
citizen of Pennsylvania, secures to the individual his private rights, unless they are taken
from him by a trial, where he has an opportunity of being heard by himself, his counsel,
and his testimony, more majorum, according to the laws and customs of our fathers, and
the securities and safeguards of the constitution”); Norman v. Heist, 5 Watts & Serg. 171,
173 (Pa. 1843) (noting in dictum that a statute allowing illegitimate child to inherit would
be a violation of the “law of the land” clause if applied retrospectively).
105. See McCabe v. Emerson, 18 Pa. 111, 112–13 (1851) (“I have no hesitation in saying
that the Act [overturning final judgment for plaintiff] is unconstitutional and void. The
legislature have no power, as has been repeatedly held, to interfere with vested rights. To
give the property of A. to B. is clearly beyond legislative authority. . . . There is no limit to
successful usurpation. Everything will depend on the will of an irresponsible majority.”).
106. In re Wash. Ave., 69 Pa. 352, 363–64 (1871) (emphasis omitted) (invalidating tax
on street-front property to finance improvements for the benefit of the public).
When, therefore, the Constitution declares in the ninth article, that among the
inherent and indefeasible rights of men is that of acquiring, possessing and
protecting property,—that the people shall be secure in their possessions, from
unreasonable seizures,—that no one can be deprived of his property unless by the
judgment of his peers, or the law of the land—that no man’s property shall be taken
or applied to public use without just compensation being made—that every man
for an injury to his lands or goods shall have remedy by due course of law, and right
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After adoption of the 1874 Constitution, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court continued to monitor legislative interferences with property and
extended its remit to protect freedom of contract as an “inherent and
indefeasible right.” Thus, in striking down a statutory imposition of a
mechanic’s lien, the court declared:
The legislature has all power not withheld from it by the people
in their fundamental law. Article 1, § 1, of the constitution
declares that: “All men are born equally free and independent
and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which
are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, or acquiring,
possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of
pursuing their own happiness.” Life, liberty, and property are put
upon the same plane, and an indefeasible right to the enjoyment
of the first two, and to the acquirement and possession of the
third, are placed beyond the power of any department of the
government. . . . “The privilege of contracting is both a liberty and
a property right” . . . .
....
. . . If there be such power in the legislature as is assumed in
the second section of this act, then every business relation
between any two persons may be declared that of principal and
agent, with unlimited authority in the agent to contract debts
which shall bind the property of the principal, in the face of
positive agreement to the contrary. Such interference with the
indefeasible rights of freedom of contract, in the acquisition and
and justice administered without sale, denial or delay—and that no law impairing
contracts shall be made—and when the people, to guard against transgressions of
the high powers delegated by them, declared that these rights are excepted out of
the general powers of government, and shall for ever remain inviolate, they, for
their own safety, stamped upon the right of private property, an inviolability which
cannot be frittered away by verbal criticism on each separate clause, nor the united
fagot broken, stick by stick, until all its strength is gone.
....
. . . Like the rain [taxation] may fall upon the people in districts and by turns,
but still it must be public in its purpose, and reasonably just and equal in its
distribution, and cannot sacrifice individual right by a palpably unjust exaction.
....
. . . [I]t becomes the judiciary to stand firmly by the fundamental law, in
defence [sic] of those general, great, and essential principles of liberty and free
government, for the establishment and perpetuation of which the Constitution
itself was ordained.
Id. at 363–64 (emphasis omitted).
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protection of property, the people have plainly reserved from
legislative power.107
During the Lochner era, limits imposed by federal and Pennsylvania
constitutional constraints on government interferences with rights of
property and contract ran along similar lines. With the New Deal
Revolution, however, the United States Supreme Court receded from
efforts to monitor legislative oppressive adjustments of economic rights
and opportunities under the rubric of substantive due process.108 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court was less emphatic in abandoning the field
under article I, section 1.109
Under the Constitution of 1968, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has continued to deploy constitutional protections of property to
invalidate zoning ordinances determined to be exclusionary110 or
107. Waters v. Wolf, 29 A. 646, 651, 653 (Pa. 1894); see also McMaster v. W. Chester
State Normal Sch., 29 A. 734, 735 (Pa. 1894) (statute invalidating waiver of mechanic’s lien
is unconstitutional); Godcharles v. Wigeman, 6 A. 354, 356 (Pa. 1886) (invalidating statute
forbidding payment of employees in goods, sections of the act are “utterly unconstitutional
and void, inasmuch as by them an attempt has been made by the legislature to do what, in
this country, cannot be done; that is, prevent persons who are sui juris from making their
own contracts. . . . subversive of his rights as a citizen of the United States. He may sell his
labor for what he thinks best, whether money or goods, just as his employer may sell his
iron or coal; and any and every law that proposes to prevent him from so doing is an
infringement of his constitutional privileges, and consequently vicious and void.”).
108. The classic progression runs from West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379,
411–13 (1937), through United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938), to
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
The United States Supreme Court reentered the field of reviewing commercial
regulations under the rubric of the First Amendment in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809
(1975) and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 770–71 (1976). In recent Terms, it seems to be widening its scope of intervention.
E.g., Janus v. American Fed’n of State, Cty., and Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2459–60 (2018); Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361,
2376–78 (2018); Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1146–47
(2017).
109. See Pa. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 272 A.2d 487, 490–91 (Pa. 1971) (“We have
held unconstitutional . . . an act regulating car rental agencies as a public utility . . . an act
forbidding gasoline stations from displaying price signs in excess of a certain prescribed
size, an act forbidding the sale of carbonated beverages made with sucaryl, an act forbidding
the sale of ice-milk milk shakes, and an act forbidding nonsigners from selling fair traded
items below the price specified in price maintenance contracts.” (citations omitted)); see also
Willcox v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 55 A.2d 521, 531 (Pa. 1947) (declaring Community
Property Act unconstitutional).
110. See C & M Developers, Inc. v. Bedminster Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 820 A.2d 143,
158–59 (Pa. 2002) (one-acre minimum lot size); In re Appeal of Shore, 573 A.2d 1011,
1012–13 (Pa. 1990) (prohibition of the development of mobile home parks); Geiger v. Zoning
Hearing Bd., 507 A.2d 361, 365 (Pa. 1986) (mobile homes); Fernley v. Bd. of Supervisors,
502 A.2d 585, 588 (Pa. 1985) (prohibition of multi-family dwellings); Hopewell Twp. Bd. of
Supervisors v. Golla, 452 A.2d 1337, 1344 (Pa. 1982) (regulatory differences between large
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arbitrarily oppressive.111 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has retained
a distinctive doctrinal framework under article I, section 1 that diverged
from the Federal Substantive Due Process doctrine with respect to other
regulation. In 1971, three years after adoption of the Constitution of
1968, Justice Roberts, writing to invalidate a ban on drug store
advertising prices as lacking legitimate justification, explicitly rejected
emerging federal standards of review.112 Instead, he read the
Pennsylvania constitutional principles to prohibit interferences which
were “unreasonable, unduly oppressive or patently beyond the
necessities of the case” and to require that “the means which it employs
must have a real and substantial relation to the objects sought to be
attained.”113 More recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated
a lifetime ban on ex-offenders’ employment in the nursing home industry
as unreasonable and unduly oppressive.114 The court has reiterated that
and small tracts of farmland); Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 382 A.2d 105, 111–12 (Pa.
1977) (exclusion of multi-family dwellings); Willistown Township v. Chesterdale Farms,
Inc., 341 A.2d 466, 468–69 (Pa. 1975) (exclusionary limitation of apartment construction );
Appeal of Girsh, 263 A.2d 395, 397 (Pa. 1970) (exclusionary limitation of apartment
construction); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 268 A.2d 765, 765–66 (Pa. 1970) (two acre
minimum), abrogated by C & M Developers, Inc. v. Bedminster Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd.,
820 A.2d 143 (Pa. 2002); cf. In re Realen Valley Forge Greenes Assocs., 838 A.2d 718,
737–38 (Pa. 2003) (Saylor, J., dissenting) (noting the “difficult, but I believe necessary, task
of weighing public and private interests necessary under the Due Process Clause, which,
despite the United States Supreme Court’s approach, remains this Court’s preferred
method of assessing validity challenges in the land use arena,” but expressing concern that
“if courts are to maintain legitimacy in the application of substantive due process in
considering government regulation, they must begin with a healthy respect for legislative,
social policy judgments”).
111. See Township of Exeter v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 962 A.2d 653, 655 (Pa. 2009)
(overturning a zoning ordinance that prohibited signs from exceeding twenty-five square
feet); In re Realen Valley Forge Greenes Assocs., 838 A.2d at 721 (“reverse spot zoning”);
Mahoney v. Township of Hampton, 651 A.2d 525, 528 (Pa. 1994) (overturning a township
ordinance that prohibited private enterprise from operating gas wells in residential
districts but permitting public operation of wells as unreasonable); Pa. Nw. Distribs., Inc.
v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 584 A.2d 1372, 1378 (Pa. 1991) (overturning a zoning ordinance
which amortized an adult book store’s pre-existing, lawful, non-conforming use); Council of
Middletown Twp. v. Benham, 523 A.2d 311, 317 (Pa. 1987) (finding that, if there is a
municipal limitation on non-public sewer systems, it must be reasonable); Beaver Gasoline
Co. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 285 A.2d 501, 505 (Pa. 1971) (overturning a total ban on gas
stations if the regulation bears no relationship to the public health, safety, morals, and
general welfare).
112. Pa. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 272 A.2d at 490–91.
113. Id. at 491 (quoting Gambone v. Commonwealth, 101 A.2d 634, 637 (Pa. 1954)).
Ironically, the Supreme Court of the United States came to similar conclusions regarding
pharmacy advertising five years later under the renovated Commercial Speech doctrine of
the First Amendment. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.
114. Nixon v. Commonwealth, 839 A.2d 277, 288, 290 (Pa. 2003) (violation of article I,
section 1 “right to pursue a lawful occupation”); see also Sec’y of Revenue v. John’s Vending
Corp., 309 A.2d 358, 362 (Pa. 1973) (“To interpret Section 403(2) as a blanket prohibition
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Pennsylvania’s constitutional standards for “reasonable” regulation
reach higher than the deeply permissive or nonexistent federal floor,115
though it continues to extend substantial deference to commercial
regulation.116
c.

“Defending . . . liberty . . . protecting . . . reputation, and of
pursuing their own happiness”

In the last half century, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
deployed judicial review to forge lines of substantive protection for
non-economic interests under article I, section 1 that reach more broadly
than their federal counterparts.
One line has highlighted the distinctive presence in the Pennsylvania
Declaration of Rights of the “inherent and indefeasible” interest in
“reputation” added by the 1790 revision. Federal due process doctrine
does not recognize impingements on reputation as deprivations of
barring anyone who has been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude without regard to the
remoteness of those convictions or the individual’s subsequent performance would be
unreasonable. We cannot assume that the legislature intended such an absurd and harsh
result.”).
115. See Shoul v. Commonwealth, 173 A.3d 669, 677–78 (Pa. 2017) (“This Court, by
contrast, applies what we have deemed a ‘more restrictive’ test. . . . we must assess whether
the challenged law has ‘a real and substantial relation’ to the public interests it seeks to
advance, and is neither patently oppressive nor unnecessary to these ends.”); id. at 681
(“[A]s Chief Justice Castille explained [concurring] in Nixon, a law which fails to account
for persons’ inherent potential for rehabilitation may well be ‘unreasonable,’ ‘unduly
oppressive,’ or ‘patently beyond the necessities of’ its regulatory aims.” (quoting Nixon, 839
A.2d at 287 n.15)). But cf. id. at 690–93 (Wecht, J., concurring) (“Oddly enough, as the
federal courts evolved toward a ‘rational relationship’ standard, this Court nonetheless has
persisted in employing the language of Gambone to superintend legislation . . . . The
Gambone/Nixon standard validates and encourages judicial overstepping . . . . It is time to
cease adherence to the outdated and overbroad language of Gambone in applying the
rational basis test in Pennsylvania.”).
116. See, e.g., id. at 672 (majority opinion) (finding lifetime disqualification from
commercial driver’s license of license holder who retrieved marijuana from a co-worker and
delivered it to a state police informant did not violate article I, section 1, but remanding for
evaluation under the Cruel Punishment Clause); Driscoll v. Corbett, 69 A.3d 197, 214–15
(Pa. 2013) (upholding mandatory judicial retirement); Khan v. State Bd. of Auctioneer
Exam’rs, 842 A.2d 936, 951–52 (Pa. 2004) (affirming reciprocal discipline of auctioneer).
The commonwealth court in recent years has likewise been restrained but not
supine. Compare E. Coast Vapor v. Pa. Dep’t of Revenue, 189 A.3d 504, 520–21 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2018) (rejecting substantive due process challenge to tax on e-cigarettes), and
Ladd v. Real Estate Comm’n, 187 A.3d 1070, 1077 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2018) (rejecting
challenge to real estate licensing regime), with Megraw v. Sch. Dist. of Cheltenham Twp.,
No. 577 C.D. 2017, 2018 WL 2012130, at *10 (Pa. Commw. Ct. May 1, 2018) (invalidating
ten-year employment disqualification of groundskeeper for providing false information
while attempting to purchase a firearm), and Peake v. Commonwealth, 132 A.3d 506, 522
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015) (invalidating lifetime ban of employment of ex-offenders).
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constitutionally protected liberty.117 By contrast, in the past half century
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has found constitutional violations
of the article I, section 1 right of “acquiring, possessing and
protecting . . . reputation” when government imposes official stigma118
and has construed statutes narrowly to avoid undue impingement on
interests in reputation.119
While the right to informational privacy holds a less than fully secure
position in federal due process doctrine,120 a second robust line of
Pennsylvania case law in the last half century reads article I, section 1
in conjunction with the fabric of the Pennsylvania Constitution to
establish substantive constitutional protection of informational privacy

117. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 706, 708–09 (1976) (a government act of defamation
does not deprive a person “of any ‘liberty’ protected by the procedural guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment;” stigma, standing alone, does not “significantly alte[r]” a person’s
legal status so as to “justif[y] the invocation of procedural safeguards.”).
118. See In re Fortieth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 197 A.3d 712, 715 (Pa. 2018)
(ordering redaction of references in grand jury report to priests who had not received
opportunity to rebut findings that they were predators because “as with all legal
proceedings which affect fundamental individual rights, the judicial branch serves a critical
role in guarding against unjustified diminution of due process protections for individuals
whose right of reputation might be impugned”); In re Fortieth Statewide Investigating
Grand Jury, 190 A.3d 560, 573 (Pa. 2018) (emphasis omitted) (ordering temporary redaction
of grand jury report: “The Pennsylvania Constitution ‘places reputational interests on the
highest plane, that is, on the same level as those pertaining to life, liberty, and property’”
(emphasis omitted)); In re J.B., 107 A.3d 1, 19 (Pa. 2014) (determining that the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act lifetime registration provision as applied to juvenile
offenders is an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption, highlighting the right to
reputation under article 1 section 1); Carlacci v. Mazaleski, 798 A.2d 186, 190 (Pa. 2002)
(“[T]here exists a right to petition for expungement of a PFAA record where the petitioner
seeks to protect his reputation. This right is an adjunct of due process and Article I, Section
1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and is not dependent upon express statutory
authority.”); Wolfe v. Beal, 384 A.2d 1187, 1189 (Pa. 1978) (holding that a person who has
been unlawfully committed to a state mental hospital has an article I, section 1 right to the
destruction of hospital records, which were created as a result of the illegal commitment).
119. See A.Y. v. Commonwealth, 641 A.2d 1148, 1152–53 (Pa. 1994) (requiring more than
hearsay evidence to prevent expungement of uncorroborated reports of child abuse);
Sprague v. Walter, 543 A.2d 1078, 1084–85 (Pa. 1988) (reading Shield Law privilege
narrowly to avoid conflict with article I, section 1); Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broad. Co.,
532 A.2d 346, 351 (Pa. 1987) (construing Pennsylvania Shield Law narrowly in light of
interest in reputation).
120. Compare NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 147 (2011) (“As was our approach in
Whalen, we will assume for present purposes that the Government’s challenged inquiries
implicate a privacy interest of constitutional significance.”), with id. at 160 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“A federal constitutional right to ‘informational privacy’ does
not exist. . . . I must observe a remarkable and telling fact about this case, unique in my
tenure on this Court: Respondents’ brief, in arguing that the Federal Government violated
the Constitution, does not once identify which provision of the Constitution that might be.”).
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rights beyond the limits on search and seizure.121 Under the 1968
Constitution, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has vindicated the article
I right to informational privacy both by invalidating infringing actions122
and by reading statutes to incorporate appropriately weighty
consideration of privacy interests under the Pennsylvania
Constitution.123
121. See, e.g., Pa. State Educ. Ass’n v. Commonwealth, 148 A.3d 142, 150 (Pa. 2016) (“In
identifying rights to informational privacy under the Pennsylvania Constitution, this Court
has focused its attention not on the rights of persons accused as set forth in Article 1, section
8, but rather to the broader array of rights granted to citizens under Article 1, Section 1,
which is entitled ‘Inherent rights of mankind.’”); In re “B”, 394 A.2d 419, 424–25 (Pa. 1978)
(“The parties in this appeal have not cited, and our research has not revealed, any
Pennsylvania appellate court decision dealing explicitly with this constitutional right of
privacy. . . . the patient’s right to prevent disclosure of such information is constitutionally
based. This constitutional foundation emanates from the penumbras of the various
guarantees of the Bill of Rights as well as from the guarantees of the Constitution of this
Commonwealth, see especially, Article I, Section 1 (inherent right to enjoy and defend life
and liberty, to protect reputation and pursue happiness[)]; Article I, Section 2 (all political
power is inherent in the people[)]; Article I, Sections 3 and 4 (people’s right to freedom of
religion); Article I, Section 7 (freedom of press and speech guaranteed to every citizen so
that they may speak, write, or print freely on any subject . . . .); Article I, Section 8 (people
shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions from unreasonable search
and seizures); Article I, Section 9 (an accused in a criminal proceeding cannot be compelled
to give evidence against himself); Article I, Section 11 (courts are to be open to all to provide
remedy for injury done to reputation); Article I, Section 20 (right of assembly); Article I,
Section 23 (prohibition of the peacetime quartering of troops in any house without the
consent of the owner); and Article I, Section 25 (reservation of powers in the people); and
Article I, Section 26 (prohibition against the denial by the Commonwealth of the enjoyment
of any civil right). In some respects these state constitutional rights parallel those of the
Federal Constitution . . . . In other respects our Constitution provides more rigorous and
explicit protection for a person’s right of privacy.” (citations omitted)); see also Seth F.
Kreimer, The Right to Privacy in the Pennsylvania Constitution, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 77,
83 (1993) (“Pennsylvania’s courts have relied on the insights under one constitutional
provision to give texture to cognate rights.”); cf. Movieclips, The Castle (9/12) Movie Clip–
The Vibe of the Thing, YOUTUBE (Oct. 6, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=ssukL9a99JA.
122. Denoncourt v. Commonwealth, 470 A.2d 945, 950 (Pa. 1983) (plurality opinion)
(declaring the reporting provisions of the Ethics Act relating to family members
unconstitutional “in that they violate the due process rights of the public official and the
family’s right to privacy under Art. I § 1”); In re “B”, 394 A.2d at 425–26 (barring subpoena
of disclosure of records of inpatient psychiatric treatment of juvenile’s mother); cf.
Markham v. Wolf, 190 A.3d 1175, 1190 (Pa. 2018) (remanding for determination of whether
governor’s order accorded sufficient protection to “strong privacy interests protecting home
addresses”); Fischer v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 502 A.2d 114, 117, 117 n.8 (Pa. 1985) (“The
court did however affirm Judge MacPhail’s conclusion that the rape and incest reporting
provisions offended constitutional safeguards, and the Commonwealth was permanently
enjoined from enforcing them. . . . We note that the Commonwealth chose not to appeal this
aspect of the Commonwealth Court’s decision.”).
123. See Reese v. Pennsylvanians for Union Reform, 173 A.3d 1143, 1159 (Pa. 2017)
(reading Right to Know Law (“RTKL”) in light of article I to require State Treasurer to
balance public access rights against “right to informational privacy”); Pa. State Educ. Ass’n
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A third strand of doctrine has vindicated Pennsylvania constitutional
limits on the government’s authority to infringe on matters of intimacy
and bodily integrity, rooted in “inherent and indefeasible rights” more
protective than those recognized by the United States Supreme Court
under contemporaneous federal law.124 Strikingly, at a time when the
same sex intimacy was entirely bereft of federal protection, a plurality
opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down a statute
prohibiting “deviate sexual intercourse” as an unconstitutional
infringement on liberty.125 And well before the United States Supreme
Court had reversed its refusal to recognize equal rights for same sex
couples, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court construed Pennsylvania
statutes in the shadow of article I, section 1 to facilitate second parent
adoption.126 In the last decade, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not
had occasion to forge ahead of the protections increasingly recognized by
the federal courts in this area.

v. Commonwealth, 148 A.3d 142, 156 (Pa. 2016) (finding that school employees’ home
addresses were exempt from disclosure under the RTKL); Tribune-Review Publ’g Co. v.
Bodack, 961 A.2d 110, 118 (Pa. 2008) (construing RTKL to protect phone numbers for
disclosure); Sapp Roofing Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, Local Union No. 12, 713
A.2d 627, 630 (Pa. 1998) (construing RTKL to require redaction of personal information).
124. See In re T.R., 731 A.2d 1276, 1281 (Pa. 1999) (“Compelling a psychological
examination in [juvenile dependency dispositional review] is nothing more or less than
social engineering in derogation of constitutional rights . . . . [W]e find such state
intervention frightening in its Orwellian aspect.”); John M. v. Paula T., 571 A.2d 1380,
1385, 1388 (Pa. 1990) (refusing to allow court-ordered blood tests); In re Baby Girl D., 517
A.2d 925, 927 (Pa. 1986) (construing guardian ad litem’s standing to question the propriety
of the fees charged for adoption to be grounded in the standing of the infant children
themselves because “it is every American’s right not to be bought or sold” pursuant to article
I, section 1).
125. Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), with Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 50 (Pa. 1980)
(Flaherty, J., writing for himself and Eagan, C.J.) (declaring statute forbidding “deviate
sexual intercourse” unconstitutional and arguing that “the police power should properly be
exercised to protect each individual’s right to be free from interference in defining and
pursuing his own morality but not to enforce a majority morality on persons whose conduct
does not harm others”). The majority of the Court in Bonadio invalidated the statute on
equal protection grounds. Id. (“Such a purpose [to regulate the private conduct of consenting
adults], we believe, exceeds the valid bounds of the police power while infringing the right
to equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and of
this Commonwealth.”).
126. Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“[The present case] does not
involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that
homosexual persons seek to enter.”), with In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1203
n.14 (Pa. 2002) (construing Adoption Act in light of article I, section 1 to find that the Act
allows same-sex second-parent adoptions without legal parent relinquishing parental
rights).
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2. Protecting Equality Without Equal Protection
The words “equal protection” do not appear in the Pennsylvania
Constitution. Rather, equality is addressed by a series of separate textual
elements that have accreted over two and a half centuries.
Since 1776, the Pennsylvania Constitution has declared that “all men
are born equally free and independent.”127 The 1790 Declaration of Rights
mandated “[t]hat elections shall be free and equal.”128 The Constitution
of 1874 adopted a prohibition against the adoption of “special law[s]” on
twenty-seven specified subjects, and a requirement that “taxes [and
duties] shall be uniform . . . and shall be levied and collected under
general laws.”129 The participants in the process that generated the
Constitution of 1968 considered adopting the “equal protection” language
of the Fourteenth Amendment, but that proposal fell by the wayside.130
The text that emerged broadened the prohibition of “special laws” to
apply to all legislation,131 retained the requirement of uniformity and
“general laws” for taxation,132 and adopted a prohibition of
“discriminat[ion] against any person in the exercise of any civil right.”133
In 1971, the Equal Rights Amendment prohibited denial of “[e]quality of
rights under the law . . . because of . . . sex.”134
A long line of discussion in opinions construing the 1968 Constitution
asserts that the standards for addressing unequal treatment under the
Pennsylvania Constitution mirror those of the Federal Equal Protection
Clause.135 But examining the holdings of Pennsylvania Supreme Court
127. PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. I, § 1; cf. id. ch. II, § 18 (“In order that the freemen of this
commonwealth may enjoy the benefit of election as equally as may be until the
representation shall commence, as directed in the foregoing section, each county at its own
choice may be divided into districts, hold elections therein . . . . And no inhabitant of this
state shall have more than one annual vote at the general election for representatives in
assembly.”).
128. PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 5.
129. PA. CONST. of 1874, art. III, § 7; id. art. IX, § 1. See generally Appeal of Ayars, 16 A.
356, 363 (Pa. 1889) (“[G]eneral laws . . . apply alike to all that are similarly situated as to
their peculiar necessities.”).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 52–53.
131. PA. CONST. art. III, § 32; see supra text accompanying notes 64–66.
132. PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
133. Id. art. I, § 26.
134. Id. art. I, § 28.
135. The first assertion under the 1968 Constitution appears to be Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad Co. v. Commonwealth, Department of Labor & Industry, 334 A.2d 636, 643 (Pa.
1975), where Justice Roberts states that “we must also consider appellees’ contentions
under the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution and article III, section 32 of
the Pennsylvania Constitution. These issues may be considered together, for the content of
the two provisions is not significantly different.” See also, e.g., City of Harrisburg v. Sch.
Dist. of Harrisburg, 710 A.2d 49, 52–53 (Pa. 1998) (“We evaluate challenges based on the
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cases reveals that the court has independently deployed Pennsylvania
equality review on a regular basis beyond the remit of federal equal
protection doctrine.136

uniformity and equal protection standards in the same manner.” (citing Leonard v.
Thornburgh, 489 A.2d 1349 (1985))); James v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 477 A.2d 1302, 1305
(Pa. 1984) (“James’ challenge . . . is also grounded on the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I, § 26 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. . . . The claims made under these separate constitutional
provisions are in essence the same.”); Commonwealth v. Kramer, 378 A.2d 824, 826 (Pa.
1977) (“[T]he protection afforded by the equal protection clause of the federal constitution
and the prohibition against special laws in the Pennsylvania Constitution are substantially
the same. The concept of equal protection requires that uniform treatment be given to
similarly situated parties.”).
For more recent echoes, see, e.g., Erfer v. Commonwealth, 794 A.2d 325, 332 (Pa.
2002) (“[T]o the extent that Petitioners’ gerrymandering claim is predicated on the equal
protection guarantee contained in Pa. Const. art. 1, §§ 1 and 26, this court has previously
determined that this right is coterminous with its federal counterpart. [W]e reject
Petitioners’ claim that the Pennsylvania Constitution’s free and equal elections clause
provides further protection to the right to vote than does the Equal Protection Clause.”
(citation omitted)), abrogated by League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737,
813 (Pa. 2018) (“[W]e reject Justice Mundy’s assertion that Erfer requires us, under the
principles of stare decisis, to utilize the same standard to adjudicate a claim of violation of
the Free and Equal Elections Clause and the federal Equal Protection Clause”); Kramer v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 883 A.2d 518, 532 (Pa. 2005) (“In evaluating equal protection
claims under the Pennsylvania Constitution, this Court has employed the same standards
applicable to federal equal protection claims.”); Harrisburg Sch. Dist. v. Zogby, 828 A.2d
1079, 1088 (Pa. 2003) (“[I]t is now generally accepted that the meaning and purpose of the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, and the state Constitution’s
prohibition against special laws, are sufficiently similar to warrant like treatment, and that
contentions concerning the two provisions may be reviewed simultaneously. In particular,
Article III, Section 32 and the Equal Protection Clause both reflect the principle that like
persons in like circumstances must be treated similarly.” (citations omitted)).
136. For citations, see infra App. C.
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Table 13: Independent Judicial Review Under Equality
Provisions
Tax Uniformity Art. VIII, § 1
Statute
Municipal Action
Administrative Action
ERA Art. I, § 28
Statute
Judicial Action
Equal Treatment Art. III, § 32
Statute
Municipal Action
Total

17
8
5
4
12
8
4
7
6
1
36

In each of these areas, the state constitutional text diverges from the
federal text, and was adopted in different time periods.137 And in each of
them, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has in fact exercised judicial
review under doctrinal analyses that are quite distinct from federal
standards.
a. Tax Uniformity
The independent nature of Pennsylvania review is clearest
with respect to the Tax Uniformity Clause. The 1873 Convention adopted
the provision to address the “considerable popular anger generated
by . . . preferential tax treatment . . . . This anger fueled the clamor for a
constitutional convention.”138 Before the 1967 Convention, the provision
was deployed to invalidate state taxation regimes that met federal

137. Of course, text and history have not been the sole axes around which federal “equal
protection” doctrine spins. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 774–75 (2013)
(relying on the “equal protection” component of the 1791 Due Process Clause to invalidate
refusal to recognize same sex marriages); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200,
237 (1995) (racial classification by the federal government held subject to strict scrutiny
under the Fifth Amendment, deploying tests developed under Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection doctrine notwithstanding the absence of “equal protection” language in the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, and its 1791 drafting and ratification by
slave-holders).
138. See Nextel Commc’ns of the Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 171 A.3d 682, 695
(Pa. 2017) (reviewing historical context of the uniformity clause).
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constitutional standards.139 Both the legislation authorizing and the
referendum question convening the Convention of 1967 explicitly
insulated the clause from possible revision,140 notwithstanding the
contemporaneous observation that “the uniformity clause of the
Pennsylvania Constitution has followed a path through our courts that
is easily as unpredictable and winding as Alice’s road through
Wonderland. No provision in our constitution has been so much litigated
yet so little understood.”141
The current state of doctrine was recently summarized by the opinion
of Justice Wecht in Mount Airy #1, LLC v. Pennsylvania Department of
Revenue:
In the past, this Court has held that the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Uniformity Clause of the
Pennsylvania Constitution are “largely coterminous” and “are to
be analyzed in the same manner.” Nevertheless, we have struck
down numerous tax statutes that unquestionably would survive
the highly deferential rational basis review attendant to a federal
Equal Protection challenge. This is so because the two
constitutional provisions are only sometimes in alignment.142

139. Compare Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 58–59 (1920) (sustaining the
constitutionality of a state graduated income tax under federal law), with Kelley v.
Kalodner, 181 A. 598, 602–03 (Pa. 1935) (invalidating graduated income tax under tax
uniformity clause).
140. Amidon v. Kane, 279 A.2d 53, 58 (Pa. 1971); see Act of March 15, 1967, No. 2, § 7(b),
1967 Pa. Laws 2, 7.
141. In re Lower Merion Township, 233 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. 1967).
142. 154 A.3d 268, 274 (Pa. 2016) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted); see also Valley
Forge Towers Apartments N, LP v. Upper Merion Area Sch. Dist., 163 A.3d 962,
967 n.4 (Pa. 2017) (“[T]ax uniformity incorporates equal protection precepts . . . . One
difference . . . is that the Uniformity Clause is more restrictive in that it does not allow the
government to engage in disparate tax treatment of different sub-classifications of real
property, such as residential versus commercial.”); id. at 973 (“[T]he federal Equal
Protection Clause guarantees this level of protection to property owners, and it also sets
the constitutional ‘floor’ for the protection of property owners’ rights under the Uniformity
Clause.”); Mount Airy #1, 154 A.3d at 274 (“In order to determine the standards associated
with a particular Uniformity Clause challenge, we look to our precedent, as well as the text
and history of the clause itself.”); Hosp. & Healthsystem Ass’n of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 77
A.3d 587, 606 n.26 (Pa. 2013) (“In some contexts the Uniformity Clause has been recognized
as reflecting more stringent limitations. We do not foreclose the possibility that the
Uniformity Clause provides greater protections in other ways as well, based on a developed
analysis of its text, history, and meaning.” (citation omitted)); Downingtown Area Sch. Dist.
v. Chester Cty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 913 A.2d 194, 200 (Pa. 2006) (explaining that
“federal equal protection jurisprudence . . . sets the floor for Pennsylvania’s uniformity
assessment”).
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b. Equal Rights Amendment
The first in the nation, Pennsylvania’s Equal Rights Amendment—
explicitly forbidding denial of equality under the law because of sex—was
proposed and ratified by the people of Pennsylvania at a time when
federal constitutional constraints on sex discrimination were a gleam in
the eye of then-Professor Ruth Bader Ginsburg.143 While the federal
doctrine has obviously evolved substantially in the last half century, it
still does not embrace the stark proposition embedded in Pennsylvania
constitutional doctrine that “[t]he law will not impose different benefits
or different burdens upon the members of a society based on the fact that
they may be man or woman.”144

143. The first Supreme Court case invalidating sex discrimination under the equal
protection clause, was decided November 22, 1971. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971).
This extension of federal “rational basis” review took place six months after adoption of the
Pennsylvania ERA, and two years after the ERA was introduced into the Pennsylvania
legislature. PA. CONST. art. I, § 28; cf. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61–62 (1961) (“Despite
the enlightened emancipation of women from the restrictions and protections of bygone
years, and their entry into many parts of community life formerly considered to be reserved
to men, woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life. We cannot say that
it is constitutionally impermissible for a State, acting in pursuit of the general welfare, to
conclude that a woman should be relieved from the civil duty of jury service . . . .”).
144. Henderson v. Henderson, 327 A.2d 60, 62 (Pa. 1974) (per curiam) (“The thrust of
the Equal Rights Amendment is to insure equality of rights under the law and to eliminate
sex as a basis for distinction. The sex of citizens of this Commonwealth is no longer a
permissible factor in the determination of their legal rights and legal responsibilities.”); see
also Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Ins. Comm’r, 482 A.2d 542, 549 (Pa. 1984) (“The
rationale underlying the ‘state action’ doctrine is irrelevant to the interpretation of the
scope of the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment, a state constitutional amendment
adopted by the Commonwealth as part of its own organic law. . . . [I]n light of the
Pennsylvania Constitution’s clear and unqualified prohibition of discrimination ‘under the
law’ based upon gender, we conclude that the Commissioner’s disapproval of Hartford’s
discriminatory sex-based rates on the ground they were ‘unfair’ and contrary to established
public policy was . . . an appropriate exercise of his statutory authority.”).
A generation after Henderson, federal doctrine remains considerably less severe in
discountenancing sex discrimination. See Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 62 (2001)
(“[T]he imposition of the requirement for a paternal relationship, but not a maternal one,
is justified by two important governmental objectives.”); cf. Sessions v. Morales-Santana,
137 S. Ct. 1678, 1690 (2017) (“[A]t least that the [challenged] classification serves important
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives.” (second alteration in original) (quoting
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996))).
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c.

Generic Constitutional Equality Analysis

Pennsylvania’s generic constitutional equality analysis145 bears
greater similarity to federal doctrine than does doctrine under the Tax
Uniformity Clause and Equal Rights Amendment. Opinions of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court regularly repeat versions of the following
heuristic for addressing claims of unequal classification:
The types of classifications are: (1) classifications which implicate
a “suspect” class or a fundamental right; (2) classifications
implicating an “important” though not fundamental right or a
“sensitive” classification; and (3) classifications which involve
none of these. Should the statutory classification in question fall
into the first category, the statute is strictly [scrutinized for] a
“compelling” governmental purpose; if the classification falls into
the second category, a heightened standard of scrutiny is applied
to [require] an “important” governmental purpose; and if the

145. The term “constitutional equality analysis” elides the fact that Pennsylvania courts
have variously found the basis for this analysis in: article III, section 32; article I, section
1; and article I, section 26. Compare League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 178
A.3d 737, 784 (Pa. 2018) (referring to “Article I, Sections 1 and 26 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution” as the “Equal Protection Guarantee”), with William Penn Sch. Dist. v. Pa.
Dep’t of Educ., 170 A.3d 414, 417 n.3 (Pa. 2017) (“Section 32 does not speak expressly in
terms of equal protection. Nonetheless, we long have gleaned equal protection principles
from Section 32 . . . .”), Robinson Township. v. Commonwealth, 147 A.3d 536, 581 (Pa. 2016)
(article III, section 32 “requires consideration of whether ‘the challenged legislation
promotes a legitimate state interest, and that a classification is reasonable rather than
arbitrary and rests upon some ground of difference, which justifies the classification and
has a fair and substantial relationship to the object of the legislation.’” (emphasis added)
(citing Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 901 (Pa. 2013))), and Zauflik v.
Pennsbury Sch. Dist., 104 A.3d 1096, 1117 (Pa. 2014) (referring to “[t]he equal protection
provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution (or, more precisely, the non-discrimination
provision)” as article I, section 26). Cf. id. at 1115 n.9 (“[C]ommon constitutional principle
at the heart of the special legislation proscription [of Section 32] and the equal protection
clause is that like persons in like circumstances should be treated similarly by the
sovereign.” (second alteration in original) (citing Pa. Turnpike Comm’n v.
Commonwealth, 899 A.2d 1085, 1094 (Pa. 2006))); Kramer v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.,
883 A.2d 518, 532 (Pa. 2005) (referring to “Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution” as the “equally free and independent” clause and as the basis for “equal
protection claims under the Pennsylvania Constitution”); Erfer v. Commonwealth, 794 A.2d
325, 355 (Pa. 2002) (“Article I, §§ 1 & 26, together, constitute an equal protection
guarantee.” (citing Love v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 597 A.2d 1137 (Pa. 1991))), abrogated
by League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737 (Pa. 2018); DeFazio v.
Civil Serv. Comm’n, 756 A.2d 1103, 1105 (Pa. 2000) (“In Pennsylvania, constitutional equal
protection is grounded in the following language: ‘The General Assembly shall pass no local
or special law in any case which has been or can be provided for by general law . . . .’” (citing
PA. CONST. art. 3 § 32)).
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statutory scheme falls into the third category, the statute is
upheld if there is any rational basis for the classification.146
This tracks a number of elements of federal equal protection analysis;
but similarity is not identity.147 Three differences are particularly salient.
First, an interest may be “fundamental” for purposes of Pennsylvania
analysis, though not of federal analysis.148 Second, while the origin of the
Pennsylvania reference to “important though not fundamental” rights
lies in federal case law from the early 1970s, the United States Supreme
Court has largely abandoned the category of “important” interests in
equal protection doctrine.149 By contrast, the Pennsylvania Supreme
146. Zauflik, 104 A.3d at 1118 (citing Smith v. City of Philadelphia, 516 A.2d 306, 311
(Pa. 1986); see, e.g., William Penn Sch. Dist., 170 A.3d at 458 (“Under a typical [equal
protection] analysis of governmental classifications, there are three different types of
classifications calling for three different standards of judicial review.” (alteration in
original) (quoting James v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 477 A.2d 1302, 1305–06 (Pa. 1984)));
Probst v. Commonwealth., 849 A.2d 1135, 1143–44 (Pa. 2004); Commonwealth v. Albert,
758 A.2d 1149, 1152 (Pa. 2000); Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265, 268 (Pa. 1995); Smith, 516
A.2d at 311.
147. Cf. League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 784 n.54 (“[W]e merely remarked
that the Equal Protection Guarantee and Equal Protection Clause involve the same
jurisprudential framework — i.e., a means-ends test taking into account a law’s use of
suspect classification, burdening of fundamental rights, and its justification in light of its
objectives.”).
148. See, e.g., William Penn Sch. Dist., 170 A.3d at 461 (“This leaves the question of what
sort of right is at issue. In turn, this will dictate what standard of review applies to
Petitioners’ equal protection claim, should it proceed. We need not resolve that question
presently, but we underscore that whether education is a fundamental right under
Pennsylvania law is not a settled question . . . .”).
149. See James v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 477 A.2d 1302, 1306, (Pa. 1984) (“[I]n the third
type of cases, if ‘important,’ though not fundamental rights are affected by the classification,
or if ‘sensitive’ classifications have been made, the United States Supreme Court has
employed what may be called an intermediate standard of review, or a heightened standard
of review.” (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 518 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
concurring))).
Justice Marshall’s focus on “important” rights was hotly contested in 1973, and had
gone into eclipse in federal doctrine by the end of the 1980s. See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub.
Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 468 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court should focus on ‘the
character of the classification in question, the relative importance to individuals in the class
discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the
asserted state interests in support of the classification.’” (quoting Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 521 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting))); cf. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S.
166, 176 n.10 (1980) (“Justice Brennan’s dissent cite[s] a number of equal protection cases
including . . . F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920) . . . U.S. Dept. of
Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) . . . and James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
The most arrogant legal scholar would not claim that all of these cases applied a uniform
or consistent test under equal protection principles. And realistically speaking, we can be
no more certain that this opinion will remain undisturbed than were those who joined the
opinion in Lindsley, Royster Guano Co., or any of the other cases referred to in this opinion
and in the dissenting opinion. But . . . we have no hesitation in asserting, contrary to the
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Court continues to identify “important” interests that trigger
“intermediate” scrutiny for equal protection purposes.150 And
Pennsylvania doctrine does not seem to have assimilated the concern for
“animus” that loomed large in Justice Kennedy’s equal protection
jurisprudence.151
Third, and most broadly important, the “rational basis” test which
has evolved in federal doctrine in the last half century upholds
distinctions when any reasonably conceivable state of facts could support
a post hoc rationalization connecting the distinction to some legitimate
public purpose.152 In applying Pennsylvania’s constitutional equality
dissent, that where social or economic regulations are involved together with this case, state
the proper application of the test. The comments in the dissenting opinion about the proper
cases for which to look for the correct statement of the equal protection rational-basis
standard, and about which cases limit earlier cases, are just that: comments in a dissenting
opinion.” (citations omitted)).
150. See Zauflik, 104 A.3d at 1119–20 (“Without revisiting the disagreement between
the Smith Court plurality and concurrence concerning whether rational basis review or
intermediate scrutiny is the more appropriate approach to a claim [regarding distinctions
in the availability of remedies], we have little difficulty in rejecting the notion that we
should engage in strict scrutiny; and, consistently with James, which represented a
majority view, we will employ intermediate scrutiny.” (emphasis omitted)).
151. E.g., United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770, 775 (2013) (invalidating statutory
refusal to recognize sex marriages due to improper animus: “The Constitution’s guarantee
of equality ‘must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot’ justify disparate treatment of that group.” (quoting U.S.
Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973))); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
635–36 (1996). With Justice Kennedy’s departure from the Court, the federal role of
“animus” may wane.
152. One competing line of federal equal protection cases reaching back to F. S. Royster
Guano Co., 253 U.S. at 415, which required “a fair and substantial relation” between
classification and legitimate state goals, rather than raw speculation, and conceivable
relation. But the tipping point for federal doctrine came with Fritz, 449 U. S. at 175,
rejecting F.S. Royster’s requirement that statute “must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.” See id. at 179 (“Where,
as here, there are plausible reasons for Congress’ action, our inquiry is at an end.”).
Since Fritz, the lowest level of federal rational basis scrutiny can be met by virtually
any speculation that can be argued to have a potential correspondence with reality. See,
e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (“[A] legislative choice is not
subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by
evidence or empirical data.”) There is such a plausible reason, “if there is any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” Id. at
313; Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (quoting Beach, 508 U.S. at 313);
Cent. State Univ. v. AAUP, 526 U.S. 124, 131 n.1 (1999) (quoting the lower court opinion
that there was “not a shred of evidence in the entire record”); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001) (quoting Heller, 509 U.S. at 320); Fitzgerald v. Racing
Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 107–08 (2003) (“Iowa Supreme Court found that the 20
percent/36 percent tax rate differential . . . ‘frustrated’ what it saw as the law’s basic
objective, namely, rescuing the racetracks from economic distress. And no rational person,
it believed, could claim the contrary.” (citation omitted)); Armour v. City of Indianapolis,
566 U.S. 673, 681 (2012); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420 (2018) (“[We] will uphold
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protection, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania disavows the authority to
second guess the wisdom of legislative policy choices. But under the 1968
Constitution, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court continues to invalidate
arbitrary and oppressive statutory classifications which lack a “fair and
substantial” relation to the statutory purpose rooted in real
distinctions.153 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the
difference between state and federal standards in the course of
invalidating the distinctions drawn by Sunday closing laws in Kroger Co.
v. O’Hara Township:
While there may be a correspondence in meaning and purpose
between the two, the language of the Pennsylvania Constitution
is substantially different from the federal constitution. We are
not free to treat that language as though it was not there.
....
In Article III, Section 32, of the Pennsylvania Constitution we
find eight areas Explicitly [sic] mentioned as areas which are not
the policy so long as it can reasonably be understood to result from a justification
independent of unconstitutional grounds. . . . [T]he Court hardly ever strikes down a policy
as illegitimate under rational basis scrutiny.”).
153. Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 51–52 (Pa. 1980); Moyer v. Phillips, 341
A.2d 441, 443–45 (Pa. 1975); In re Estate of Cavill, 329 A.2d 503, 506 (Pa. 1974); see also
Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 147 A.3d 536, 576 (Pa. 2016) (“Commonwealth has
not identified any difference between the oil and gas industry and the myriad of other
industries operating within our Commonwealth, many of which use chemicals in their
manufacturing processes, which justify these heavy constraints on health professionals’
access to, and ability to use or further disclose, this type of information while carrying out
the vital responsibilities of their vocation, and we cannot reasonably hypothesize any such
justification.”); id. at 582 (“[R]equirement that only public water facilities must be informed
in the event of a spill is unsupportable under Article III, Section 32 of our Constitution.”);
Pa. Tpk. Comm’n v. Commonwealth, 899 A.2d 1085, 1096, (Pa. 2006) (“[T]here is no rational
reason to treat first-level supervisors of the Commission differently than all other first-level
supervisors of other public employers when it comes to collective bargaining.”); Harrisburg
Sch. Dist. v. Hickok, 761 A.2d 1132, 1136 (Pa. 2000) (invalidating distinction singling out
Harrisburg, noting that “the judicial function, then, with respect to classifications, is to see
that the classification at issue is founded on real distinctions in the subjects classified and
not on artificial or irrelevant ones used for the purpose of evading the constitutional
prohibition” (internal quotation marks omitted)); DeFazio v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of
Allegheny Cty., 756 A.2d 1103, 1106, (Pa. 2000); Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265, 268 (Pa.
1995); Ridley Arms, Inc. v. Township of Ridley, 531 A.2d 414, 417 (Pa. 1987) (“[T]he
payment of approximately $58,000 to government for the performance of services which can
be, and actually were provided by the private sector for approximately $23,000, less than
half the amount charged by government, is not ‘reasonable.’”); Snider v. Thornburgh, 436
A.2d 593, 597 (Pa. 1981) (“[T]he mistaken assumption that the phrase ‘rational basis’
implies a greater assumption of constitutionality or connotes a less strict standard of review
than the phrase ‘fair and substantial relation’, should be discarded.”).
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to be encumbered by special laws treating certain citizens
differently than others. . . . We therefore find that it is our judicial
duty to carefully examine any law regulating trade.
....
“Fair and substantial” means that the classification must be
reasonable and not arbitrary, and the classification must rest
upon some ground of difference which has a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly situated shall be treated alike.
. . . There is no fair and substantial relationship between the
objective of providing a uniform day of rest and recreation and in
permitting the sale of novelties but not Bibles and bathing suits;
in permitting the sale of fresh meat patties but not frozen meat
patties; or in permitting the installation of an electric meter but
not a T.V. antenna.154
The Pennsylvania court recently reiterated in William Penn School
District v. Pennsylvania Department of Education, that to be rational for
purposes of Pennsylvania’s constitutional equality analysis, “a
classification must rest upon some ground of difference which justifies
the classification and have a fair and substantial relationship to the
object of the legislation.”155
C. Disanalogous/Skew Provisions
Provisions that lack a federal analog accounted for a quarter (93/373,
25%) of the cases exercising judicial review under the 1968 Constitution
over the last fifty years and over a third (91/253, 36%) of cases which find
violations of state but not federal constitutional provisions. They make
up 41% (57/138) of the cases exercising judicial review with respect to
statutes, comparable to the incidence of cases invoking congruent
provisions (39%).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s rate of review under these
provisions increased from under one case per year in the first decade of

154. 392 A.2d 266, 274–75 (Pa. 1978) (citations omitted).
155. 170 A.3d 414, 458 (Pa. 2017); see id. at 458 n.64 (“[T]his ‘reasonable relationship’
terminology closely tracks that of the ‘reasonable relation’ test invoked, if opaquely
employed, by this Court in the Teachers’ Tenure Act Case, Danson, and Marrero II.”). For a
discussion of the “fair and substantial” requirement adopted in Shoul and Nixon, see supra
notes 114–15.
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the 1968 Constitution to almost two cases per year in the second, third,
and fourth decades, and again to 2.5 cases per year in the latest decade.
The rate of review of statutes under disanalogous provisions, doubled
from five cases during the decade 1968–1977 (.5 per year) to twelve per
decade during the second and third decades, and fourteen per year in the
fourth and fifth decades.
Table 14: Judicial Review Under Skew Provisions
1968–
1977

1978–
1987

1988–
1997

1998–
2007

2008–
2018

Total

Judicial Autonomy and
Administration

4

9

9

9

7

38

Limits on Municipal Action

1

3

3

3

2

12

Non-Delegation

2

2

3

2

9

5

3

1

1

1

3

1

8

2

4

6

5

5

14

1

3

4

3

3

2

3

1

1

25

93

Remedies Art. I, § 11
Limits on Legislative
Process

2

Single-Subject Rule
[leg. limits + single-subject]

2

1

1

Limits on Executive Action
Elections Art. I, § 5
Environmental Art. I, § 27

1

9

Criminal Process
Education Art. III, § 14
Total

9

19

18

22
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Table 15: Judicial Review by Skew Provision
Judicial Autonomy and Administration
Art. V, § 10
Art. V, § 18
Art. V, § 16
Art. V, § 1
Art. V, § 13
Art. V, § 9
Separation of Powers
Art. V, § 12
Art. IV, § 9
Art. V, § 5
Limits on Municipal Action
Art. III, § 27
Art. IX, § 2
Art. VI, § 7
Separation of Powers
Art. III, § 14
Art. IX, § 10
Non-Delegation
Art. II, § 1
Art. VI, § 7
Remedies Art. I, § 11
Limits on Legislative Process
Art. III, § 9
Art. IV, § 8
Separation of Powers
Art. VI, § 7
Art. III, § 11
Art. II, § 2
Art. II, § 15
Single-Subject Rule
Art. III, § 3
Art. XI, § 1
Limits on Executive Action

38
18
4
3
3
3
2
2
1
1
1
12
4
3
2
1
1
1
9
8
1
9
8
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
6
5
1
4
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Art. VI, § 1
Art. IV, § 16
Art. II, § 2
Art. IV, § 15
Elections
Art. I, § 5
Art. II, § 17
Environmental Art. I, § 27
Education Art. III, § 14
Total

347
1
1
1
1
3
2
1
3
1
93

Table 16: Finding State but No Federal Violation Under
Skew Provisions
Judicial Autonomy and Administration
Limits on Municipal Action
Non-Delegation
Limits on Legislative Process
Remedies Art. I, § 11
Single-Subject Rule
Limits on Executive Action
Elections Art. I, § 5
Environmental Art. I, § 27
Education Art. III, § 14
Total

38
12
9
8
7
6
4
3
3
1
91
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Table 17: Statutory Review Under Skew Provisions
1968–
1977

1978–
1987

1988–
1997

1998–
2007

2008–
2018

23
9
6

2
2

7

6
3
1

2
2

2

6
2
3

6
5

1

1

1

2
1

1
4

[11]
3

[1]

[1]

[1]

[3]

[5]
3

Total
Judicial Autonomy
and Administration
Non-Delegation
Remedies Art. I, § 11
Limits on Legislative
Process
Single-Subject Rule
[Legis. Proc. Plus
Single Subject]
Elections Art. I, § 5
Limits on Municipal
Action
Environmental Art. I,
§ 27
Education Art. III, §
14
Total

2

1

2

1

1

12

1
14

1
57

5

1

12

14

1. Judicial Autonomy
The most numerous class of cases raised under skew provisions, both
in total (38) and in statutory review (23), involves constitutional claims
to judicial autonomy, set forth at Tables 16 and 17 above.
A concern with legislative interventions abridging judicial autonomy
is not new in Pennsylvania constitutional doctrine.156 But the
156. See, e.g., McCabe v. Emerson, 18 Pa. 111, 112–13 (1851) (holding statute
overturning final judgment for plaintiff unconstitutional as inconsistent with constitutional
scheme); Commonwealth ex rel. Johnson v. Halloway, 42 Pa. 446, 448–49 (1862)
(invalidating legislation reducing prisoner’s sentence); In re Investigation by Dauphin Cty.
Grand Jury, Sept., 1938, 2 A.2d 804, 809(Pa. 1938) (statute suspending grand jury
investigation pending impeachment held unconstitutional). The court in Leahey v. Farrell
expressed constitutional concerns regarding legislative interference with the judiciary:
The legislature cannot, by an act of assembly, overrule a judicial decision, it
may not direct a statute to be construed in a certain way, it cannot grant a new
trial, or order an illegitimate child to be regarded as legitimate under terms of prior
deed, it may not change the effect of judgments or decrees previously rendered . . . .
....
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wholesale restructuring of Pennsylvania’s judicial system into a unified
judiciary—by the Constitution of 1968 article V, section 1, combined with
the wording of article V, section 10, vesting the supreme court “general
supervisory and administrative authority over all the courts”—laid the
groundwork for a particularly aggressive assertion of judicial primacy,
beginning in 1978 with the sua sponte prospective announcement that
application of the Public Agency Open Meeting Law to the supreme court
was unconstitutional.157 This set of constitutional interventions peaked
during the decades between 1978 and 2007, with six cases of statutory
review in each decade. The last ten years, by contrast, contain only two
statutory cases, and none in the last four years. The reduction could
either be tied to the Pennsylvania Legislature coming to terms with the
judicial declaration of institutional independence or by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court’s conclusion that legislative confrontation is not without
costs.158
2. Due Process of Lawmaking
The second most numerous class of cases invoking disanalogous
provisions involves judicial policing of constitutional constraints on
. . . Should the legislature, or the county salary board, act arbitrarily or
capriciously and fail or neglect to provide a sufficient number of court employes
[sic] or for the payment of adequate salaries to them, whereby the efficient
administration of justice is impaired or destroyed, the court possesses the inherent
power to supply the deficiency. Should such officials neglect or refuse to comply
with the reasonable requirements of the court they may be required to do so by
mandamus.
66 A.2d 577, 579–80 (Pa. 1949) (citations omitted).
157. In re 42 Pa. C.S. § 1703, 394 A.2d 444, 452 (Pa. 1978). Even commentators critical
of the extent of judicial declarations of primacy under the Constitution of 1968 acknowledge
that some warrant for it can be found in the “history underlying the adoption of Section 10.”
Charles Gardner Geyh, Highlighting a Low Point on a High Court: Some Thoughts on the
Removal of Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Rolf Larsen and the Limits of Judicial
Self-Regulation, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1041, 1057–63 (1995).
158. Compare Cty. of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 534 A.2d 760, 763, 765 (Pa. 1987),
enforcement denied sub nom., County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 626 A.2d 492 (Pa.
1993) (statutory scheme obligating county to fund courts within its judicial system violated
mandate for unified judicial system under Pennsylvania Constitution article V, section 1),
and Pa. State Ass’n. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Commonwealth, 681 A.2d 699, 701, 703 (Pa. 1996)
(granting petition for mandamus and order that the General Assembly enact a funding
scheme for the court system pursuant to article V, section 1), with Pa. State Ass’n of Cty.
Comm’rs v. Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 1213, 1232–33 (Pa. 2012) (declining to issue
enforcement orders, and instead reasoning that “we believe that the better course is for
further enhancements of the unified judicial system to be a product of inter-branch
cooperation. . . . [W]e are encouraged that the changes implemented as a result of the 1997
Interim Report have served as a foundation for further evolution toward a better,
administratively unified judicial system.”).
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legislative process (fourteen cases total, eleven involving statutory
review).159
Most of these provisions have their origin in the distrust of the
legislature that characterized the convention of 1873.160 But within years
of their enactment, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court took a posture of
abstention as “essential to the peace and order of the state”; the “enrolled
bill” doctrine prevented courts from looking behind the face of a final bill
to determine the constitutional propriety of its passage.161 And with
respect to the “single subject” requirement of article III, section 3, which
could be raised by examining the face of the bill, by the middle of the
twentieth century, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court came to apply
“almost an irrebuttable presumption of constitutionality.”162
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania abandoned the enrolled bill
doctrine in 1986 as inconsistent with the proper understanding of the
mandates of the 1873 Convention and the proper role of the court.163 And
159. See supra Tables 14, 17.
160. See Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth,
877 A.2d 383, 394 (Pa. 2005) (“[W]hile these changes to the Constitution originated during
a unique time of fear of tyrannical corporate power and legislative corruption, these
mandates retain their value even today by placing certain constitutional limitations on the
legislative process.”); cf. City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 838 A.2d 566, 586 (Pa.
2003) (“Although Section 3’s single-subject and clear-expression requirements were
originally added to the Constitution by amendment in 1864, their inclusion in the 1874
Constitution was consistent with the electorate’s overall goal of curtailing legislative
practices that it viewed with suspicion.” (citation omitted)).
161. See Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa. 401, 412 (1877) (per curiam) (“[W]hen a law has been
passed and approved and certified in due form, it is no part of the duty of the judiciary to
go behind the law as duly certified to inquire into the observance of form in its
passage. . . .The presumption in favor of regularity is essential to the peace and order of the
state.”); Mikell v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 58 A.2d 339, 346 (Pa. 1948) (“[T]he enrolled bill is the
conclusive evidence of statutory enactment and no other evidence is admissible to establish
that the bill was not lawfully enacted . . . .” (citation omitted)); see David B. Snyder, The
Rise and Fall of the Enrolled Bill Doctrine in Pennsylvania, 60 TEMP. L. Q. 315, 321 (1987).
162. Williams, State Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure, supra note 33 at
810; see City of Philadelphia, 838 A.2d at 587 (“In the early part of the Twentieth Century,
this Court applied the ‘germaneness’ test in a fairly strict manner. . . . In more recent
decisions, however . . . Pennsylvania courts have become extremely deferential toward the
General Assembly in Section III challenges.”); Pennsylvanians Against Gambling
Expansion Fund, Inc., 877 A.2d at 400 (“[I]t is plain that the Court’s interpretation of
Article III, Section 3 has fluctuated over time.”).
163. See Consumer Party of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 507 A.2d 323, 332, 334 (Pa. 1986),
abrogated by, Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc., 877 A.2d 383 (Pa.
2005) (“[T]he people speaking through their Constitution have mandated a procedure to
provide each legislator the opportunity to properly perform that obligation. That directive
is mandatory and not precatory and the judicial branch cannot ignore a clear
violation because of a false sense of deference to the prerogatives of a sister branch of
government. . . . However, for the reasons that follow, we find that Article III, section 1 has
not been violated in this instance.”). For cases invalidating legislation under procedural
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in the twenty-first century—recapturing the distrust of the legislature
surrounding the 1873 Convention164—the court has invalidated
legislation repeatedly for failure to comply with the single subject rule.165
3. Skew Provisions and Public Impact
Cases construing disanalogous constitutional provisions originating
over two centuries of constitutional development account for many of the
highest profile and highest impact exercises of judicial review under the
Constitution of 1968.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s recent, controversial, and
consequential
invalidation
of
extravagantly
gerrymandered
congressional districts and consequent reapportionment in League of
Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth rested on the 1790
guarantee in article I, section 5 of “free and equal elections.”166 Its
determination preventing the implementation of restrictive voter
identification requirements was grounded in the 1874 mandate of article
I, section 5 that “no power, civil or military, shall at any time interfere to
prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage.”167 The justification for
opening review of Pennsylvania’s system of unequal education funding
relied on the 1874 command of article III, section 14 to ensure a
“thorough and efficient education,” as modified in 1967.168 Review of the
limits not manifest on the face of the bill, see Washington v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare of
Commonwealth, 188 A.3d 1135, 1152–54 (Pa. 2018), and cases cited infra App. C.
164. See Washington, 188 A.3d at 1145, 1147 (reviewing history and noting that “the
people lost confidence in the legislature’s ability to fulfill its most paramount constitutional
duty of representing their interests. . . . [C]onsistent with the intent of the electorate who
ratified the 1874 Constitution, the overarching purpose of these and the other restrictions
on the legislative process contained in Article III was to furnish essential constitutional
safeguards”).
165. Commonwealth v. Derhammer, 173 A.3d 723, 725, 730–31 (Pa. 2017); Leach v.
Commonwealth, 141 A.3d 426, 435 (Pa. 2016); Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603,
615–16 (Pa. 2013); Pa. State Ass’n of Jury Comm’rs v. Commonwealth, 64 A.3d 611, 619
(Pa. 2013); Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc., 877 A.2d at 394, 419;
City of Philadelphia, 838 A.2d at 592–94 (Pa. 2003).
166. 178 A.3d 737, 802 (Pa. 2018) (“[T]he Free and Equal Elections Clause has no federal
counterpart.”).
167. Applewhite v. Commonwealth, 54 A.3d 1, 3 (Pa. 2012) (per curiam); see Applewhite
v. Commonwealth, 2014 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 756, at 74–76 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan.
17, 2014) (granting final injunction on remand); Applewhite v. Commonwealth, 2012 Pa.
Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 749, at *20 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 2, 2012) (granting preliminary
injunction on remand); see also Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 38 A.3d
711, 718 (Pa. 2012) (finding that the reapportionment plan “considered as a whole, contains
numerous political subdivision splits that are not absolutely necessary, and the Plan thus
violates the constitutional command to respect the integrity of political subdivisions” as
required by article II, section 16 of the Pennsylvania Constitution).
168. William Penn Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 170 A.3d 414, 425, 441 (Pa. 2017).
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complex statutes facilitating fracking construed Pennsylvania’s 1971
Environmental Rights Amendment, article I, section 27.169 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has relied on provisions that “lack[] a
counterpart in the U.S. Constitution” to limit the unilateral authority of
the Governor,170 and on the distinctive provisions for removal of civil
officers in article VI, section 7 to invalidate a hotly contested mayoral
recall.171 It has grounded sweeping orders requiring funding of the
“unified judicial system” on 1968 provisions that are not mirrored by the
federal structure.172 And—just beyond the scope of the fifty-year time
frame—the court recently invalidated a statute that “made sweeping
changes to the administration of the state’s human services programs”
based on a failure to comply with the 1874 legislative procedure
mandates of article III, section 4.173

169. See Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 944 (Pa. 2013) (“The
Environmental Rights Amendment has no counterpart in the federal charter . . . .” (citations
omitted)); Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 916, 937, 939 (Pa. 2017)
(holding that the diversion of proceeds from oil and gas development to a non-trust purpose
violates the Environmental Rights Amendment).
170. See Jubelirer v. Rendell, 953 A.2d 514, 524, 533, 537–38, (Pa. 2008) (line item veto);
Arneson v. Wolf, 124 A.3d 1225, 1227–28 (Pa. 2015) (construing removal authority under
article VI, sections 1, 7); cf. Scarnati v. Wolf, 173 A.3d 1110, 1136 (Pa. 2017) (invalidating
line item veto).
171. See Citizens Comm. to Recall Rizzo v. Bd. of Elections of City & Cty. of Phila., 367
A.2d 232, 246–47, 248–49, 254 (Pa. 1976) (holding, in separate opinions, that recall
provisions of the Philadelphia home rule charter were unconstitutional under article VI,
section 7).
172. See Pa. State Ass’n of Cty. Comm’rs v. Commonwealth, 681 A.2d 699, 701, 703–04
(Flaherty, J., writing for the majority & Newman, J., concurring) (Pa. 1996) (granting
petition for mandamus and order that the General Assembly enact a funding scheme for
the court system pursuant to article V, section 1); County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth,
534 A.2d 760, 763, 765 (Pa. 1987) (statutory scheme obligating county to fund courts within
its judicial system violated mandate for unified judicial system under article V, section 1).
This was not one of the court’s most rapidly successful initiatives; cf. Pa. State Ass’n of Cty.
Comm’rs v. Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 1213, 1233 (Pa. 2012) (reviewing two decades of
litigation to hold that “we will not grant further mandamus relief; and neither are we
inclined to go backward and overrule our prior decisions, rendered in light of the realities
of that time. We are optimistic that recent progress on budgetary questions will continue”).
173. Washington v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare of Pa., 188 A.3d 1135, 1139 (Pa. 2018); see
Commonwealth v. Derhammer, 173 A.3d 723, 725, 730–31 (Pa. 2017) (declaring Megan’s
Law amendment unconstitutional under Pennsylvania Constitution, article III, section3);
Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603, 616 (Pa. 2013) (same); Leach v. Commonwealth,
141 A.3d 426, 427–28, 435 (Pa. 2016) (holding municipal firearm legislation ban violated
article III, section 3); Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v.
Commonwealth, 877 A.2d 383, 390, 396 (Pa. 2005) (declaring provisions of the Gaming Act
violated article III, section 3).
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IV. STILL LIVING AFTER FIFTY YEARS
In high profile cases exercising judicial review under disanalogous
provisions of the Constitution of 1968, the Pennsylvania court has
engaged in extensive analyses of the text, history, policy, case law,
traditions, and values associated with the provisions in question. And it
has regularly been willing to revisit matters that had previously been
settled. Thus, in construing the Free and Equal Elections Clause of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v.
Commonwealth rejected prior precedent declaring
partisan
gerrymandering non-justiciable.174 In William Penn School District v.
Pennsylvania Department of Education, it revisited and reversed
precedent precluding judicial enforcement of the Education Clause.175 In
Robinson Township v. Commonwealth176 and Pennsylvania
Environmental Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth,177 the court
invalidated statutes under the Environmental Rights Amendment,

174. 178 A.3d 737, 813 (Pa. 2018) (“To the extent that Erfer can be read for that
proposition, we expressly disavow it, and presently reaffirm that, in accord with Shankey
and the particular history of the Free and Equal Elections Clause, recounted above, the two
distinct claims remain subject to entirely separate jurisprudential consideration.”
(emphasis omitted)); cf. Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 38 A.3d 711,
758–59 (Pa. 2012) (per curiam) (“[Technological] development suggests that this Court’s
early establishment of the primacy of equalization of population in formulating
redistricting plans . . . may warrant reconsideration. . . . [O]ur own review of our
governing precedent in deciding these appeals has led us to conclude that it should be
recalibrated . . . . Our prior precedent sounds in constitutional law; to the extent it is
erroneous or unclear, or falls in tension with intervening developments, this Court has
primary responsibility to address the circumstance.”).
175. 170 A.3d 414, 456–57 (Pa. 2017) (“To the extent that our prior cases have suggested,
if murkily, that a court cannot devise a judicially discoverable and manageable standard
for Education Clause compliance that does not entail making a policy determination
inappropriate for judicial discretion, or that we may only deploy a rubber stamp in a hollow
mockery of judicial review, we underscore that we are not bound to follow precedent
when it cannot bear scrutiny, either on its own terms or in light of subsequent
developments. . . . We find irreconcilable deficiencies in the rigor, clarity, and consistency
of the line of cases that culminated in Marrero II.”).
176. 83 A.3d 901, 946 (Pa. 2013) (plurality opinion) (“[I]n circumstances where prior
decisional law has obscured the manifest intent of a constitutional provision as expressed
in its plain language, engagement and adjustment of precedent as a prudential matter is
fairly implicated and salutary.”); Holt, 38 A.3d at 759 n.38 (“Our charter . . . is not easily
amended and any errant interpretation is not freely subject to correction by any co-equal
branch of our government, other than this Court. For this reason, we are not constrained
to closely and blindly re-affirm constitutional interpretations of prior decisions which have
proven to be unworkable or badly reasoned.” (citation omitted)).
177. 161 A.3d 911, 937 (Pa. 2017).
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notwithstanding precedent dating from shortly after its adoption to the
effect that the amendment was non-self-executing.178
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has similarly been willing to
revisit and revise prior doctrine under both parallel provisions179 and
congruent provisions.180
178. Compare Commonwealth ex rel. Shapp v. Nat’l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc.,
311 A.2d 588, 594–95 (Pa. 1973), with Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 161 A.3d at 936 n.28 (“As
noted in Robinson Township, this Court previously misstated that a plurality of the justices
in Gettysburg concluded that the Section 27 was not self-executing in United Artists’
Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, when in fact only two justices specifically found
it to require legislative action.” (citations omitted)); id. at 937 (“[W]e re-affirm our prior
pronouncements that the public trust provisions of Section 27 are self-executing.”).
179. Compare, e.g., Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 898 (Pa. 1991) (rejecting
federally crafted good faith exception to exclusionary rule under article I, section 8 and
remarking that, “[f]rom DeJohn forward, a steady line of case-law has evolved under the
Pennsylvania Constitution, making clear that Article I, Section 8 is unshakably linked to a
right of privacy in this Commonwealth”), with Commonwealth v. Russo, 934 A.2d 1199,
1207 (Pa. 2007) (“[Before 1961] this Court’s historical interpretation of Article I, Section 8
always followed ‘the fundamental principle of the common law that the admissibility of
evidence is not affected by the illegality of the means by which it was obtained.’” (quoting
Commonwealth v. Chaitt, 112 A.2d 379, 381(Pa. 1955))).
180. The process started with respect to protection of free expression as the 1968
Constitution was being beginning to be framed, as reflected in Justice Eagen’s dissenting
opinion in William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana:
The majority opinion reasons that even though prior restraint, in exceptional cases,
do not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution, it does violate Article I, Section 7, of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
In order to reach this conclusion, the Majority does a little selective picking from
both Constitutions. They go first to the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution in order to bring motion pictures into the ambit of the
constitutional guarantee of free speech and free press and imply, therefore, that
Article I, Section 7, also covers motion pictures. But, they then reject the First and
Fourteenth Amendments and one hundred seventy-one years of Pennsylvania law
and state that the Pennsylvania Constitution is different from the United States
Constitution, and that the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits all prior
restraints—no matter how unlawful the publication may be, which, as pointed out
before, is directly contrary to the United States Constitution.
173 A.2d 59, 71–72 (Pa. 1961) (Eagen, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
Modern protection under article I, section 7, reaches considerably beyond the
shelter provided by the provision in the era of its framing. Compare Pap’s A.M. v. City of
Erie, 812 A.2d 591, 594, 612 (Pa. 2002) (protecting the right of women to engage in erotic
dance without wearing pasties), with Respublica v. Dennie, 4 Yeates 267, 271 (Pa. 1805)
(“[I]f the consciences of the jury shall be clearly satisfied that the publication was
seditiously, maliciously, and wilfully aimed at the independence of the United States, the
constitution thereof, or of this state, they should convict the defendant.” (emphasis
omitted)), and Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394, 409 (Pa. 1824) (“[F]rom
a regard to decency and the good order of society, profane swearing, breach of the Sabbath,
and blasphemy, are punishable by civil magistrates, these are not punished as sins or
offences against God, but crimes injurious to, and having a malignant influence on
society.”). Cf. Pap’s A.M., 812 A.2d at 613 (Saylor, J., dissenting) (doctrine “extending
greater protection to communication than that provided under the First
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In today’s climate, such evolution raises the question of whether the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court is subject to the argument, raised regularly
and pungently by the late Justice Scalia that the concept of a “living
constitution” licenses judicial misfeasance, and that courts should be
bound by the constitution’s “original intent” or perhaps “original
meaning.” Justice Scalia has passed on from his active role in public life,
but his claim that the United States Constitution is “dead, dead, dead” is
very much alive.181
There are reasons to be skeptical of a Scalian critique of a living
Pennsylvania Constitution. To begin with, even if one were to grant that
“original intent” or “original meaning” is a desirable and useful
interpretive mandate in the federal context—a point of some substantial
contention—it is a bit mysterious what “original meaning” would govern
in construing the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1968.
The language of article I, section 1 recognizing “men are born equally
free and independent,” for example, was a part of the original Declaration
of Rights adopted by the Convention of 1776.182 The provision was
readopted verbatim in 1790, 1838, and 1874 and became part of the
Constitution of 1968. Should the original meaning of “equality” date from
the extra-legal Convention of 1776, when the provision was adopted by a
group chosen by a narrow electorate of 6000, or from 1790 when the
provision was readopted and modified by a more broadly elected, but still
extra-legal, convention? From 1838 when a constitution was first adopted
by a convention that was legally convened, and was ratified by
Pennsylvania voters? From the most recent rounds of electoral
ratification in 1968?

Amendment . . . has previously been applied to forms of pure speech as opposed to the
communicative aspects of conduct or symbolic speech”). Compare also Ullom v. Boehm, 142
A.2d 19, 21, 24 (Pa. 1958) (summarily rejecting article I, section 7 challenge to prohibitions
on price advertising by opticians because “it impairs the plaintiff’s right of freedom of
speech.”), with Commonwealth, Bureau of Prof’l & Occupational Affairs v. State Bd. of
Physical Therapy, 728 A.2d 340, 343–44 (Pa. 1999) (invalidating advertising by
chiropractors under article I, section 7).
181. See, e.g., Prakash, supra note 10, at 27 (“The Justice had at least two black beasts.
First, he rejected the claim that the meaning of laws could drift or change without a formal
change in text. This opposition made him dead set against the theory of the living
Constitution. He was certain that something could not become unconstitutional (or
constitutional) merely because political views or moral sensibilities had changed. Hence he
liked to exclaim that the Constitution was not living but ‘dead, dead, dead.’ Second, and in
keeping with his opposition to a living Constitution, the Justice combated the tendency of
judges to read their preferences into the law. ‘Now the main danger in judicial
interpretation of the Constitution . . . is that the judges will mistake their own predilections
for the law.’” (alteration in original) (footnote omitted)).
182. PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. I, § 1.

356

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:287

Mysteries proliferate. Pennsylvania’s constitutional equality
analysis actually springs doctrinally not only from article I, section 1, but
also from article III, section 32, adopted in 1874 by convention and
electorally ratified, and modified by legislatively proposed and electorally
ratified amendment in 1967.183 And from article I, section 26 legislatively
proposed and adopted by the electorate in 1967.184 If—to simplify
matters—each of these provisions should be construed according to the
“original meaning” when they were initially promulgated, would courts
need to shuttle back and forth among the centuries in evaluating claims
of unconstitutional differential treatment? Should they look for
consensus? Should they give primacy to legal as opposed to extra-legal
initiatives? Should they seek a majority of decision makers, or provisions,
or a flow of understanding?
And what of the requirement of tax uniformity in article VIII, section
1? The provision was originally proposed and ratified in 1874. Voters
rejected efforts to amend it in 1913 and 1938. It was specifically
preserved inviolate by the legislature that called for a referendum on a
Convention in 1967, and by the question put to the voters who passed the
referendum in 1967, and retained by the Convention and the
Constitution of 1968.185 Yet at the time that the legislators and voters
preserved it, informed observers understood, for better or worse, that the
clause had manifestly taken its meaning from a process of continued
judicial construction and evolution.186 Both the actual participants and
reasonable observers had every reason to expect that the process would
continue. So, the “original understanding” in 1967 was that judges would
not be particularly constrained by a static originalism.187
Acknowledging the reality of a “living constitution” seems the only
sensible way to begin to think about construing the Pennsylvania
Constitution. After all, the underlying document really does grow, the
courts’ explication of the changing text manifestly evolves over time, and
the ratifying People periodically recast the document without challenging
the evolution of doctrine.
The challenges to originalism as a singular and preclusive strategy
for construing the Pennsylvania Constitution run deeper still. “Original
183. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
184. PA. CONST. art. I, § 26.
185. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
186. See In re Lower Merion Township, 233 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. 1967) (“[T]he uniformity
clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution has followed a path through our courts that is
easily as unpredictable and winding as Alice’s road through Wonderland.”).
187. Similarly, in 1968, Pennsylvania’s courts had retained their practice of examining
exercises of government authority for a “fair and substantial relation” to legitimate
government interests. See infra App. C, Section C.
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intent” or “original meaning” must incorporate some conception of the
ways in which language will be judicially construed. Even if we were
persuaded that Pennsylvania constitutional analysis might be
appropriately tied to 1776, or 1790, or 1838, or 1874, or 1967, or 1968,
the process of deriving the “original meaning” of the provisions in that
era would confront the question raised pointedly a generation ago by
Professor Powell, and mooted since: Did the promulgators understand, or
would a contemporaneous reasonable legal observer expect that their
work would be construed in originalist terms—and more broadly, what
was the original legal meaning, in light of the strategy the framers or
ratifiers expected the courts to deploy in constitutional interpretation
and construction?188
In 1968, the convention proposed, and the Pennsylvania electorate
adopted an extensive reworking of the judicial system. Any politically
aware citizen would have understood the judicial authority of
constitutional review in light of the recent work of the United States
Supreme Court.
Such a citizen would be aware of the New Deal Revolution.189

188. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 885, 885–88 (1985); cf. Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1127–28 (1987); Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in the States, 61 U.
CIN. L. REV. 171, 171 (1992). The turn to “original meaning” has not avoided the problem,
since the “original meaning” of legal terms must incorporate a conception of the expectation
of the methods by which meaning is derived from the enacted text. For inquiries by
enthusiasts for originalism, see generally John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport,
Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against
Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 768 n.66 (2009); John O. McGinnis & Michael B.
Rappaport, The Constitutional and the Language of the Law, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1321,
1325–32 (2018); Gary Lawson, Dead Document Walking, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1225, 1225–27
(2012); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own
Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 858–64 (2009).
189. Compare, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399–400 (1937) (“There
is an additional and compelling consideration which recent economic experience has
brought into a strong light. The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal
position with respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively defenseless against the
denial of a living wage is not only detrimental to their health and well being, but casts a
direct burden for their support upon the community. . . . Our conclusion is that the case of
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, supra, should be, and it is, overruled.”), with id. at 587
(Sutherland, J., dissenting, joined by Van Devanter, McReynolds, Butler, JJ.) (“It is urged
that the question involved should now receive fresh consideration, among other reasons,
because of ‘the economic conditions which have supervened’; but the meaning of the
Constitution does not change with the ebb and flow of economic events. We frequently are
told in more general words that the Constitution must be construed in the light of the
present. If by that it is meant that the Constitution is made up of living words that apply
to every new condition which they include, the statement is quite true. But to say, if that
be intended, that the words of the Constitution mean today what they did not mean when
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The accepted canon for a legally sophisticated observer would include
Chief Justice Hughes declaiming:
It is no answer to say that this public need was not
apprehended a century ago, or to insist that what the provision
of the Constitution meant to the vision of that day it must mean
to the vision of our time. If by the statement that what the
Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it means to-day, it
is intended to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must
be confined to the interpretation which the framers, with the
conditions and outlook of their time, would have placed upon
them, the statement carries its own refutation. It was to guard
against such a narrow conception that Chief Justice Marshall
uttered the memorable warning: “We must never forget, that it is
a constitution we are expounding a constitution intended to
endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the
various crises of human affairs.” When we are dealing with the
words of the Constitution, said this Court in Missouri v. Holland,
“we must realize that they have called into life a being the
development of which could not have been foreseen completely by
the most gifted of its begetters. The case before us must be
considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in
that of what was said a hundred years ago.”
Nor is it helpful to attempt to draw a fine distinction between
the intended meaning of the words of the Constitution and their
intended application. . . . The vast body of law which has been
developed was unknown to the fathers, but it is believed to have
preserved the essential content and the spirit of the
Constitution. . . . This development is a growth from the seeds
which the fathers planted.190
In 1968 the alert citizen would understand the proposed
Pennsylvania Constitution in the context of the Warren Court’s growing
edifice of living constitutionalism, from Reynolds v. Sims191 in 1964, to
Griswold v. Connecticut192 in 1965, Miranda v. Arizona193 and Harper v.
written—that is, that they do not apply to a situation now to which they would have applied
then—is to rob that instrument of the essential element which continues it in force as the
people have made it until they, and not their official agents, have made it otherwise.”).
190. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442–44 (1934) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
191. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
192. 381 U. S. 479 (1965).
193. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Virginia State Board of Elections194 in 1966, and Loving v. Virginia,195
Katz v. United States,196 and In re Gault197 in 1967. A sophisticated legal
observer would have noted as well that the premise of a “living
constitution” was a standard understanding not only of liberal lions but
of the most staid and lawyerly of Justices.198
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the expectation that
Pennsylvania judges would construe a “living constitution” would have
been bound up with the “original meaning” of a unified judicial
system; and that the “original intent” of the 1968 Constitution—if it is
relevant—was that judges should transcend originalism.
V. CONCLUSION
In 1976, Justice Rehnquist observed: “At first blush . . . a living
Constitution is better than what must be its counterpart, a dead
Constitution. It would seem that only a necrophile could disagree.”199 In
1968, the People of Pennsylvania had no reason to expect that their
judiciary would be afflicted by constitutional necrophilia. And today, the
Justices who have construed a living Pennsylvania Constitution, with
due regard for text, history, and tradition over the last half century have
no reason to be abashed by their failure to adopt it.

194. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
195. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
196. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
197. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
198. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The
balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history
teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from
which it broke. That tradition is a living thing.”); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (“For reasons stated at length in my dissenting opinion in Poe v.
Ullman . . . I believe . . . . the relevant inquiry may be aided by resort to one or more of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights, it is not dependent on them or any of their radiations. The
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands, in my opinion, on its own
bottom.”); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170–71 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.) (“[T]he verbal
symbols of the Constitution does not give them a fixed technical content. It exacts a
continuing process of application. . . . To believe that this judicial exercise of judgment could
be avoided by freezing ‘due process of law’ at some fixed stage of time or thought is to
suggest that the most important aspect of constitutional adjudication is a function for
inanimate machines and not for judges, for whom the independence safeguarded by Article
III of the Constitution was designed.”); cf. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 798 (1973) (Powell,
J., concurring, joined by Burger, C.J., & Rehnquist, J.) (“[T]he Constitution-a vital and
living charter after nearly two centuries because of the wise flexibility of its key
provisions.”).
199. William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 693
(1976) (emphasis omitted).
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APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGY: FIFTY YEARS OF PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME
COURT JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF 1968
Selection of cases for this census began with the cases identified in
the Lexis Pennsylvania Supreme Court file using the following search:
(“pennsylvania constitution” or “constitution of pennsylvania” or “state
constitution”) and (“unconstitutional” or violat!), undertaken between
January 2018 and July 2018. The search generated a total of 1,586
entries over the fifty-year period following ratification of the 1968
Amendments on April 23, 1968. This constituted roughly 16% of the
cases reported during this period. [A search for “held” during the fiftyyear period in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court file generated 9242
cases].
Within this sample, we then identified the opinions in which the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court invoked the Pennsylvania Constitution as
part of the rationale for a decision exercising judicial review. This search
was supplemented by Shepardizing the identified cases to find additional
relevant cases within the period, and also searching for references in
cases to constitutional provisions invoked as authoritative in identified
cases.
This process generated a total of 373 cases in which the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court exercised its authority of judicial review under
the Pennsylvania Constitution during the fifty-year period April 23,
1968–April 23, 2018. The fifty-year period provides a convenient closing
date for the sample.
The cases selected included:
• Cases in which official actions were declared unconstitutional
as violating the Pennsylvania Constitution (coded as “yes,”
293 cases)
• Cases in which legal rules were interpreted in light of the
mandates of the Pennsylvania Constitution (coded as
“statutory construction”—although in 19 of the 51 cases,
actions were undertaken by entities other than the state
legislature)
• Cases in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court sustained
the viability of a state constitutional challenge but remanded
the case for resolution in light of that ruling (coded as
“remand,” 29 cases)
• Cases that did not rely on the Pennsylvania Constitution for
a rule of decision were excluded from the sample, as were
cases in which challenged official actions were held to be
wholly consistent with Pennsylvania constitutional norms.
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The identified sample of constitutional review cases was coded to
identify:
• The state constitutional provision on which the case turned
o Because of limitations of the data analysis program,
cases could only be coded in one category. Where two
or more categories potentially applied (as where more
than one constitutional provision was the basis for
determination) the cases were coded on the basis of
which mode of analysis predominated. Appendix C
contains multiple entries for cases which invoked
multiple provisions.
• Whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court also found a
federal constitutional violation (117 cases in the sample), and
whether the interpretation of the state constitution followed
federal rules (130 cases in the sample)
• The relation between the wording of the state constitutional
provision invoked and federal constitutional provisions:
o “Parallel” provisions (174 cases), using the same
wording
o “Congruent” provisions (106 cases), analogous
subjects but using different wording
o “Skew” provisions (93 cases), disanalogous subject
and wording
• The source of the official action reviewed:
o Administrative action by state executive officials or
agencies (29 cases)
o Ballot measure (2 cases)
o Criminal trial, including judicial rulings and
prosecutorial actions (89 cases)
o Judicial action in a non-criminal context (26 cases)
o Law enforcement action by state or local officers (51
cases)
o Municipal action (38 cases)
o Statute (138 cases)
• An excel spreadsheet incorporating this coding was provided
to the Rutgers University Law Review, and is available for
review on request.

362

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:287
APPENDIX B: CHARTS
Independent Constitutional Review by Justice
1968–2018 (32 Justices)
Zappala
Flaherty
Roberts
Nix
Castille
Saylor
Cappy
Nigro
Todd
O'Brien
Manderino
Per curiam
Baer
Newman
Larsen
Eakin
Jones
Papadakos
Wecht
Eagen
Hutchinson
Donohue
Lamb
McDermott
Stout
Fitzgerald
Orie Melvin
Pomeroy
Stevens
Unanimous
Bell
Dougherty

41
36
33
28
24
19
19
15
14
13
13
12
12
11
11
10
7
7
7
6
6
6
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
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Kauffman
Jones, O'Brien, Nix
Montemuro
Baer, Todd
Total

363
1
1
1
1
373

Independent Constitutional Review of Statutes by Justice
1968–2018 (25 Justices)
Zappala
Statutory construction
Yes
Roberts
Statutory construction
Yes
Flaherty
Statutory construction
Yes
Nix
Statutory construction
Yes
Castille
Remand
Statutory construction
Yes
Per curiam
Remand
Statutory construction
Yes
Saylor
Remand
Statutory construction
Yes
Todd
Remand

18
5
13
14
1
13
14
4
10
13
6
7
9
1
1
7
9
1
1
7
9
1
1
7
6
1
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Yes
Cappy
Yes
Larsen
Statutory construction
Yes
Eagen
Statutory construction
Yes
Manderino
Remand
Yes
Baer
Yes
Wecht
Remand
Yes
Statutory construction
O'Brien
Statutory construction
Yes
Nigro
Yes
Jones
Statutory construction
Yes
Hutchinson
Statutory construction
Yes
Newman
Yes
Eakin
Yes
Papadakos
Yes

5
5
5
5
3
2
4
2
2
4
1
3
4
4
4
1
2
1
3
1
2
3
3
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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Fitzgerald
Statutory construction
Unanimous
Yes
Pomeroy
Yes
Dougherty
Yes
Donohue
Statutory construction
Montemuro
Statutory construction
Total

365
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
138
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APPENDIX C: PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT EXERCISE OF INDEPENDENT
JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION 1968–2018

PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT EXERCISE OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE PENNSYLVANIA
CONSTITUTION 1968–2018
Seth F. Kreimer, Kenneth W. Gemmill Professor of Law,
University of Pennsylvania, and Maura Douglas, J.D. 2018
University of Pennsylvania Law School
I.GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF LAW MAKING ................. 181
A. Art. II, § 1 [Non-Delegation Doctrine]................................. 181
B. Art. III, § 3 [Single Subject Rule] ....................................... 183
C. Judicial Autonomy and Administration ............................ 184
D. Limits on Legislative Process ............................................. 194
E. Limits on Executive Action ................................................. 196
F. Limits on Municipal Action ................................................ 197
II.DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND SUBSTANTIVE LIMITS ......................... 200
A. Art. I, § 1 [“All men are born equally free and independent,
and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among
which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty,
of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and
reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness”]....... 200
1. Substantive Limits on Undue Oppression .................... 200
2. Procedural Limits ......................................................... 206
3. Reputation and Privacy ................................................ 208
B. Art. I, § 3 [Religious Freedom]............................................ 211
C. Art. I, § 5 [Elections] ........................................................... 211
D. Art. I, § 6 [Jury Trial]......................................................... 212
E. Art. I, § 7 [Free Expression] ................................................ 213
F. Art. I, § 10 [Taking] ............................................................ 215
G. Art. I, § 11 [Remedies] ........................................................ 217
H. Art. I, § 13 [Cruel Punishment] .......................................... 220
I. Art. I, § 17 [Ex Post Facto].................................................. 222
J. Art. I, § 17 [Impairment of Contracts] ................................ 223
K. Art. 1, § 27 [Environmental] ............................................... 225
L. Art. I, § 28 [Equal Rights Amendment] .............................. 226
M. Art. III, § 14 [Education] .................................................... 230
N. Art. III, § 32 [Equal Treatment] ......................................... 230
O. Art. VIII, § 1 [Tax Uniformity] ........................................... 234
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III.CRIMINAL PROCESS .......................................................................... 238
A. Art. I, § 8 [Search and Seizure] .......................................... 238
B. Pa. Const. Art. I., § 9 .......................................................... 252
1. Assistance of Counsel ................................................... 252
2. Law of the Land ............................................................ 257
3. Additional Rights of the Accused .................................. 259
C. Pa. Const. Art. I, § 10 [Double Jeopardy] ........................... 267
I. GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF LAW MAKING
A. Art. II, § 1 [Non-Delegation Doctrine]
• Protz v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 161 A.3d 827, 830 (Pa. 2017)
(holding provision of Workers’ Compensation Act requiring
physician to determine a claimant’s degree of impairment by
applying methodology set forth in the most recent version of
guide issued by the American Medical Association was an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority).
o Majority: Justice Wecht, joined by Justice Todd, Justice
Donohue, Justice Dougherty & Justice Mundy
o Concurrence: Chief Justice Saylor
o Dissent: Justice Baer
• W. Phila. Achievement Charter Elementary Sch. v. Sch. Dist., 132
A.3d 957, 959, 968 (Pa. 2016) (holding that Distress Law Section
6-696(i)(3) of the School Code, which gave a governor-appointed
school reform commission broad power over public education and
charter schools in Philadelphia, violated the non-delegation rule
in article II, section 1).
o Majority: Chief Justice Saylor, joined by Justice Todd, Justice
Dougherty & Justice Wecht
o Dissent: Justice Baer, joined by Justice Donohue
o Justice Eakin did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
• Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v.
Commonwealth, 877 A.2d 383, 415, 419 (Pa. 2005) (finding the
provision of Race Horse Development and Gaming Act that
barred local subdivisions from prohibiting or regulating licensed
gaming facility was unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power to the Board).
o Majority: Chief Justice Cappy, joined by Justice Castille,
Justice Nigro, Justice Saylor, Justice Eakin & Justice Baer

368

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:287
Justice Newman did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.
Probst v. Commonwealth, 849 A.2d 1135, 1138, 1142 (Pa. 2004)
(holding statute requiring serial DUI offenders to install an
ignition interlock before license suspension was lifted violated
separation of powers and was an unconstitutional delegation of
power of certain responsibilities to the courts).
o Majority: Chief Justice Cappy, joined by Justice Castille,
Justice Nigro, Justice Newman, Justice Saylor & Justice
Eakin
o Former Chief Justice Zappala did not participate in the
decision of this case.
Commonwealth v. Mockaitis, 834 A.2d 488, 491, 501 (Pa. 2003)
(Act 63, which delegated sentencing courts’ responsibilities over
installation of ignition interlock devices, violated separation of
powers doctrine).
o Majority: Justice Castille, joined by Justice Cappy, Justice
Nigro, Justice Newman & Justice Saylor
o Former Chief Justices Flaherty and Zappala did not
participate in the decision of this case.
Blackwell v. Commonwealth, 567 A.2d 630, 634–35 (Pa. 1989)
(holding that the purported one-year extension of the life of the
Commission by Leadership Committee pursuant to provision of
the Sunset Act was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power to a subcommittee of the General Assembly).
o Majority: Justice Larsen, joined by Chief Justice Nix, Justice
Flaherty, Justice McDermott & Justice Zappala
o Justice Papadakos did not participate in the consideration or
decision.
Commonwealth ex rel. Kane v. McKechnie, 358 A.2d 419, 420–21
(Pa. 1976) (holding that provision of the Administrative Code
delegating appointment of person elected by the State Dental
Society as its president to the State Dental Council and
Examining Board violated the non-delegation doctrine of article
II, section 1).
o Majority: Justice Manderino, joined by Justice Eagen, Justice
Roberts & Justice Nix
o Dissent: Justice Pomeroy, joined by Chief Justice Jones &
Justice O’Brien
Hetherington v. McHale, 329 A.2d 250, 253 (Pa. 1974) (“Section
16(e) violates this principle [of only being governed by elected
representatives in a democratic form of government] by
o
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surrendering to private organizations the power to select eight of
seventeen members of a committee responsible for the
disbursement of public funds.”).
o Majority: Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Manderino
o Concurrence: Justice Manderino
o Concurring in the result: Justice Eagen
o Dissent: Chief Justice Jones, joined by Justice O’Brien &
Justice Pomeroy
B. Art. III, § 3 [Single Subject Rule]
• Commonwealth v. Derhammer, 173 A.3d 723, 724–25, 731 (Pa.
2017) (finding the State lacked authority to prosecute defendant
for failing to comply with sex offender registration and waiting
five days to report his address change under Megan’s Law, which
had already been ruled unconstitutional in Neiman under article
III, section 3).
o Majority: Chief Justice Saylor, joined by Justice Baer, Justice
Todd, Justice Donohue, Justice Dougherty, Justice Wecht &
Justice Mundy
o Concurrence: Justice Wecht
o Concurrence: Justice Mundy
• Leach v. Commonwealth, 141 A.3d 426, 427–28, 430, 435 (Pa.
2016) (holding municipal firearm legislation, Act 192, which
added a newly-defined offense of theft of secondary metal while
also giving persons adversely affected by local gun-control laws
standing to bring an action against the municipality, violated the
single subject requirement of article III, section 3).
o Majority: Chief Justice Saylor, joined by Justice Baer, Justice
Todd, Justice Donohue, Justice Dougherty & Justice Wecht
o Former Justice Eakin did not participate in the consideration
or decision of this case.
• Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603, 605, 613 (Pa. 2013)
(determining that Act 152 of 2004 amending Megan’s Law
“clearly, palpably, and plainly” violates the single subject rule of
the state constitution).
o Majority: Justice Todd, joined by Justice Saylor, Justice
Eakin, Justice Baer & Justice McCaffery
o Dissent: Chief Justice Castille
o Former Justice Melvin did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.
• Pa. State Ass’n of Jury Comm’rs v. Commonwealth, 64 A.3d 611,
613–14 (Pa. 2013) (finding that Act 108 of 2011, which allowed
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counties to abolish office of jury commissioner, violated the single
subject rule of the state constitution).
o Majority: Justice Baer, joined by Chief Justice Castille,
Justice Saylor, Justice Eakin, Justice Todd & Justice
McCaffery
o Justice Melvin did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
• Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v.
Commonwealth, 877 A.2d 383, 402–03 (Pa. 2005) (holding that
“certain of the appropriations of revenues collected pursuant to
the Gaming Act” violated the single subject rule of the state
constitution but that these portions were severable from the rest
of the Act).
o Majority: Chief Justice Cappy, joined by Justice Castille,
Justice Nigro, Justice Saylor, Justice Eakin & Justice Baer
o Justice Newman did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.
• City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 838 A.2d 566, 571, 593
(Pa. 2003) (holding Act which reorganized the governance of the
Pennsylvania Convention Center violated the article III, section
3 prohibition against multi-subject legislation).
o Majority: Justice Saylor, joined by Chief Justice Cappy,
Justice Castille, Justice Nigro, Justice Newman, Justice
Eakin & Justice Lamb
• Bergdoll v. Kane, 731 A.2d 1261, 1263, 1266, 1270 (Pa. 1999)
(holding ballot question posing amendments to both article I,
section 9 and article V, section 10(c) violated the single subject
rule—article XI, section 1).
o Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Chief Justice Flaherty,
Justice Cappy, Justice Castille, Justice Nigro, Justice
Newman & Justice Saylor
o Concurrence: Justice Saylor
o Note: this case refers to the single subject rule with respect to
constitutional amendments, article XI, section 1.
C. Judicial Autonomy and Administration
• Friends of Pa. Leadership Charter Sch. v. Chester City Bd. of
Assessment Appeals, 101 A.3d 66, 67–68, 73, 76, 78 (Pa. 2014)
(holding that retroactive application of a real estate tax
exemption for nonprofit entities associated with charter schools
violated separation of powers because it operated as “a legislative
command to open a final judgment and to have the rights and
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obligations resolved in that final judgment reassessed in accord
with the subsequently expressed legislative will”).
o Majority: Justice Baer, joined by Chief Justice Castille,
Justice McCaffery & Justice Stevens
o Concurrence: Justice Saylor, joined by Justice Todd (finding
the exemption violates the Uniformity Clause, not separation
of powers)
o Concurrence: Justice Eakin, joined by Chief Justice Castille
(finding the exemption violates both the Uniformity Clause
and separation of powers)
• In re Bruno, 101 A.3d 635, 641, 661, 682 (Pa. 2014) (holding that
article V, section 18 creating the Judicial Conduct Board did not
divest the Supreme Court of jurisdiction over juridical discipline
matters, and that the Court had supervisory power to order the
interim suspension of a sitting judge without pay).
o Majority: Chief Justice Castille, joined by Justice Eakin,
Justice Baer & Justice Stevens
o Special Concurrence: Chief Justice Castille
o Concurrence: Justice Saylor, joined by Justice Todd
o Concurrence: Justice Baer
o Concurrence: Justice Todd
o Concurrence: Justice McCaffery
• In re Merlo, 58 A.3d 1, 2, 15, 17 (Pa. 2012) (affirming decision that
magisterial district judge “violated article V, section 18(d)(1) . . .
by neglecting or failing to perform the duties of her office and by
engaging in conduct which brings the judicial office into
disrepute[,]” such as her repeated failure to appear, and lateness
in appearing, for court hearings, warranting her removal from
office).
o Majority: Justice Todd, joined by Chief Justice Castille,
Justice Saylor, Justice Eakin, Justice Baer & Justice
McCaffery
o Justice Melvin did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
• Jefferson Cty. Court Appointed Emps. Ass’n v. Pa. Labor Relations
Bd., 985 A.2d 697, 699, 708 (Pa. 2009) (“[E]xamin[ing], in the
context of a labor dispute, the inherent conflict between a board
of county commissioners’ constitutional right, in its legislative
capacity, to implement a budget and the judiciary’s constitutional
right to administer justice by hiring, firing, and supervising its
employees, within that budget.” Ultimately holding that the
county violated the judiciary’s constitutional rights, and that
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“separation of powers doctrine mandate[d] that the County
present the Judiciary with the reduced budget and allow the
Judiciary to determine how to operate within it.”).
o Majority: Justice Baer, joined by Chief Justice Castille,
Justice Todd & Justice McCaffery
o Concurrence: Justice Greenspan
o Dissent: Justice Eakin
o Justice Saylor did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
• Commonwealth v. McMullen, 961 A.2d 842, 848–50 (Pa. 2008)
(finding that the statute (§ 4136) that granted the right to jury
trial in all indirect criminal contempt cases involving a violation
of a restraining order or injunction violated the Court’s exclusive
constitutional authority to establish rules of procedure under
article V, section 10(c)).
o Majority: Eakin, joined by Chief Justice Castille, Justice
Baer, Justice McCaffery & Justice Greenspan
o Concurrence: Chief Justice Castille, joined by Justice
Greenspan
o Concurrence: Justice Greenspan, joined by Justice McCaffery
o Concurrence and Dissent: Justice Saylor
o Justice Todd did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
• Beyers v. Richmond, 937 A.2d 1082, 1091–93 (Pa. 2007) (holding
that the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law
did not apply to attorneys practicing law because the General
Assembly did not have constitutional authority to regulate
attorney conduct, given the Supreme Court’s “exclusive
constitutional authority to regulate [and monitor] the practice of
law” under article V, section 10(c)).
o Majority: Justice Fitzgerald, joined by Justice Castille &
Justice Baldwin
o Concurrence: Chief Justice Cappy, joined by Justice Baer
(agrees with the majority “to the extent that it holds that as
a matter of statutory construction, the [UTPCPL] does not
apply to attorneys practicing law”) (citations omitted).
o Dissent: Justice Eakin, joined by Justice Saylor
o Dissent: Justice Saylor
• Commonwealth v. Whitmore, 912 A.2d 827, 832, 834 (Pa. 2006)
(finding the Superior Court lacked authority to sua sponte order
a new judge be assigned to preside over resentencing of defendant
because such authority is within the Supreme Court’s article V,
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section 10(c) general supervisory and administrative power over
all courts).
o Majority: Justice Newman, joined by Justice Castille, Justice
Saylor, Justice Eakin, Justice Baer & Justice Baldwin
o Concurrence: Chief Justice Cappy
Stilp v. Commonwealth, 905 A.2d 918, 949 (Pa. 2006) (holding that
the statute (Act 72 of 2005) repealing legislation that increased
salaries for judiciary was unconstitutional “to the extent that it
diminished judicial compensation” pursuant to article V, section
16(a)).
o Majority: Justice Castille, joined by Justice Newman, Justice
Eakin, Justice Baer & Justice Baldwin
o Concurrence and Dissent: Justice Saylor
o Chief Justice Cappy did not participate in the consideration
or decision of this matter.
Payne v. Commonwealth Dep’t of Corr., 871 A.2d 795, 804–05 (Pa.
2005) (determining that sections 6605(a)–(c) of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PRLA”), which contained a procedure for
the “automatic dissolution” of preliminary injunctions after
ninety days, was unconstitutional because it “intrudes upon this
Court’s exclusive rulemaking authority granted under Article V,
Section 10(c)”).
o Majority: Chief Justice Cappy, joined by Justice Eakin,
Justice Baer, Justice Castille, Justice Nigro, Justice
Newman, and in Parts V–VII by Justice Saylor
o Concurring in part and in the result: Justice Saylor
Shaulis v. Pa. State Ethics Comm’n, 833 A.2d 123, 132 (Pa. 2003),
modified, Yocum v. Commonwealth, 61 A.3d 228, 244 n.10 ( Pa.
2017) (holding that section 1103(g) of the Ethics Act was
unconstitutional in violation of article V, section 10, because it
imposed restrictions upon former government employees who are
also attorneys and thus, specifically targeted attorneys).
o Majority: Justice Newman, joined by Chief Justice Cappy,
Justice Castille, in Part II by Justice Lamb, and in Part I by
Justice Eakin
o Concurrence: Justice Lamb
o Concurrence and Dissent: Justice Eakin
o Dissent: Justice Saylor, joined by Justice Nigro
In re Melograne, 812 A.2d 1164, 1169 (Pa. 2002) (holding that the
Court of Judicial Discipline lacked the authority to disbar a judge
pursuant to article V, section 10(c) based on his conviction of a
felony: conspiracy to violate civil rights).
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Majority: Justice Cappy, joined by Justice Newman & Justice
Eakin
o Concurrence: Chief Justice Zappala
o Concurrence and Dissent: Justice Saylor, joined by Justice
Nigro
o Justice Castille did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.
Gmerek v. State Ethics Comm’n, 807 A.2d 812, 813, 819 (Pa. 2002)
(affirming lower court decision by equally divided court that
Lobbying Disclosure Act violated Supreme Court’s exclusive
authority to regulate the practice of law under article V, section
10).
o Per Curiam: Chief Justice Zappala, joined by Justice Cappy
in support of affirmance
o Opinion in Support of Affirmance: Justice Castille
o Opinion in Support of Reversal: Justice Saylor, joined by
Justice Nigro & Justice Newman
o Former Chief Justice Flaherty did not participate in the
decision of this matter.
First Judicial Dist. of Pa. v. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n, 727
A.2d 1110, 1112 (Pa. 1999) (holding that the Human Relations
Commission had no jurisdiction to adjudicate any complaints
against the judicial branch because of the separation of powers
doctrine).
o Majority: Chief Justice Flaherty, joined by Justice Cappy,
Justice Castille, Justice Nigro, Justice Newman & Justice
Saylor
o Concurring in result: Justice Zappala
In re Suspension of Capital Unitary Review Act, 722 A.2d 676, 678
(Pa. 1999) (holding that CURA violated article V, section 10 by
directly conflicting with existing procedural rules established by
SCOPA).
o Per curiam: Justice Castille
o Concurring in the result: Justice Zappala & Justice Nigro
Commonwealth v. Stern, 701 A.2d 568, 573 (Pa. 1997) (holding
that section 4117(b)(1) of the Crimes Code prohibiting payment
for referrals violated separation of powers, under article V,
section 10, as the Supreme Court has exclusive authority to
supervise conduct of attorneys).
o Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Chief Justice Flaherty,
Justice Cappy, Justice Castille, Justice Nigro & Justice
Newman
o
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• Court of Common Pleas of Erie Cty. v. Pa. Human Relations
Comm’n, 682 A.2d 1246, 1247–48 (Pa. 1996) (finding that the
separation of powers doctrine, embodied in article V, section 10,
prohibited PHRC from deciding a Pennsylvania Human Rights
Act discrimination claim filed by a juvenile probation officer
employed by the Court of Common Pleas).
o Majority: Justice Nigro, joined by Justice Flaherty & Justice
Castille
o Concurrence: Justice Cappy
o Dissent: Justice Zappala
o Former Chief Justice Nix and Justice Newman did not
participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
• Pa. State Ass’n of Cty. Comm’rs v. Commonwealth, 681 A.2d 699,
700–01 (Pa. 1996) (granting “petition for mandamus and
order[ing] that the General Assembly enact a funding scheme for
the court system on or before January 1, 1998,” based on its prior
holding in County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 534 A.2d 760
(1987) that the existing funding system violated article V, section
1).
o Per Curiam: Justice Flaherty, joined by Justice Zappala,
Justice Nigro & Justice Newman
o Concurrence: Justice Newman
o Dissent: Chief Justice Nix, joined by Justice Castille
o Dissent: Justice Castille, joined by Chief Justice Nix
o Justice Cappy did not participate in this Order.
• Commonwealth ex rel. Jiuliante v. County of Erie, 657 A.2d 1245,
1252 (Pa. 1995) (“We are persuaded that the constitutional
scheme of separation of powers, which preserves the
independence of the judiciary, warrants recognition of a limited
exception to the general rule and therefore hold that attorney’s
fees may be awarded in a successful action challenging conduct
which genuinely threatens or interferes with the inherent
authority of the judiciary.”).
o Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Chief Justice Nix,
Justice Flaherty, Justice Cappy, Justice Castille & Justice
Montemuro (sitting by designation)
o Justice Papadakos did not participate in the decision of the
case.
• In re Act 147 of 1990, 598 A.2d 985, 990 (Pa. 1991) (“Act 147 is
unconstitutional and violates the separation of powers doctrine
[under article V, sections 2 and 10] in our Constitution because it
attempts to place constables within the judicial branch of
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government and under the supervisory authority of the judicial
branch.”).
o Per Curiam: Justice Papadakos, joined by Justice Flaherty,
Justice Zappala & Justice Cappy
o Concurring in the result: Justice McDermott
o Dissent: Justice Larsen
o Chief Justice Nix did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.
• Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Anonymous Attorney A, 595 A.2d
42, 46–47, 49 (Pa. 1991) (holding that because article V, section
18 “mandates the procedure for bringing disciplinary actions
against judicial officers[,]” and “[n]o other body or agency has
jurisdiction to bring an action against a judicial officer for
misconduct[,]” the Office of Disciplinary Counsel could not
proceed against attorneys after they were removed from judicial
office).
o Majority: Justice Cappy, joined by Chief Justice Nix, Justice
Larsen, Justice Flaherty & Justice Zappala
o Dissent: Justice Papadakos
o Justice McDermott did not participate in the consideration or
decision of the appeals considered herein.
• Goodheart v. Casey, 555 A.2d 1210, 1210–11, 1215 (Pa. 1989)
(holding that State Employees’ Retirement Code of 1974, “which
reduced pension benefits for members of the Commonwealth
judiciary[,]” violated separation of powers pursuant to article V,
section 16(a)).
o Per Curiam: Chief Justice Nix, joined by Justice Flaherty &
Justice Flaherty
o Concurring in the result: Justice Larsen, Justice Zappala &
Justice Papadakos
o Dissent: Justice McDermott
• Klein v. Commonwealth, 555 A.2d 1216, 1223 (Pa. 1989) (“We
hold, therefore, that the two-tiered system of retirement benefits
establishing radical disparities in the deferred compensation
paid to the members of the two classes of judges . . . is
unconstitutional as inimical to and destructive of the ‘unified
judicial system’ mandated by Article V, section 1 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution.”).
o Majority: Justice Larsen, joined by Chief Justice Nix, Justice
Flaherty & Justice Stout
o Concurrence: Chief Justice Nix, joined by Justice Flaherty &
Justice Stout
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o Dissent: Justice McDermott
• Sprague v. Casey, 550 A.2d 184, 186, 192–94 (Pa. 1988) (ordering
removal from the 1988 general election ballot of the offices of
Justice of the Supreme Court and Judge of the Superior Court
because “the vacancies, having occurred during the term of office,
were required to be filled by gubernatorial appointment exercised
in accordance with section 13(b) of Article V”).
o Majority: Chief Justice Nix, joined by Justice Larsen, Justice
Flaherty, Justice McDermott, Justice Zappala & Justice
Papadakos
o Justice Stout did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
• County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 534 A.2d 760, 763–65 (Pa.
1987) (holding statutory scheme obligating the county to fund
courts within its judicial system was void as violative of
constitutional mandate for unified judicial system under article
V, section 1).
o Majority: Justice Flaherty, joined by Justice Larsen & Justice
Zappala
o Dissent: Chief Justice Nix, joined by Justice McDermott
o Dissent from denial of reargument: Justice Papadakos, joined
by Chief Justice Nix & Justice McDermott
o Justice Hutchinson did not participate in the decision of this
case.
• In re Subpoena on Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 517 A.2d 949,
950–51, 955 (Pa. 1986) (holding that constitutional authority
under article V, section 13 providing that record of proceedings
before the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board where no
disciplinary action is recommended is permanently and
absolutely confidential, must prevail over statutory authority,
and thus, the Pennsylvania Crime Commission could not obtain
confidential record of proceedings before Board with respect to
investigation of judicial misconduct charge).
o Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Justice McDermott,
Justice Hutchinson & Justice Papadakos
o Chief Justice Nix & Justice Flaherty did not participate in
the decision of this case.
o Justice Larsen did not participate in the consideration of this
case.
• In re Casale, 517 A.2d 1260, 1260–63 (Pa. 1986) (holding that the
common pleas court lacked jurisdiction to require the defendant
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to appear at the office of the assistant district attorney and order
suspect to submit handwriting exemplar).
o Majority: Justice Hutchinson, joined by Chief Justice Nix,
Justice Larsen, Justice Flaherty, Justice McDermott, Justice
Zappala & Justice Papadakos
Commonwealth v. Lutz, 495 A.2d 928, 935–36 (Pa. 1985) (holding
that provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code that allowed local
Courts of Common Pleas to establish their own rules applicable
to the administration of the accelerated rehabilitative disposition
(ARD) program in first offender drunk driving cases violated
article V, section 10 because they were inconsistent with the rules
adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court).
o Majority: Justice Flaherty, joined by Justice Larsen, Justice
McDermott, Justice Hutchinson & Justice Papadakos
o Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Chief Justice Nix,
joined by Justice Zappala
Kremer v. State Ethics Comm’n, 469 A.2d 593, 594–96 (Pa. 1983)
(holding that financial disclosure provisions of the Ethics Act,
insofar as they are applied to judges, infringe on the Supreme
Court’s power to supervise courts and are thus unconstitutional
pursuant to article V, section 10 and separation of powers).
o Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Chief Justice Roberts,
Justice Larsen, Justice Flaherty & Justice McDermott
o Concurrence: Justice Larsen
o Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Justice
Hutchinson, joined by Justice Nix
Mezvinsky v. Davis, 459 A.2d 307, 309 (Pa. 1983) (holding that
“the legislatively prescribed system requiring election of judges
to the Commonwealth Court and precluding all of the electors
from participating in the selection of the candidates for each
vacancy on that court is contrary to the mandate of [article V]
Section 13(a)”).
o Majority: Justice Flaherty, joined by Justice Nix & Justice
Larsen
o Concurrence: Justice Zappala
o Dissent: Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice McDermott
& Justice Hutchinson
Commonwealth v. Sorrell, 456 A.2d 1326, 1327–29 (Pa. 1982)
(holding that 42 Pa. C.S. § 5104(c), which “conferr[ed] upon the
prosecution an absolute right to a jury trial” that could overrule
a defendant’s decision to waive this right, was unconstitutional

2018]

•

•

•

•

STILL LIVING

379

pursuant to article V, section 10(c), which establishes “general
supervisory and administrative authority over all the courts”).
o Majority: Justice Roberts, joined by Chief Justice O’Brien,
Justice Larsen & Justice Flaherty
o Dissent: Justice Nix, joined by Justice Hutchinson
o Dissent: Justice McDermott
Wajert v. State Ethics Comm’n, 420 A.2d 439, 441–42 (Pa. 1980)
(“We are persuaded the [Ethics Act] was intended to apply
to former judges, but, when so interpreted, it is
unconstitutional. . . . There can be no doubt that the statute has
infringed on this Court’s exclusive power to govern the conduct of
an attorney, and is, hence, unconstitutional.”).
o Majority: Chief Justice Eagen, joined by Justice O’Brien,
Justice Roberts, Justice Nix, Justice Larsen, Justice Flaherty
& Justice Kauffman
In re 42 Pa. C.S. § 1703, 394 A.2d 444, 446–47 (Pa. 1978) (Supreme
Court writes a direct letter to the General Assembly and to the
Governor expressing the view that the provision of the Public
Agency Open Meeting Law that made the Supreme Court a
“covered agency” when exercising its rule-making authority, and
thus subject to the requirement that it make its meetings public,
violated article V, section 10(c)).
o Unanimous letter
Leedom v. Thomas, 373 A.2d 1329, 1330–32 (Pa. 1977) (granting
writ of quo warranto, removing respondent from office, and
declaring relator—who had been elected—entitled to the office of
district justice of the peace for a magisterial district pursuant to
article V, section 13, which mandates that judicial offices be filled
by election).
o Per curiam: Chief Justice Eagen, Justice O’Brien, Justice
Roberts, Justice Pomeroy & Justice Manderino
o Dissent: Justice Nix
Flegal v. Dixon, 372 A.2d 406, 407–08 (Pa. 1977) (holding the
Magisterial District Reform Act, which prohibits a person from
filing nominating petitions until that person has successfully
completed the course of training and instruction and passed
examination, violated article V, section 12(b), requiring only that
a course of training and instruction be completed and
examination passed “[p]rior to assuming office”).
o Per curiam, before Chief Justice Eagen, Justice O’Brien,
Justice Roberts, Justice Pomeroy, Justice Nix & Justice
Manderino
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• Commonwealth v. Sutley, 378 A.2d 780, 782 (Pa. 1977) (holding
that amended statute, reducing penalties for possession of
marijuana, was unconstitutional because it “fatally interferes
with final judgments of the judiciary” and thus violated
separation of powers doctrine).
o Majority: Justice Nix, joined by Justice Eagen, Justice
O’Brien & Justice Pomeroy
o Concurrence: Justice Pomeroy
o Dissent: Justice Roberts
o Dissent: Justice Manderino
o Former Chief Justice Jones did not participate in the decision
of this case.
• Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Vignola, 285 A.2d 869, 872 (Pa.
1971) (holding that governor could not remove the president
judge of traffic court during his fixed five-year term pursuant to
section 16(i) of the Schedule to Judiciary article V).
o Majority: Chief Justice Bell, joined by Justice Jones, Justice
O’Brien & Justice Barbieri
o Dissent: Justice Eagen
o Dissent: Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Pomeroy
D. Limits on Legislative Process
• Hosp. & Healthsystem Ass’n of Pa. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 888
A.2d 601, 603, 615–16 (Pa. 2005) (holding General
Appropriations Act of 2002 violated article III, section 11, which
requires that a “general appropriation bill shall embrace nothing
but appropriations” because the legislature improperly
attempted to impose certain reimbursement rates for emergency
services by out-of-network hospitals) (emphasis added).
o Majority: Justice Baer, joined by Chief Justice Cappy, Justice
Castille, Justice Nigro, Justice Newman, Justice Saylor &
Justice Eakin
• Indep. Oil & Gas Ass’n of Pa. v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals of
Fayette Cty., 814 A.2d 180, 184–85 (Pa. 2002) (determining that
the Board did not have the authority to impose real estate tax in
question, which was an ad valorem tax on oil and gas interests
and the tax was unconstitutional).
o Majority: Chief Justice Zappala, joined by Justice Cappy,
Justice Castille, Justice Newman & Justice Eakin
o Concurrence: Justice Nigro, joined by Justice Saylor
• W. Shore Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 626 A.2d 1131,
1135–36 (Pa. 1993) (“Under section 7(b) [of the Sunset Act] as
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drafted, the legislature need not seek the Governor’s approval for
any adopted resolution. Merely the passage of a resolution by
both chambers would reestablish an agency set for
termination. . . . [W]e hold that section 7(b) as drafted violates
Article 3, Section 9 of our State Constitution.”).
o Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Chief Justice Nix,
Justice Flaherty, Justice Papadakos & Justice Cappy
o Concurring in the result: Justice Larsen
o Justice McDermott did not participate in the decision of this
case.
• Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 532 A.2d 775, 776, 782 (Pa. 1987)
(striking down provisions of the Sentencing Code where its
guidelines resulted from a legislative rejection resolution that
was not presented to the Governor, which violated article III,
section 9).
o Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Justice Papadakos, Chief
Justice Nix, Justice Flaherty & Justice McDermott
o Concurrence: Justice Papadakos
o Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Justice
Hutchinson
o Dissent: Justice Larsen
• Consumers Educ. & Protective Ass’n v. Nolan, 368 A.2d 675, 685
(Pa. 1977) (In reviewing claim that Senate vote was invalid
because of Sunshine Law the Court “observe[d] that even were
[it] to agree that the meeting in question was subject to the
Sunshine Law so as to invalidate the committee vote there taken,
appellants provide no authority for a judicial holding that the
subsequent confirmation vote, taken by the Senate as a whole as
provided by the Constitution, was similarly invalid.”).
o Majority: Justice Eagen, joined by Justice Roberts, Chief
Justice Jones, Justice O’Brien, Justice Nix & Justice
Manderino
o Concurrence: Justice Roberts
o Dissent: Justice Pomeroy
• Frame v. Sutherland, 327 A.2d 623, 626 (Pa. 1974) (“We hold that
the Senate’s attempt to adjourn sine die failed because of the
absence of consent by the House of Representatives. Our holding
rests on a conclusion that the Constitution prohibits either house
from adjourning sine die without the consent of the other.”).
o Majority: Justice Roberts, joined by Chief Justice Jones &
Justice O’Brien
o Concurring in the result: Justice Pomeroy
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Dissent: Justice Nix
Dissent: Justice Eagen
Justice Manderino did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.

E. Limits on Executive Action
• Pittman v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 159 A.3d 466, 467–68, 474
(Pa. 2017) (construing Subsection 6138(a)(2.1) of the Parole Code
in light of the constitutional right to appeal from an
administrative agency granted in article V, section 9 to require
that the Parole Board “must articulate the basis for its decision
to grant or deny a [convicted parole violator] credit for time
served at liberty on parole”).
o Majority: Justice Baer, joined by Justice Todd, Justice
Donohue & Justice Dougherty
o Concurring in the result: Chief Justice Saylor, joined by
Justice Todd
o Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Justice Mundy,
joined by Justice Wecht
• Scarnati v. Wolf, 173 A.3d 1110, 1112, 1135–36 (Pa. 2017) (holding
that the Governor’s attempted partial vetoes of the proposed
General Appropriations Act of 2014 did not adhere to the
requirements set forth in article IV, section 15 of the state
constitution).
o Majority: Justice Wecht, joined by Justice Todd, Justice
Mundy, Chief Justice Saylor (Parts I and III), Justice Baer
(Parts I and III) & Justice Donohue (Parts I and II)
o Concurrence: Chief Justice Saylor
o Concurrence: Justice Donohue
o Concurrence and dissent: Justice Baer, joined by Justice
Dougherty
• Arneson v. Wolf, 124 A.3d 1225, 1227–28 (Pa. 2015) (adopting
Commonwealth Court’s opinion that the Governor could not
terminate the Executive Director of the Office of Open Records
(OOR) in accordance with the Right to Know Law (RTKL) and
the state constitution under article VI, sections 1 and 7 because
the Office is “a unique and sui generis independent body,
[insulated] from the Governor’s constitutional power to remove
his appointees at-will”).
o Majority: Justice Baer, joined by Chief Justice Saylor &
Justice Eakin
o Dissent: Justice Todd
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Justice Stevens did not participate in the consideration or
decision of the case.
• Jubelirer v. Rendell, 953 A.2d 514, 537 (Pa. 2008) (holding that
the Governor is not constitutionally authorized under article IV,
section 16 to veto portions of the language defining a specific
appropriation in an appropriations bill “without disapproving the
funds with which the language is associated”).
o Majority: Chief Justice Castille, joined by Justice Saylor,
Justice Eakin, Justice Baer, Justice Todd & Justice
McCaffery
• Perzel v. Cortes, 870 A.2d 759, 765 (Pa. 2005) (holding that the
Secretary of Commonwealth’s rejection of the Writ of Election to
fill a vacancy in the General Assembly “offends the separation of
powers” because such authority is vested exclusively in General
Assembly pursuant to article II, section 2).
o Majority: Justice Newman, joined by Chief Justice Cappy,
Justice Castille, Justice Nigro, Justice Saylor, Justice Eakin
& Justice Baer
o

F. Limits on Municipal Action
• Buckwalter v. Borough of Phoenixville, 985 A.2d 728, 729, 733 (Pa.
2009) (invalidating an ordinance that eliminated pay to council
members because it violated article III, section 27’s limitation
that no “law,” which includes municipal ordinances, shall
decrease a public officer’s salary after election or appointment).
o Majority: Justice Eakin, joined by Chief Justice Castille,
Justice Baer, Justice Todd, Justice McCaffery & Justice
Greenspan
o Concurrence: Justice Saylor
• Pa. Gaming Control Bd. v. City Council of Phila., 928 A.2d 1255,
1258, 1270 (Pa. 2007) (enjoining city council from using an
ordinance to place a question on the ballot regarding the location
of gaming facilities because the ordinance was an “unlawful and
unconstitutional exercise of power” under the home rule charter
provision of article IX, section 2).
o Majority: Chief Justice Cappy, joined by Justice Eakin,
Justice Baldwin & Justice Fitzgerald
o Concurrence: Justice Baer
o Dissent: Justice Castille
o Dissent: Justice Saylor
• S. Newton Twp. Electors v. S. Newton Twp. Supervisor, 838 A.2d
643, 644, 649 (Pa. 2003) (holding that Section 503 of the Second
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Class Township Code, “which provides for the recall of a township
supervisor,” violated article VI, section 7 and its provision for the
“exclusive method of removal for elected officials”).
o Majority: Chief Justice Cappy, joined by Justice Castille,
Justice Nigro, Justice Newman & Justice Saylor
o Dissent: Justice Lamb
o Justice Eakin did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
Eakin v. Keller, 730 A.2d 953, 954–55, 958 (Pa. 1999) (pursuant to
article III, section 27, a district attorney could not receive a salary
increase from a statute enacted during the first year of his term).
o Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Chief Justice Flaherty,
Justice Cappy, Justice Nigro & Justice Newman
o Justice Castille did not participate in the decision of this case.
In re Petition to Recall Reese, 665 A.2d 1162, 1167 (Pa. 1995) (“[I]n
providing for recall the municipality of Kingston exceeded the
powers conferred by Article IX, Section 2 and the Home Rule
Charter and Optional Plans Law. This method of removal is
specifically denied by the Constitution.”).
o Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Chief Justice Nix,
Justice Flaherty, Justice Cappy, Justice Castille & Justice
Montemuro (sitting by designation)
Clark v. Troutman, 502 A.2d 137, 138–39, 141 (Pa. 1985) (granting
petition to open a prior unappealed declaratory judgment based
on an intervening decision by the Supreme Court holding
unconstitutional raises in salary for county officials who were
elected prior to the enactment of the salary-raising statute,
because “[t]o hold otherwise in this case would not only
perpetuate an error of constitutional dimension at public
expense, but would place appellees in the unique position of being
the only county officials in the Commonwealth who were elected
prior to enactment of Act 223 who may receive salaries at the
increased rate prescribed in that Act”).
o Majority: Justice Flaherty, joined by Chief Justice Nix,
Justice Larsen, Justice Hutchinson, Justice Zappala &
Justice Papadakos
o Concurrence: Justice Hutchinson, joined by Justice
McDermott
Bundy v. Belin, 461 A.2d 197, 198, 204 n.15, 207 (Pa. 1983)
(construing the Local Government Unit Debt Act in light of
article IX, section 10 (local government debt) and “the principle
that tax statutes are to be strictly construed and all doubts are to
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be resolved in favor of the taxpayer, [to] find [that] the language
in Section 505 . . . was enacted to clarify that unpaid tax
anticipation notes, not converted into funding debt, may be
included in the budget of the ensuing fiscal year” (footnote
omitted)).
o Majority: Justice Nix, joined by Justice Flaherty, Justice
McDermott, Justice Hutchinson & Justice Zappala
o Concurrence: Chief Justice Roberts
o Justice Larsen did not participate in the consideration or
decision in this case.
• Bakes v. Snyder, 403 A.2d 1307, 1309, 1314 (Pa. 1979) (rejecting
county officials’ claim to a salary increase under Act 223 by
construing that provision to avoid a constitutional conflict with
article III, section 27—which prohibits sitting officials from
receiving a salary increase while in office—in accordance with
“the traditional presumption that the Legislature does not intend
an unconstitutional result”).
o Majority: Justice Roberts, joined by Chief Justice Eagen,
Justice O’Brien, Justice Nix & Justice Manderino
o Dissent: Justice Larsen
• Citizens Comm. to Recall Rizzo v. Bd. of Elections of Phila., 367
A.2d 232, 246–50 (Pa. 1976) (plurality opinion) (in separate
opinions, the Court held that the recall provisions of the
Philadelphia Home Rule Charter were unconstitutional under
article VI, section 7).
o Majority: Chief Justice Jones
o Concurrence: Justice O’Brien
o Concurrence: Justice Nix, joined by Justice Manderino
o Dissent: Justice Eagen
o Dissent: Justice Roberts
o Dissent: Justice Pomeroy
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II. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND SUBSTANTIVE LIMITS

A. Art. I, § 1 [“All men are born equally free and independent, and have
certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of
enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and
protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own
happiness”]
1. Substantive Limits on Undue Oppression
• Hosp. & Healthsystem Ass’n of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 77 A.3d
587, 604, 606 (Pa. 2013) (holding that medical providers had “a
vested entitlement under the Due Process Clause [article I,
section 1] to have [MCARE Fund] money utilized in the manner
directed by statute,” but remanding the issue of whether
reallocation of alleged “surplus” from the MCARE fund to the
General Fund actually violated these rights, rendering the
legislation unconstitutional).
o Majority: Justice Saylor, joined by Chief Justice Castille,
Justice Eakin & Justice McCaffery
o Dissent: Justice Baer
o Dissent: Justice Todd
o Justice Melvin did not participate in the decision of this case.
• Township of Exeter v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Exeter Twp., 962
A.2d 653, 659, 663 (Pa. 2009) (striking down zoning ordinance
that prohibited signs from exceeding 25 square feet because it
constituted a de facto exclusion of billboards in violation of the
billboard company’s article I, section 1 rights).
o Majority: Chief Justice Castille, joined by Justice Saylor,
Justice Baer, Justice Todd & Justice McCaffery
o Dissent: Justice Eakin
• Nixon v. Commonwealth, 839 A.2d 277, 288–89 (Pa. 2003) (holding
that the criminal records chapter of the Protective Services Act
violated the non-fundamental article I, section 1 “right to pursue
a lawful occupation” because it did not bear a substantial
relationship to the state interest in protecting elderly citizens).
o Majority: Justice Nigro, joined by Justice Saylor & Justice
Lamb
o Concurrence: Justice Castille
o Concurrence in result: Chief Justice Cappy, joined by Justice
Newman
o Dissent: Justice Eakin
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• In re Realen Valley Forge Greenes Assocs., 838 A.2d 718, 721, 727
(Pa. 2003) (holding that agricultural zoning designed to prevent
development of property was “reverse spot zoning” outside the
scope of municipality’s proper powers and violated article I,
section 1).
o Majority: Justice Lamb, joined by Chief Justice Cappy,
Justice Castille & Justice Eakin
o Dissent: Justice Saylor
o Justice Nigro and Justice Newman did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.
• In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1196–97, 1201–03 (Pa.
2002) (construing Adoption Act to find that in same-sex
second-parent adoption the legal parent need not relinquish
parental rights; avoiding challenge under article I, section 1).
o Majority: Chief Justice Zappala, joined by Justice Cappy,
Justice Castille, Justice Newman & Justice Saylor
o Concurring in the result: Justice Nigro
o Justice Eakin did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
• C & M Developers, Inc. v. Bedminster Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd.,
820 A.2d 143, 158–59 (Pa. 2002) (holding that zoning ordinance’s
one-acre minimum lot size was not reasonable or substantially
related to township’s interest in preserving its agricultural lands
and activities and thus constitutionally invalid).
o Majority: Justice Nigro, joined by Chief Justice Zappala,
Justice Cappy, Justice Castille, Justice Newman, Justice
Saylor & Justice Eakin
• Mahony v. Township of Hampton, 651 A.2d 525, 526, 528 (Pa.
1994) (holding zoning ordinance that prohibited private
enterprise from operating gas wells in residential districts but
permitted public operation of wells was an invalid exercise of
police power).
o Majority: Justice Flaherty, joined by Justice Papadakos,
Justice Castille & Justice Montemuro (sitting by designation)
o Dissent: Justice Cappy, joined by Chief Justice Nix
o Justice Zappala did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
• Pa. Nw. Distribs. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Moon, 584 A.2d 1372,
1376–77 (Pa. 1991) (holding “that the amortization and
discontinuance of a lawful pre-existing nonconforming use is per
se confiscatory and violative of the Pennsylvania Constitution,”
article I, section 1, and therefore reversing the lower court
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decisions upholding township’s finding that adult bookstore was
out of compliance with a newly enacted ordinance).
o Majority: Justice Larsen, joined by Justice Flaherty, Justice
Zappala & Justice Cappy
o Concurrence: Chief Justice Nix, joined by Justice Papadakos
o Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Justice
McDermott
In re Appeal of Shore, 573 A.2d 1011, 1013 (Pa. 1990) (affirming
the lower court ruling that zoning ordinance improperly
prohibited the development of mobile home parks).
o Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Justice Flaherty
o Concurrence: Chief Justice Nix
o Concurrence: Justice McDermott, joined by Justice
Papadakos
o Dissent: Justice Larsen
o Justice Stout did not participate in the decision of this case.
Council of Middletown Twp. v. Benham, 523 A.2d 311, 316–17 (Pa.
1987) (construing “public sanitary sewer system” in zoning
ordinance to not limit systems to existing government-owned
systems because “if a municipality is to have a monopoly on the
service, it must provide it in a reasonable manner”).
o Majority: Justice Hutchinson, joined by Chief Justice Nix,
Justice Flaherty & Justice Zappala
o Concurring in the result: Justice Papadakos
o Justice Larsen & Justice McDermott did not participate in
the consideration or decision of this case.
Craig v. Magee Mem’l Rehab Ctr., 515 A.2d 1350, 1353 (Pa. 1986)
(holding damages for delay under Rule 238 violated due process
and altered the substantive rights of litigants).
o Majority: Justice McDermott, joined by Chief Justice Nix,
Justice Flaherty & Justice Zappala
o Concurring in the result: Justice Hutchinson
o Dissent: Justice Larsen, joined by Justice Papadakos
In re Baby Girl D, 517 A.2d 925, 927 (Pa. 1986) (construing the
guardian ad litem’s standing to question the propriety of the fees
charged for adoption to be grounded in the standing of the infant
children themselves, as “it is every American’s right not to be
bought or sold” pursuant to article I, section 1).
o Majority: Justice Flaherty, joined by Chief Justice Nix,
Justice Larsen & Justice McDermott
o Dissent: Justice Hutchinson, joined by Justice Zappala &
Justice Papadakos
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• Geiger v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of N. Whitehall Twp., 507 A.2d 361,
365 (Pa. 1986) (holding that the zoning ordinance
unconstitutionally excluded use of mobile homes on individual
lots, and unconstitutionally discriminated against property
owners who wished “to permanently affix a mobile home to their
realty and make improvements rendering the structure
immobile”).
o Majority: Justice McDermott, joined by Chief Justice Nix,
Justice Flaherty, Justice Hutchinson & Justice Zappala
o Concurrence: Justice Larsen
o Concurrence: Justice Hutchinson
o Concurring in the result: Justice Papadakos
• Fernley v. Bd. of Supervisors of Schuylkill Twp., 502 A.2d 585, 586
(Pa. 1985) (holding that the township zoning ordinance, which
prohibited multi-family dwellings, was unconstitutional).
o Majority: Justice Hutchinson, joined by Chief Justice Nix,
Justice Larsen, Justice Flaherty & Justice Papadakos
o Concurrence: Chief Justice Nix
o Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Justice
McDermott, in the dissent joined by Justice Zappala
o Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Justice Zappala,
joined in the dissent by Justice McDermott
• Krenzelak v. Krenzelak, 469 A.2d 987, 994 (Pa. 1983) (refusing to
retroactively apply new legislation to conveyances before
effective date of new Divorce Code so as to avoid due process
conflict).
o Majority: Justice Hutchinson, joined by Chief Justice
Roberts, Justice Larsen, Justice McDermott & Justice
Zappala
o Concurrence: Justice Nix
o Concurrence: Justice Flaherty, joined by Justice Larsen
• Hopewell Twp. Bd. of Supervisors v. Golla, 452 A.2d 1337, 1343
(Pa. 1982) (“[T]he restrictions on landowner rights imposed by
the [township zoning] ordinance in question are too severe to be
regarded as ‘clearly necessary’ when their burdens are balanced
against the public interest sought to be protected; hence, they do
not meet the standard constitutionally required of municipal
zoning ordinances.”).
o Majority: Justice Flaherty, joined by Chief Justice O’Brien &
Justice Roberts
o Concurrence: Justice Hutchinson, joined by Justice Nix
o Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Justice Larsen
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o Dissent: Justice McDermott
• Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Upper Providence, 382 A.2d 105,
106–07
(Pa.
1977)
(holding
township
ordinance
unconstitutionally excluded multi-family dwellings in violation of
article I, section 1).
o Majority: Justice Nix, joined by Justice Eagen & Justice
O’Brien
o Concurring in the result: Justice Manderino
o Concurrence: Justice Roberts
o Chief Justice Jones did not participate in the decision of this
case.
o Justice Pomeroy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
• Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 341 A.2d 466,
468–69 (Pa. 1975) (holding zoning ordinance to be
unconstitutionally exclusionary when it provided for apartment
construction in only eighty out of the 11,589 acres in the
township).
o Majority: Justice O’Brien, joined by Justice Eagen & Justice
Nix
o Concurrence: Justice Roberts
o Concurring in the result: Justice Manderino
o Dissent: Justice Pomeroy
o Chief Justice Jones did not participate in the consideration
or decision of this case.
• Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 328 A.2d 464, 469–70 (Pa. 1974)
(upholding landowner’s attack on a zoning ordinance and finding
it unconstitutional, but remanding the issue of the requested
building permit to the Zoning Hearing Board because “the right
thereto is conditioned on other prior approvals which have not
been given”).
o Majority: Justice Eagen, joined by Justice O’Brien, Justice
Roberts, Justice Nix & Justice Manderino
o Concurring in the result: Justice Pomeroy
o Dissent: Chief Justice Jones
• Commonwealth v. Harmar Coal Co., 306 A.2d 308, 316 (Pa. 1973)
(construing Clean Streams Law and the Sanitary Water Board’s
denial of coal companies’ applications for mine drainage permits
as a constitutional regulation to promote general welfare of the
community).
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Majority: Chief Justice Jones, joined by Justice Eagen,
Justice O’Brien, Justice Roberts, Justice Pomeroy & Justice
Nix
o Justice Manderino did not participate in the consideration or
decision of these cases.
Pa. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Pastor, 272 A.2d 487, 489, 495 (Pa.
1971) (holding a statute that made it unlawful for pharmacists to
advertise prices of dangerous drugs was an unreasonable
exercise of police power and therefore unconstitutional).
o Majority: Justice Roberts, joined by Chief Justice Bell,
Justice Eagen, Justice O’Brien & Justice Pomeroy
o Dissent: Justice Jones
o Justice Cohen did not participate in the decision of this Case.
Beaver Gasoline Co. v. Zoning Board of Osborne, 285 A.2d 501,
505 (Pa. 1971) (remanding to the lower court to allow borough to
produce additional evidence in order to meet its burden of
showing that a zoning ordinance that operated as a total ban on
gas stations anywhere within the limits of the borough “bears a
relationship to the public health, safety, morals and general
welfare[;]” otherwise the ordinance was unconstitutional).
o Majority: Justice O’Brien, joined by Justice Eagen & Justice
Roberts
o Concurrence: Justice Jones, joined by Justice Pomeroy
o Chief Justice Bell & Justice Barbieri did not participate in
the consideration and decision of this case.
Appeal of Girsh, 263 A.2d 395, 398–99 (Pa. 1970) (striking down
as unreasonable a zoning scheme that failed to provide for
apartments in an area of 4.64 square miles with a population of
nearly 13,000 people).
o Majority: Justice Roberts, joined by Chief Justice Bell,
Justice Eagen & Justice O’Brien
o Concurrence: Chief Justice Bell
o Dissent: Justice Jones, joined by Justice Cohen & Justice
Pomeroy
Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 268 A.2d 765, 765–66 (Pa. 1970),
clarified by C&M Developers, Inc. v. Bedminster Twp. Zoning
Hearing Bd., 820 A.2d 143 (Pa. 2002) (zoning ordinance requiring
lots of at least two acres along existing roads but at least three
acres in the interior to be unconstitutional under article I, section
1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution).
o

•

•

•

•
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Majority: Justice Roberts, joined by Chief Justice Bell,
Justice Eagen, Justice O’Brien & Justice Pomeroy
Concurrence: Chief Justice Bell (arguing that the zoning
ordinance was an unconstitutional restriction on an owner’s
right of ownership and use of property under article I, section
1 and general welfare principles)
Dissent: Justice Jones, joined by Justice Cohen

2. Procedural Limits
• Pittman v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 159 A.3d 466, 468, 474–75
(Pa. 2017) (construing Subsection 6138(a)(2.1) of the Parole Code
“to honor the basic notions of due process” and holding that the
Parole Board abused its discretion by failing to consider whether
to grant credit for time spent at liberty on parole by a convicted
parole violator).
o Majority: Justice Baer, joined by Justice Todd, Justice
Donohue & Justice Dougherty
o Concurring in the result: Chief Justice Saylor, joined by
Justice Todd
o Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Justice Mundy,
joined by Justice Wecht
• City of Philadelphia v. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 5
(Breary), 985 A.2d 1259, 1274 (Pa. 2009) (affirming decision to
vacate grievance arbitration award to police union because city’s
procedural due process rights under article I, section 1 were
violated by the arbitrator, who excluded critical evidence to the
city despite the fact that the city cured any prejudice resulting
from a discovery violation which was not done in bad faith).
o Majority: Justice Baer, joined by Chief Justice Castille,
Justice Saylor, Justice Todd & Justice Greenspan
o Dissent: Justice Eakin, joined by Justice McCaffery
o Dissent: Justice McCaffery
• Lyness v. Commonwealth, 605 A.2d 1204, 1204 (Pa. 1992) (“[A]
violation of due process occurs under the Pennsylvania
Constitution when an administrative board . . . determines that
a professional licensing prosecution should be initiated, and then
acts as the ultimate fact-finder in determining whether a
violation has occurred” due to the “commingling of prosecutorial
and adjudicative functions within a single multi-member
administrative board . . . .”).
o Majority: Justice Cappy, joined by Justice Papadakos &
Justice Zappala
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Concurrence: Justice Papadakos
Dissent: Justice McDermott, joined by Justice Flaherty
Chief Justice Nix & Justice Larsen did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.
• Tracy v. County of Chester, 489 A.2d 1334, 1339 (Pa. 1985) (“The
collection of taxes . . . may not be implemented without due
process of law that is guaranteed in the Commonwealth and
federal constitutions; and this due process, as we have stated
here, requires at a minimum that an owner of land be actually
notified by government, if reasonably possible, before his land is
forfeited by the state. Reasonable efforts to effect actual notice
were not carried out in this case, and the tax sale of this property
must be set aside.”).
o Majority: Justice Flaherty, joined by Chief Justice Nix,
Justice McDermott, Justice Hutchinson & Justice Papadakos
o Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Justice Zappala,
joined by Justice Larsen
• Hardee’s Food Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp. of Pa., 434 A.2d 1209,
1212 (Pa. 1981) (holding the Department of Transportation
violated “Hardee’s constitutionally protected right of access to a
state highway” by denying its application for driveways without
providing “reasonable notice of a hearing and an opportunity to
be heard”).
o Majority: Justice Kauffman, joined by Justice Nix, Justice
Larsen & Justice Flaherty
o Dissent: Justice Roberts
o Chief Justice O’Brien & Justice Wilkinson did not participate
in the consideration or decision of this case.
• Conestoga Nat’l Bank of Lancaster v. Patterson, 275 A.2d 6, 11
(Pa. 1971), superseded by statute, 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 733302(A)(2) (2012) (holding that Department of Banking order
approving bank application to establish a branch constituted a
“judicial determination involving substantial property rights”
and violated due process without affording notice and a hearing
to competing protesting banks).
o Majority: Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Jones, Justice
Eagen, Justice O’Brien & Justice Pomeroy
o Dissent: Chief Justice Bell
o Justice Cohen took no part in the decision of this case.
o
o
o
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3. Reputation and Privacy
• Reese v. Pennsylvanians For Union Reform, 173 A.3d 1143, 1148,
1159 (Pa. 2017) (reading Right-to-Know-Law (“RTKL”) in light of
article I to require State Treasurer to balance public access rights
against “right to informational privacy” prior to disseminating to
the public a list of the names of all state employees as well as
their position, date of birth, voting residence, salary,
appointment date, whether he/she was continuously employed,
periods of service, and positions held).
o Majority: Justice Donohue, joined by Chief Justice Saylor,
Justice Baer & Justice Dougherty
o Concurrence: Justice Wecht, id. at 1160 (“[I]t is not the
role of agencies or the legislature to adjudicate
constitutional rights. . . . Executive branch agencies—like the
Treasurer—are subject to constitutional limitations, which
are expounded and interpreted by this Court.”).
o Justice Todd did not participate in the decision of the case.
• Pa. State Educ. Ass’n v. Commonwealth, 148 A.3d 142, 158 (Pa.
2016) (finding that school employees’ home addresses were
exempt from disclosure under the RTKL because there is a “right
to informational privacy . . . guaranteed by Article I, Section 1 of
the Pennsylvania Constitution, [which] may not be violated
unless outweighed by a public interest favoring disclosure.”).
o Majority: Justice Donohue, joined by Chief Justice Saylor,
Justice Baer, Justice Todd & Justice Dougherty
o Concurrence: Justice Wecht, id. at 160 (finding the case “is
not one of statutory interpretation. It is one of constitutional
right” as there is a right to privacy enshrined in article I,
section 1).
• In re J.B., 107 A.3d 1, 14, 16 (Pa. 2014) (determining that
SORNA’s lifetime registration provision as applied to juvenile
offender was an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption,
highlighting right to reputation under article I, section 1).
o Majority: Justice Baer, joined by Chief Justice Castille,
Justice Saylor, Justice Eakin & Justice Todd
o Dissent: Justice Stevens
o Justice McCaffrey did not participate in the decision of this
case.
• Carlacci v. Mazaleski, 798 A.2d 186, 190 (Pa. 2002) (“[T]here exists
a right to petition for expungement of a PFAA [Protection From
Abuse Act] record where the petitioner seeks to protect his
reputation. This right is an adjunct of due process and Article I,
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Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and is not dependent
upon express statutory authority.”).
o Majority: Chief Justice Zappala, joined by Justice Flaherty,
Justice Cappy, Justice Castille & Justice Nigro
o Dissent: Justice Saylor, joined by Justice Newman
o Dissent: Justice Newman
o Justice Flaherty did not participate in the decision of this
case.
In re T.R., 731 A.2d 1276, 1281 (Pa. 1999) (“Compelling a
psychological examination in this context [juvenile dependency
dispositional review] is nothing more or less than social
engineering in derogation of constitutional rights, and where, as
here, there is an abundance of information about the ability of
the parent to be a parent, there is no state interest, much less a
compelling state interest, in the ordering of parental
psychological examinations. In fact, we find such state
intervention frightening in its Orwellian aspect.”).
o Majority: Chief Justice Flaherty, joined by Justice Nigro &
Justice Cappy
o Concurrence: Justice Nigro
o Concurring in result: Justice Zappala
o Dissent: Justice Newman, joined by Justice Castille
A.Y. v. Commonwealth, 641 A.2d 1148, 1152 (Pa. 1994)
(construing hearsay statute in light of the right to reputation in
article I, section 1).
o Majority: Senior Justice Montemuro (sitting by designation),
joined by Chief Justice Nix, Justice Flaherty, Justice Zappala
& Justice Cappy
o Concurrence: Justice Castille, joined by Justice Papadakos
John M. v. Paula T., 571 A.2d 1380, 1386 (Pa. 1990) (holding that
a person’s privacy interests in preserving bodily integrity and the
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizure precluded court-ordered blood tests).
o Majority: Justice Larsen, joined by Chief Justice Nix, Justice
Flaherty, Justice McDermott, Justice Zappala & Justice
Papadakos
o Concurrence: Chief Justice Nix, joined by Justice Flaherty,
Justice McDermott, Justice Zappala & Justice Papadakos
Sprague v. Walter, 543 A.2d 1078, 1084–85 (Pa. 1988) (declining
to interpret the Shield Law privilege broadly to avoid conflict
with article I, section 1, reasoning that the privilege was not
intended to allow media defendant to use any of its sources and
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information as proof of verification or evidence of responsibility,
but extrinsic evidence could be introduced in that regard without
abandonment of privilege).
o Majority: Chief Justice Nix, joined by Justice Flaherty,
Justice Zappala & Justice Papadakos
o Did Not Participate: Justice Larsen, Justice McDermott &
Justice Stout
Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broad. Co., 532 A.2d 346, 351 (Pa.
1987) (construing Pennsylvania Shield Law to hold that
unpublished documentary information was discoverable by
plaintiff in libel action as long as the information did not reveal
or could redact the identity of personal source of information).
o Majority: Chief Justice Nix, joined by Justice Flaherty,
Justice Zappala & Justice Papadakos
o Concurring in the result: Justice Hutchinson
o Justice Larsen & Justice McDermott did not participate in
the consideration or decision of these cases.
Denoncourt v. Commonwealth, 470 A.2d 945, 950 (Pa. 1983)
(holding “that the reporting provisions of the Ethics Act relating
to family members [were] unconstitutional in that they violate
the due process rights of the public official and the family’s right
to privacy under Art. I § 1”).
o Majority: Justice Flaherty, joined by Justice McDermott,
Justice Zappala & Chief Justice Roberts (as to Part I)
o Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Justice
Hutchinson
o Dissent: Justice Nix, joined by Justice Larsen
In re “B”, 394 A.2d 419, 425–26 (Pa. 1978) (establishing right to
privacy under penumbras of various guarantees of the state
constitution and barring disclosure of records of inpatient
psychiatric treatment of juvenile’s mother).
o Majority: Justice Manderino, joined by Justice Roberts &
Justice Larsen
o Concurrence: Justice Roberts
o Concurring in the result: Justice O’Brien
o Dissent: Chief Justice Eagen
o Dissent: Justice Pomeroy, joined by Justice Nix
Wolfe v. Beal, 384 A.2d 1187, 1189 (Pa. 1978) (holding that “a
person who has been unlawfully committed to a state mental
hospital has a[n article I, section 1] right to the destruction of the
hospital records which were created as a result of the illegal
commitment”).
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Majority: Justice Larsen, joined by Justice Roberts, Justice
Nix & Justice Manderino
Dissent: Justice Pomeroy, joined by Chief Justice Eagen &
Justice O’Brien

B. Art. I, § 3 [Religious Freedom]
• Commonwealth v. Eubanks, 512 A.2d 619, 622–23 (Pa. 1986)
(grounding 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5902(b) (1976) in the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 3 of
the Pennsylvania Constitution to remand for a new trial because
defendant was cross-examined with questions concerning his
religion in violation of the legislation).
o Majority: Justice Flaherty, joined by Chief Justice Nix,
Justice McDermott, Justice Hutchinson & Justice Zappala
o Concurrence: Justice McDermott
o Dissent: Justice Larsen, joined by Justice Papadakos
C. Art. I, § 5 [Elections]
• League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 821
(Pa. 2018) (finding that the Pennsylvania Congressional
Redistricting Act of 2011 violated the state constitution’s free and
equal elections clause in article I, section 5).
o Majority: Justice Todd, joined by Justice Donohue, Justice
Dougherty & Justice Wecht
o Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Justice Baer
o Dissent: Chief Justice Saylor, joined by Justice Mundy
o Dissent: Justice Mundy
• League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 181 A.3d 1083, 1087
(Pa. 2018) (adopting a remedial plan for redistricting).
o Per curiam
o Dissent: Chief Justice Saylor
o Dissent: Justice Baer
o Dissent: Justice Mundy
• Applewhite v. Commonwealth, 54 A.3d 1, 5 (Pa. 2012) (vacating
denial of injunction against implementation of photographic
Voter ID, remanding constitutional question under article I,
section 5).
o Per curiam
o Dissent: Justice Todd, joined by Justice McCaffery
o Dissent: Justice McCaffery, joined by Justice Todd
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On remand: Applewhite v. Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D.
2012, 2014 Pa. Commw. Ct. LEXIS 756, at *49–50, 55, 72 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. Jan. 17, 2014) (invalidating photographic Voter
ID under article I, section 5; “all qualified electors;” and equal
protection principles).
• Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 38 A.3d 711,
715–16 (Pa. 2012) (finding the 2011 Legislative Reapportionment
Plan is contrary to law, violating article II, section 17(d) because
of subdivision splits that were not absolutely necessary).
o Per curiam
o Dissent in part, concurrence in part: Justice Saylor, joined by
Justice Eakin & Justice Orie Melvin, id. at 716 (“I am not
persuaded that the 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Plan
is contrary to law as reflected in the existing precedent.”).
o Dissent in part, concurrence in part: Justice Eakin
o Dissent: Justice Orie Melvin
o

D. Art. I, § 6 [Jury Trial]
• Blum ex rel. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 626 A.2d 537, 538
(Pa. 1993) (holding that article I, section 6 “entitles a party who
properly demands a twelve person jury to a verdict from a jury of
twelve persons”).
o Majority: Chief Justice Nix, joined by Justice Larsen, Justice
Papadakos, Justice Flaherty, Justice Zappala & Justice
Cappy
o Concurrence: Justice Larsen, joined by Justice Papadakos
o Justice McDermott did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
• Heller v. Frankston, 475 A.2d 1291, 1296 (Pa. 1984) (holding
arbitration procedures of Health Care Services Malpractices Act
was unconstitutional insofar as it applied to the regulation of
attorney fees under article I, section 6, following Mattos v.
Thompson, 421 A.2d 190 (Pa. 1980)).
o Majority: Chief Justice Nix, joined by Justice Flaherty,
Justice McDermott, Justice Zappala & Justice Papadakos
o Concurring in the result: Justice Larsen
o Dissent: Justice Hutchinson
• Stein Enters., Inc. v. Golla, 426 A.2d 1129, 1134 (Pa. 1981)
(construing statute “to ensure that qualified parties would be
able to take advantage of their right of appeal, regardless of their
financial condition. In order to give full effect to the language and
purpose of [section] 72, we hold that the costs of an appeal bond
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and the arbitrators’ fees are ‘costs of the suit’ under [section]
72.”).
o Majority: Justice Larsen, joined by Chief Justice O’Brien,
Justice Roberts, Justice Nix, Justice Flaherty & Justice
Kauffman
• Mattos v. Thompson, 421 A.2d 190, 195–96 (Pa. 1980) (“Today, we
are satisfied that sufficient time has passed to allow for a
meaningful evaluation and must regrettably conclude that the
lengthy delay occasioned by the arbitration system therein does
in fact burden the right of a jury trial with ‘onerous conditions,
restrictions or regulations which . . . make the right practically
unavailable.’ . . . We are compelled, therefore, to declare
unconstitutional section 309 of the Act . . . giving the health care
arbitration panels ‘original exclusive jurisdiction’ over medical
malpractice claims because the delays . . . result in an oppressive
delay and impermissibly infringes upon the constitutional right
to a jury.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
o Majority: Justice Nix, joined by Justice O’Brien, Justice
Flaherty & Justice Kauffman
o Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Justice Larsen
o Dissent: Justice Roberts, joined by Chief Justice Eagen
• Weber v. Lynch, 375 A.2d 1278, 1284 (Pa. 1977) (holding that Rule
303 J of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas violated
the Arbitration Act, and that “[w]e need not here determine the
extent of the legislature’s power to go beyond the present statute
without impinging upon the constitutionally-protected right to
trial by jury”).
o Majority: Chief Justice Eagen, joined by Justice O’Brien,
Justice Roberts, Justice Pomeroy, Justice Nix & Justice
Manderino
o Concurrence: Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Manderino
E. Art. I, § 7 [Free Expression]
• DePaul v. Commonwealth, 969 A.2d 536, 538, 552–53 (Pa. 2009)
(finding provision of Race Horse Development and Gaming Act
that “impose[d] upon a class of individuals affiliated with licensed
gaming in Pennsylvania an absolute ban on political
contributions” violated the state constitution’s protection of
freedom of expression and association under article I, sections 7,
20, and 26).
o Majority: Chief Justice Castille, joined by Justice Saylor,
Justice Eakin, Justice Baer & Justice Todd
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o Dissent: Justice McCaffery
• Pap’s A.M. v. City of Erie, 812 A.2d 591, 603, 613 (Pa. 2002)
(holding public nudity sections of city ordinance violated article
I, section 7 protecting freedom of speech after employing
Edmunds framework (citing Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586
A.2d 887 (1991)).
o Majority: Justice Castille, joined by Chief Justice Zappala,
Justice Cappy, Justice Nigro & Justice Eakin
o Dissent: Justice Saylor (would remand for an evidentiary
hearing regarding alleged secondary effects of ordinance).
o Justice Newman did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
• Pa. State Police, Bureau of Liquor Control Enf’t v. Hosp. Invs. of
Phila., Inc., 689 A.2d 213, 216–17 (Pa. 1997) (holding statute
prohibiting advertising of liquor prices violated First
Amendment and article I, section 7).
o Majority: Justice Cappy, joined by Chief Justice Flaherty,
Justice Zappala, Justice Castille, Justice Nigro & Justice
Newman
o Concurrence: Justice Castille
• Ins. Adjustment Bureau v. Ins. Comm’r for Pa., 542 A.2d 1317,
1324 (Pa. 1988) (“Article I, Section 7, will not allow the prior
restraint or other restriction of commercial speech by any
governmental agency where the legitimate, important interests
of government may be accomplished practicably in another, less
intrusive manner. Since the legitimate governmental goals in
this case could be accomplished by enforcement of civil, criminal
and administrative remedies already in place, Commonwealth
Court was in error in upholding the validity of the statute’s
restriction on speech.”).
o Majority: Justice Flaherty, joined by Chief Justice Nix,
Justice Larsen, Justice McDermott, Justice Zappala &
Justice Papadakos
o Justice Stout did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
• Commonwealth v. Tate, 432 A.2d 1382, 1387 (Pa. 1981) (“[W]e are
of the view that the Constitution of this Commonwealth protects
appellants’ invaluable right to freedom of expression against the
enforcement, by state criminal statute, of the college’s
standardless permit requirement,” which had prevented them
from distributing leaflets in outdoor campus grounds).
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Majority: Justice Roberts, joined by Chief Justice O’Brien,
Justice Nix, Justice Flaherty & Justice Kauffman
o Dissent: Justice Larsen
• Willing v. Mazzocone, 393 A.2d 1155, 1157 (Pa. 1978) (determining
that court order enjoining former client from demonstrating
outside lawyer’s office by carrying a “sandwich-board” sign was
an invalid prior restraint on former client’s speech).
o Majority: Justice Manderino, joined by Justice O’Brien,
Justice Roberts & Justice Pomeroy
o Concurrence: Justice Roberts, joined by Justice O’Brien
o Concurrence: Justice Pomeroy
o Dissent: Chief Justice Eagen
o Dissent: Justice Nix & Justice Larsen
• Commonwealth ex rel. Davis v. Van Emberg, 347 A.2d 712, 715–
16 (Pa. 1975) (reversing decree enjoining operation of a print shop
because “a blanket prohibition against the dissemination of all
‘books, papers, magazines and all other materials’ cannot be
tolerated” under the First Amendment and article I, section 7 of
the Pennsylvania Constitution).
o Majority: Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Eagen, Justice
O’Brien, Justice Pomeroy, Justice Nix & Justice Manderino
o Chief Justice Jones did not participate in the consideration
or decision of this case.
• In re Appeal of Chalk, 272 A.2d 457, 458 (Pa. 1971) (suspension of
public assistance caseworkers for comments made at a public
meeting was unconstitutional as the statements were
constitutionally protected under article I, section 7).
o Majority: Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Jones & Justice
O’Brien
o Concurring in the result: Justice Pomeroy
o Dissent: Chief Justice Bell
o Dissent: Justice Eagen
o Justice Cohen did not participate in the decision of this case.
o

F. Art. I, § 10 [Taking]
• Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 147 A.3d 536, 542 (Pa.
2016) (“[W]e determine that Section 3241 is unconstitutional on
its face, as it grants a corporation the power of eminent domain
to take private property for a private purpose, in violation of the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article
I, Sections 1 and 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution . . . .”).
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Majority: Justice Todd, joined by Justice Donohue, Justice
Dougherty & Justice Wecht
o Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Chief Justice Saylor
(joined takings holding)
o Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Justice Baer (joined
takings holding)
o Justice Eakin did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
Reading Area Water Auth. v. Schuylkill River Greenway Ass’n,
100 A.3d 572, 583–84 (Pa. 2014) (construing Property Rights
Protection Act in light of article I, section 10 to hold that the Act
prohibited the water authority from using its eminent domain
powers to condemn the easement).
o Majority: Justice Saylor, joined by Chief Justice Castille,
Justice Eakin, Justice Baer, Justice Todd, Justice McCaffery
& Justice Stevens
In re Opening Private Rd., 5 A.3d 246, 258 (Pa. 2010) (holding that
Private Road Act would constitute unconstitutional taking in the
absence of showing of public benefit).
o Majority: Justice Saylor joined by Justice Todd, Justice
McCaffery & Justice Orie Melvin
o Dissent: Justice Eakin, joined by Chief Justice Castille &
Justice Baer
In re De Facto Condemnation & Taking of Lands of WBF Assocs.
by Lehigh-Northampton Airport Auth., 903 A.2d 1192, 1211 (Pa.
2006) (holding that the failure of a landowner’s real estate
development project caused by announcement of airport
expansion project constituted a de facto taking under article I,
section 10, and landowner was unconstitutionally deprived of the
“full and normal use” of his property).
o Majority: Justice Newman, joined by Chief Justice Cappy,
Justice Castille & Justice Baer
o Concurrence and Dissent: Justice Saylor
o Concurrence and Dissent: Justice Eakin
o Justice Nigro did not participate in the decision of this case.
Redevelopment Auth. of Oil City v. Woodring, 445 A.2d 724,
727–28 (Pa. 1982) (holding that city redevelopment authority’s
“decision requiring all electrical wires to be relocated
underground . . . . substantially deprived Mrs. Woodring of the
use and enjoyment of her property, and that it thus constituted a
taking within the meaning of the Eminent Domain Code”).
o

•

•

•

•
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Majority: Justice Larsen, joined by Chief Justice O’Brien,
Justice Roberts, Justice Nix, Justice Flaherty, Justice
McDermott & Justice Hutchinson
o Concurrence: Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Nix & Justice
Hutchinson
• City of Chester v. Commonwealth, 434 A.2d 695, 702 (Pa. 1981)
(“As we believe the loss suffered by residents of any political
subdivision from the taking of a road or bridge is no less real than
the loss suffered by private individuals as condemnees, we hold
that the Pennsylvania Constitution does not allow the
Commonwealth to escape its financial obligation owed to a public
condemnee for property taken.”).
o Majority: Chief Justice O’Brien, joined by Justice Nix, Justice
Larsen, Justice Flaherty & Justice Kauffman
o Concurrence: Justice Nix
o Dissent: Justice Roberts
• Redevelopment Auth. of Phila. v. Lieberman, 336 A.2d 249, 251,
258–59 (Pa. 1975) (condemnee whose retail liquor license lost
value as a result of condemnation of premises for which the
license was issued was entitled to have such loss considered in
the award of just compensation to be paid by condemnor).
o Majority: Justice Manderino, joined by Justice O’Brien,
Justice Roberts, Justice Pomeroy & Justice Nix
o Dissent: Justice Eagen
o Chief Justice Jones did not participate in the consideration
or the decision of this case.
o

G. Art. I, § 11 [Remedies]
• Ieropoli v. AC&S Corp., 842 A.2d 919, 932 (Pa. 2004) (holding
unconstitutional under article I, section 11 (the “Remedies
Clause”) a statute that limited successor asbestos-related
liabilities of corporations that had merged or consolidated
because it took away appellants’ right to remedy).
o Majority: Chief Justice Cappy, joined by Justice Castille,
Justice Nigro & Justice Baer
o Dissent: Justice Newman, joined by Justice Eakin
o Dissent: Justice Saylor, joined by Justice Eakin
• Jenkins v. Hosp. of Med. Coll. of Pa., 634 A.2d 1099, 1100 (Pa.
1993) (holding that retroactive application of statute that
eliminated a cause of action for wrongful birth would violate due
process and equal protection guarantees of state and federal
constitutions).
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Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Justice Flaherty &
Justice Cappy
o Concurring in the result: Chief Justice Nix & Justice
Papadakos
o Justice Montemuro did not participate in the consideration
or decision of this case.
• Masloff v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cty., 613 A.2d 1186, 1190 (1992)
(holding that collective bargaining provision of the Port
Authority Act violated right to remedy under article I, section 11
to the extent that it restricted the ability to “seek redress for a
legal injury in an entity [the PAT] other than the one who
sustains the injury”).
o Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Justice Flaherty, Justice
McDermott, Justice Papadakos & Justice Cappy
o Dissent: Chief Justice Nix
o Dissent: Justice Larsen, joined in Parts I, II, and III by Chief
Justice Nix
o Former Justice McDermott did not participate in the decision
of this case.
• Boettger v. Loverro, 555 A.2d 1234, 1239–40 (Pa. 1989)
(construing Wiretapping and Surveillance Control Act to avoid
conflict with reputation protections of article I, section 11 and
holding newspaper liable for publishing information gleaned
from a mistakenly disclosed wiretapped conversation otherwise
entitled to privacy protections under the Act: “but for the
enactment of the Act both the collection and dissemination of
electronically obtained conversations would be clearly and
absolutely prohibited. From this we reason that only when the
protected information is disseminated either through an order of
court unsealing it or through its use as evidence in an open court
proceeding does the media’s interest rise above those of the
Commonwealth and its citizens”), vacated, 493 U.S. 885 (1989).
o Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Justice Flaherty &
Justice Papadakos
o Dissent: Chief Justice Nix
o Justice Larsen and Justice McDermott did not participate in
the consideration or the decision of this case.
• Boyle v. O’Bannon, 458 A.2d 183, 185 (Pa. 1983) (determining that
the Commonwealth Court erred by dismissing plaintiff’s
complaint one day after it was filed and before the complaint was
served on the defendant, conflicting with due process inherent in
article I, section 11).
o
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Majority: Justice Larsen, joined by Justice Flaherty
Concurring in the result: Justice Zappala & Chief Justice
Roberts
o Dissent: Justice Nix, joined by Justice McDermott
o Dissent: Justice McDermott
o Dissent: Justice Hutchinson
• Commonwealth v. Contakos, 453 A.2d 578, 582 (Pa. 1982) (“This
right of the public to attend criminal trials and of the accused to
be assured of the freedom of the public to attend these trials and
to monitor what goes on there has been abridged in this case. The
trial court failed to preserve the appellant’s constitutional right
to an impartial public trial.”).
o Majority: Justice Flaherty, joined by Justice Roberts & Chief
Justice O’Brien
o Concurrence: Justice Roberts, joined by Chief Justice O’Brien
o Dissent: Justice Nix, joined by Justice Hutchinson
o Dissent: Justice McDermott
• Commonwealth v. Hayes, 414 A.2d 318, 327 (Pa. 1980) (granting
newspaper’s motion to reverse decision to close suppression
hearing to the public in light of article I, section 11 because
“closure may not be ordered where some other available
procedural device can fully protect the defendant’s right” to a fair
trial).
o Majority: Justice Nix, joined by Justice Larsen, Justice
Flaherty & Justice Kauffman
o Concurrence: Justice Larsen
o Concurrence: Justice Flaherty
o Concurrence: Justice Kauffman
o Dissent: Justice Roberts, joined by Chief Justice Eagen &
Justice O’Brien
• Bershefsky v. Commonwealth, 418 A.2d 1331, 1332 (Pa. 1980)
(following the Court’s decision in Gibson v. Commonwealth, 415
A.2d 80 (Pa. 1980), to hold that Act 152—creating statutory
sovereign immunity in certain cases—could not be
constitutionally applied to actions, such as the one at issue,
“which accrued and were in existence prior to passage of the
Act”).
o Majority: Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Larsen, Justice
Flaherty & Justice Kauffman
o Concurrence: Justice Larsen
o Dissent: Justice Nix
o Dissent: Chief Justice Eagen, joined by Justice O’Brien
o
o
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• Gibson v. Commonwealth, 415 A.2d 80, 82–83 (Pa. 1980) (holding
that Act 152 (sovereign immunity) did not apply to plaintiff’s
actions alleging the Commonwealth negligently supervised a
dam that caused a flood, because otherwise plaintiff would be
without a remedy in violation of article I, section 11).
o Majority: Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Larsen & Justice
Flaherty
o Concurrence: Justice Larsen, joined by Justice Flaherty
o Dissent: Chief Justice Eagen, Justice O’Brien & Justice Nix
H. Art. I, § 13 [Cruel Punishment]
• Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet & Contents Seized, 160 A.3d
153, 192 (Pa. 2017) (remanding for gross disproportionality
analysis under the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 13
of the Pennsylvania Constitution, in order to determine whether
“the forfeited property was . . . grossly disproportionate to the
gravity of the offense”).
o Majority: Justice Todd, joined by Chief Justice Saylor, Justice
Baer, Justice Donohue, Justice Dougherty & Justice Wecht
• Commonwealth v. $34,440.00, 174 A.3d 1031, 1037 n.9, 1046 (Pa.
2017) (construing statute to allow rebuttal of presumption of
drug relatedness without establishing “innocent owner” defense,
and declining to address constitutional issues under “Excessive
Fine Clauses” of the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 13).
o Majority: Justice Baer joined by Justice Todd, Justice
Donohue, Justice Dougherty & Justice Wecht
o Dissent: Chief Justice Saylor, joined by Justice Mundy
o Dissent: Justice Mundy
• Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 484 (Pa. 2017) (adopting a
presumption against the imposition of a sentence of life without
parole for a juvenile offender, and determining that defendant’s
sentence was unconstitutional).
o Majority: Justice Donohue, joined by Chief Justice Saylor,
Justice Todd, Justice Dougherty & Justice Wecht
o Concurrence: Justice Wecht, joined by Justice Todd
o Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Justice Baer
o Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
• Shoul v. Commonwealth, 173 A.3d 669, 687 (Pa. 2017) (finding no
violation of article I, section 1 rights under Nixon v.
Commonwealth, 839 A.2d 277 (Pa. 2003), but remanding for
gross disproportionality analysis to consider whether life
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disqualification of commercial driver’s licenses for convictions of
certain drug crimes constituted cruel and unusual punishment).
o Majority: Justice Todd, joined by Chief Justice Saylor; Justice
Donohue; Justice Wecht as to Parts I, II(B), and III; Justice
Dougherty as to Parts I and II(B); & Justice Mundy as to
Parts I and II(A)
o Concurrence: Justice Wecht
o Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Justice Dougherty,
joined by Justice Baer
o Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Justice Mundy
Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 98 A.3d 1268, 1270 (Pa. 2014)
(holding that mandatory minimum fine of $75,000 for
misdemeanor theft of $200 under Gaming Act violated Excessive
Fines Clause of article I, section 13).
o Majority: Chief Justice Castille, joined by Justice Saylor,
Justice Eakin, Justice Baer, Justice Todd & Justice
McCaffery
o Former Justice Orie Melvin did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.
Commonwealth v. Boczkowski, 846 A.2d 75, 80 (Pa. 2004)
(vacating death sentence based on the fact that aggravating
circumstance of prior murder committed in another state was
based on an arbitrary factor due to prosecutor’s violation of a
court order).
o Majority: Justice Castille, joined by Justice Cappy, Justice
Newman, Justice Saylor & Justice Nigro
o Concurrence: Justice Saylor, joined by Justice Nigro
o Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Justice Eakin
o Chief Justice Zappala did not participate in the decision of
this case.
Commonwealth v. Jasper, 737 A.2d 196, 196–97 (Pa. 1999)
(holding that absence of jury instruction telling jury they were
not required to impose death penalty when they found one
mitigating circumstance violated article I, section 13).
o Majority: Chief Justice Flaherty, joined by Justice Zappala,
Justice Cappy & Justice Nigro
o Concurrence: Justice Zappala
o Dissent: Justice Castille, joined by Justice Newman
Commonwealth v. Baker, 511 A.2d 777, 790 (Pa. 1986) (“We
conclude that the inherent bias and prejudice to Appellant
engendered by the Assistant District Attorney’s remarks
necessitates reversal of the death sentence in the instant case,
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and that under the circumstances said remarks also violated
Appellant’s rights under the Eighth Amendment . . . as well as
violating Appellant’s rights under Article I, § 13 . . . .”).
o Majority: Justice Papadakos, joined by Chief Justice Nix,
Justice Larsen, Justice Flaherty, Justice McDermott, Justice
Hutchinson & Justice Zappala
• Commonwealth v. Story, 440 A.2d 488, 489–90 (Pa. 1981) (citation
omitted) (vacating defendant’s death penalty sentence for a
homicide allegedly committed in 1974: “Because the previous law
governing this case has been declared unconstitutional insofar as
it authorizes the death penalty, the sole permissible maximum
punishment for appellant’s crime committed in 1974 is life
imprisonment.”).
o Majority: Justice Roberts, joined by Chief Justice O’Brien,
Justice Nix & Justice Wilkinson
o Concurrence: Justice Nix
o Dissent: Justice Larsen, joined by Justice Flaherty & Justice
Kauffman
I.

Art. I, § 17 [Ex Post Facto]
• Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189, 1223 (Pa. 2017)
(performing an Edmunds analysis to find that the state
constitution’s ex post facto clause affords greater protections
than its federal counterpart, and that SORNA’s registration
provisions constituted punishment violating both federal and
state ex post facto clauses).
o Majority: Justice Dougherty, joined by Justice Baer & Justice
Donohue; Justice Todd & Justice Wecht join except as to
Parts V and VI.
o Concurrence: Justice Wecht, joined by Justice Todd
o Dissent: Chief Justice Saylor
o Justice Munday did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
• Commonwealth v. Reed, 168 A.3d 132 (Pa. 2017) (mem.) (per
curiam order reversing decision of the Superior Court in light of
Commonwealth v. Muniz, which found that SORNA violated the
Ex Post Facto Clauses of the U.S. and Pennsylvania
Constitutions).
o Per curiam
o Concurrence: Justice Mundy
o Concurrence: Chief Justice Saylor
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• Spann v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 169 A.3d 1084 (Pa. 2017)
(mem.) (per curiam order reversing decision of the Superior Court
in light of Commonwealth v. Muniz, which found that SORNA
violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the U.S. and Pennsylvania
Constitutions).
o Per curiam
o Concurrence: Justice Mundy
o Concurrence: Chief Justice Saylor
• Commonwealth v. Rose, 127 A.3d 794, 796, 807 (Pa. 2015)
(determining that defendant must be sentenced under statute in
effect at the time of the assault, in accordance with ex post facto
clauses of both federal and state constitutions).
o Majority: Justice Todd, joined by Chief Justice Saylor, Justice
Eakin & Justice Baer
o Concurrence: Chief Justice Saylor
o Concurrence: Justice Eakin
o Dissent: Justice Stevens
J. Art. I, § 17 [Impairment of Contracts]
• Parsonese v. Midland Nat’l Ins. Co., 706 A.2d 814, 815–16, 819
(Pa. 1998), (refusing to apply statute making designation of
spouse as beneficiary ineffective after divorce because “if applied
to this case, [it] would be unconstitutional, in violation of the
contract clause.”).
o Majority: Chief Justice Flaherty, joined by Justice Zappala,
Justice Cappy, Justice Castille, Justice Nigro & Justice
Newman
• First Nat’l Bank of Pa. v. Flanagan, 528 A.2d 134, 135, 137–38
(Pa. 1987) (“The parties frame the issue before us as whether the
legislature can retroactively impose disclosure requirements on
a loan transaction without violating the clauses of the United
States and Pennsylvania Constitutions prohibiting impairment
of the obligations of contracts. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; PA. CONST.
art. I, § 17.1 As so framed, we must hold on this record that
retroactive application of the amendment restoring disclosure
requirements to this interim transaction is unconstitutional.”).
o Majority: Justice Hutchinson, joined by Chief Justice Nix,
Justice Larsen, Justice Flaherty, Justice McDermott, Justice
Zappala & Justice Papadakos
• City of Allentown v. Local 302, International Association of Fire
Fighters, 512 A.2d 1175, 1181–82 (Pa. 1986) (holding that “the
City’s unilateral decision to close enrollment in the Pension Fund
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and require new members of the bargaining unit to enroll in the
Retirement System, with different obligations and benefits,
constituted a breach of the collective bargaining agreement
between the Union and the City,” and that “a unilateral change
in retirement benefits to non-vested members cannot pass
constitutional muster under Article I, § 17, of the State
Constitution, prohibiting the impairment of contracts”).
o Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Chief Justice Nix,
Justice Larsen, Justice Flaherty, Justice McDermott &
Justice Hutchinson
o Concurring: Justice Larsen
o Justice Papadakos did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
• Ass’n of Pa. State Coll. & Univ. Faculties v. State Sys. of Higher
Educ., 479 A.2d 962, 963, 965 (Pa. 1984) (affirming order
declaring unconstitutional and permanently enjoining the
enforcement of an amendment to the State Employees’
Retirement Code, requiring each member to contribute an
additional 1.25% of wages to the system’s retirement fund as “a
unilateral modification in the System adverse to its members
[that] is void as applied to employees whose contractual rights
were vested prior to its enactment”).
o Majority: Chief Justice Nix, joined by Justice Larsen, Justice
Flaherty, Justice McDermott, Justice Zappala & Justice
Papadakos
o Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Justice
Hutchinson
• Pa. Fed’n of Teachers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila, 484 A.2d 751, 753 (Pa.
1984) (holding that “the increased contribution rate prescribed in
section 2 of Act 31 cannot constitutionally be imposed on
employees who were members of PSERS prior to the effective
date of the Act” pursuant to article I, section 17).
o Majority: Chief Justice Nix, joined by Justice Larsen, Justice
Flaherty, Justice McDermott, Justice Hutchinson, Justice
Zappala & Justice Papadakos
o Concurrence: Justice Hutchinson
• Bellomini v. State Emps.’ Ret. Bd., 445 A.2d 737, 741 (Pa. 1982)
(holding that denial of former state employees’ retirement
benefits due to retroactive application of Act 140 was
unconstitutional).
o Majority: Chief Justice O’Brien, joined by Justice Nix, Justice
McDermott & Justice Flaherty

2018]

STILL LIVING

411

Concurrence: Justice Nix, joined by Justice McDermott
Dissent: Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Larsen
Justice Hutchinson did not participate in the consideration
and decision of this case.
• McKenna v. State Emps.’ Ret. Bd., 433 A.2d 871, 871–72 (Pa.
1981) (holding that class of all active state court judges with ten
or more years of service as of June 22, 1972 had their retirement
benefits impermissibly impaired under article I, section 17 by
provisions of the revised State Employees’ Retirement Code).
o Majority: Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Nix, Justice
Flaherty, Justice Larsen & Justice Kauffman
o Concurrence: Justice Nix
o Concurrence: Justice Flaherty
o Concurrence: Justice Larsen, joined by Justice Flaherty &
Justice Kauffman
o
o
o

K. Art. 1, § 27 [Environmental]
• Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 916,
938–39 (Pa. 2017) (“Because state parks and forests, including
the oil and gas minerals therein, are part of the corpus of
Pennsylvania’s environmental public trust, we hold that the
Commonwealth, as trustee, must manage them according to the
plain language of Section 27, which imposes fiduciary duties
consistent with Pennsylvania trust law,” and thus, statutes
allocating oil and gas royalties to general fund are facially
unconstitutional).
o Majority: Justice Donohue, joined by Justice Todd, Justice
Dougherty & Justice Wecht
o Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Justice Baer, id. at
940–41 (concurs in holdings of enforceability that “solidify
the jurisprudential sea-change begun by Chief Justice
Castille’s plurality in Robinson Township v. Commonwealth,
623 Pa. 564, 83 A.3d 901, 950–51 (2013);” dissents from
application of “inflexible private trust requirements”)
o Dissent: Chief Justice Saylor; joins “central analysis” of
Justice Baer’s opinion
• Robinson Township v. Commonwealth (Robinson II), 83 A.3d 901,
930–82 (Pa. 2013) (invalidated provisions of Act 13 regulating
oil and gas extraction under environmental rights
amendment: provision preempting municipalities’ obligation to
plan for environmental concerns for oil and gas operations;
statutory requirement that municipal zoning ordinances be
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amended to include oil and gas operations in all zoning districts;
statutory well location restrictions that allowed Department of
Environmental Protection (DEP) to grant waiver from setback
requirements; and provision that precluded municipalities from
seeking appellate review of DEP’s decisions on restriction
waivers).
o Plurality: Chief Justice Castille, joined by Justice Todd &
Justice McCaffery; Justice Baer joins as to Parts I, II, IV, V,
VI(A), (B), (D)–(G)
o Concurrence: Justice Baer
o Dissent: Justice Saylor, Justice Eakin
o Dissent: Justice Eakin
o Justice Orie Melvin did not participate in the consideration
or decision of this matter.
• Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 147 A.3d 536, 542 (Pa.
2016) (holding enforcement provisions of Act 13 were not
severable from invalidated portions, and declining to reconsider
Robinson II because issue was not properly before the court).
o Majority: Justice Todd, joined by Justice Donohue, Justice
Dougherty & Justice Wecht
o Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Chief Justice Saylor
(dissents from severability)
o Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Justice Baer (joins
severability)
o Justice Eakin did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
• Commonwealth v. Locust Point Quarries, Inc., 396 A.2d 1205,
1209 (Pa. 1979) (construing Air Pollution Control Act pursuant
to article I, section 27, and holding that the legislature had the
power to enact policy to protect air resources to the degree
necessary for the protection of the health, safety, and wellbeing
of citizens).
o Majority: Chief Justice Eagen, joined by Justice Roberts,
Justice Nix, Justice Manderino & Justice Larsen
o Justice Pomeroy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
o Justice O’Brien did not participate in the decision of this case.
L. Art. I, § 28 [Equal Rights Amendment]
• Phila. Hous. Auth. v. Am. Fed’n of State Emps., Local 934, 52 A.3d
1117, 1123, 1128 (Pa. 2012) (relying in part on Equal Rights
Amendment, article I, section 28 as “a clear declaration of public
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policy against sex discrimination,” holding that “the arbitrator’s
award of reinstatement with back pay” in a case involving
egregious sexual harassment “violates the public policy of this
Commonwealth”).
o Majority: Chief Justice Castille joined by Justice Saylor,
Justice Eakin & Justice Todd
o Concurrence: Justice Saylor
o Concurrence: Justice Eakin
o Concurrence in part: Justice McCaffery & Justice Baer
o Justice Orie Melvin did not participate in the decision of this
case.
• Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Ins. Comm’r of Pa., 482 A.2d
542, 543 (Pa. 1984) (reading provision of Casualty and Surety
Rate Regulation Act with term “unfairly discriminatory” in light
of the equal rights amendment).
o Majority: Chief Justice Nix, joined by Justice Flaherty &
Justice Hutchinson
o Concurrence: Justice Flaherty, joined by Justice Hutchinson
o Concurrence: Justice Hutchinson, joined by Justice Flaherty
o Dissent: Justice McDermott, joined by Justice Zappala
o Dissent: Justice Zappala, joined by Justice McDermott
• Commonwealth ex rel. Stein v. Stein, 406 A.2d 1381, 1387 (Pa.
1979) (reading statute “to provide for reciprocity of remedy by
spouses seeking to effectuate support orders” to avoid equal
rights amendment conflict).
o Majority: Justice Nix, Justice Roberts & Justice Larsen
o Concurrence: Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Larsen
o Concurring in the result: Justice O’Brien
o Concurring in the result: Justice Manderino
o Dissent: Chief Justice Eagen
• George v. George, 409 A.2d 1, 1–2 (Pa. 1979) (construing statute
allowing wives to obtain divorce from bed and board to avoid
constitutional conflict with ERA: “We believe the proper
disposition of this case is to apply the statute in question in such
a way as to read it as providing for reciprocity of remedies for
spouses.”).
o Majority: Justice Flaherty, joined by Chief Justice Eagen,
Justice O’Brien, Justice Nix & Justice Larsen
o Concurring in the result: Justice Roberts
o Justice Manderino did not participate in the decision of this
case.
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• Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson, 368 A.2d 635, 639–40
(Pa. 1977) (affirming trial court’s grant of custody to father and
rejecting “tender years doctrine,” which created a presumption
against the male parent, in light of the equal rights amendment).
o Majority: Justice Nix, joined by Justice O’Brien & Justice
Roberts
o Concurring in the result: Chief Justice Jones, Justice Eagen
& Justice Pomeroy
o Justice Manderino did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
• Adoption of Walker, 360 A.2d 603, 605 (Pa. 1976) (holding that a
statute providing that only mother is required to consent to
adoption in the case of an illegitimate child creates an
impermissible “distinction between unwed mothers and unwed
fathers” that is “patently invalid” under the equal rights
amendment of the Pennsylvania Constitution).
o Majority: Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Eagen, Justice
O’Brien & Justice Manderino
o Concurring in the result: Justice Pomeroy & Justice Nix
o Chief Justice Jones did not participate in the consideration
or decision of this matter.
• Commonwealth v. Santiago, 340 A.2d 440, 445 (Pa. 1975)
(rejecting female defendant’s defense of “coverture”—that she
was coerced by her husband—in light of “present day
considerations,” including Conway v. Dana, 318 A.2d 324 (Pa.
1974), and the equal rights amendment).
o Majority: Justice Nix, joined by Chief Justice Jones, Justice
Eagen, Justice O’Brien & Justice Pomeroy
o Concurrence: Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Manderino
• DiFlorido v. DiFlorido, 331 A.2d 174, 179 (Pa. 1975) (classifying
certain household goods and furniture acquired during the
marriage and used by both spouses to be marital property, even
though primarily bought with husband’s savings—rejecting
earlier presumptions regarding household property ownership).
o Majority: Chief Justice Jones, joined by Justice Eagen,
Justice O’Brien, Justice Roberts, Justice Pomeroy, Justice
Nix & Justice Manderino
• Butler v. Butler, 347 A.2d 477, 481 (Pa. 1975) (holding that wife
was not entitled to constructive trust on the basis that she
provided most of the money for their home while her husband
contributed his salary to the marital unit and his labor in
building the home).
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Majority: Chief Justice Jones, joined by Justice Eagen,
Justice O’Brien, Justice Pomeroy & Justice Nix
o Concurrence: Justice Pomeroy, id. at 482 (“[D]ifference in
treatment of transfers of property as between spouses
violates the Equality of Rights Amendment . . . .”)
o Dissent: Justice Roberts
o Dissent: Justice Manderino
Kushik v. Kushik, 328 A.2d 505, 506–07 (Pa. 1974) (remanding
matter regarding enforcement order requiring husband to pay
alimony in light of Conway v. Dana).
o Majority: Justice Manderino, joined by Chief Justice Jones,
Justice Eagen, Justice O’Brien, Justice Pomeroy & Justice
Nix
o Justice Roberts did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
Conway v. Dana, 318 A.2d 324, 326 (Pa. 1974) (“We hold that
insofar as these decisions suggest a presumption that the father,
solely because of his sex and without regard to the actual
circumstances of the parties, must accept the principal burden of
financial support of minor children, they may no longer be
followed[,]” pursuant to the Equal Rights Amendment).
o Majority: Justice Nix, joined by Justice Eagen, Justice
O’Brien, Justice Roberts, Justice Pomeroy & Justice
Manderino
o Dissent: Chief Justice Jones
Commonwealth v. Butler, 328 A.2d 851, 852, 855 (Pa. 1974)
(holding “unconstitutional that portion of the new Muncy Act
directing that no minimum sentence be imposed on women
convicted of crime” because it violates the Equal Rights
Amendment).
o Majority: Justice Roberts, joined by Chief Justice Jones,
Justice O’Brien, Justice Pomeroy, Justice Nix & Justice
Manderino
o Concurrence: Justice Pomeroy
o Concurring in the result: Justice Eagen
Henderson v. Henderson, 327 A.2d 60, 62 (Pa. 1974) (per curiam)
(determining that former statutory provision, which permitted
the payment of alimony pendente lite, counsel fees, and expenses
to the wife in a divorce action but not to the husband, was invalid
as violative of the Equal Rights Amendment).
o Per curiam
o

•

•

•
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• Hopkins v. Blanco, 320 A.2d 139, 140 (Pa. 1974) (“[I]f the husband
may recover for loss of consortium, to deny the wife an equal right
would be invalid under the Pennsylvania Constitution. To draw
such a distinction would have no rational or proper foundation at
law, and would clearly be a form of invalid discrimination based
strictly on sex.”).
o Majority: Justice Eagen, joined by Justice O’Brien, Justice
Roberts, Justice Pomeroy, Justice Nix & Justice Manderino
o Concurring in the result: Chief Justice Jones
M. Art. III, § 14 [Education]
• William Penn Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 170 A.3d 414, 417,
463–64 (Pa. 2017) (finding justiciable claims that the system of
public education funding violated the state constitution’s
education and equal protection clauses: PA. CONST. art. III, §§ 14,
32).
o Majority: Justice Wecht, joined by Justice Todd, Justice
Donohue, Justice Dougherty & Justice Mundy
o Concurrence: Justice Dougherty
o Dissent: Chief Justice Saylor
o Dissent: Justice Baer
N. Art. III, § 32 [Equal Treatment]
• Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 147 A.3d 536, 572, 576,
582 (Pa. 2016) (Robinson III) (holding that provision restricting
health care professionals’ access to and ability to disseminate
information regarding chemicals used in fracking process
constituted “legislative favoritism of particular industries” in
violation of section 32 and that exclusion of private well owners
from mandatory spill notification provided to public water
systems was unconstitutional because it furthered no legitimate
legislative goal).
o (Notice provisions struck entirely, with effect stayed for 180
days).
o Majority: Justice Todd, joined by Justice Donohue, Justice
Dougherty, and Justice Wecht
o Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Chief Justice Saylor
(dissents from notification holding)
o Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Justice Baer
(dissents from notification holding)
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Justice Eakin did not participate in the consideration or
decision of the case.
W. Mifflin Area Sch. Dist. v. Zahorchak, 4 A.3d 1042, 1048–49 (Pa.
2010) (holding that statutes concerning closure of high school
programs by third class school districts created a class of one
member that is closed or substantially closed to future
membership, which is “special legislation” that is per se
unconstitutional in violation of article III, section 32).
o Majority: Justice Saylor, joined by Chief Justice Castille,
Justice Eakin, Justice Baer, Justice Todd, Justice McCaffery
& Justice Orie Melvin
Pa. Tpk. Comm’n v. Commonwealth, 899 A.2d 1085, 1086–87,
1096 (Pa. 2006) (holding that the First-Level Supervisor
Collective Bargaining Act violated the constitutional prohibition
against special laws, because “there is no rational reason to treat
first-level supervisors of the Commission differently than all
other first-level supervisors of other public employers when it
comes to collective bargaining”).
o Majority: Justice Castille, joined by Chief Justice Cappy,
Justice Newman, Justice Saylor, Justice Eakin, Justice Baer
& Justice Baldwin
Harrisburg Sch. Dist. v. Hickok, 761 A.2d 1132, 1136 (Pa. 2000)
(amendment to Education Empowerment Act that exempted
school district in state capital from treatment mandated for other
school district was unconstitutional special legislation because it
created a class of one member).
o Majority: Chief Justice Flaherty, joined by Justice Zappala,
Justice Cappy & Justice Castille
o Concurring in result: Justice Nigro
o Concurrence and Dissent: Justice Saylor
DeFazio v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 756 A.2d 1103, 1106 (Pa. 2000)
(statutes requiring sheriffs of second class counties to abide by
certain hiring and promotion procedures violated equal
protection provision under article III, section 32).
o Majority: Chief Justice Flaherty, joined by Justice Cappy,
Justice Castille, Justice Nigro, Justice Newman & Justice
Saylor
o Concurrence in the result: Justice Zappala
Hoffman v. Township of Whitehall, 677 A.2d 1200, 1203 (Pa. 1996)
(statutory preference in Veterans’ Preference Act accorded to
veterans seeking promotion in public employment was
o

•

•

•

•

•
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unconstitutional, a holding grounded in due process and equal
protection).
o Majority: Justice Flaherty, Chief Justice Nix & Justice Cappy
o Dissent: Justice Zappala, joined by Justice Castille
o Dissent: Justice Castille
Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265, 270 (Pa. 1995) (invalidating statute
on the basis that there is “no rational reason why those similarly
situated with respect to needing funds for college education,
should be treated unequally”).
o Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Chief Justice Nix,
Justice Flaherty & Justice Castille
o Dissent: Justice Montemuro, joined by Justice Cappy
Ridley Arms, Inc. v. Ridley Township, 531 A.2d 414, 416–18 (Pa.
1987) (construing First Class Township Code in light of article
III, section 32 to determine that solid waste removal ordinance
violates the Code by imposing unreasonable fees and charges,
and avoids constitutional analysis).
o Majority: Justice Flaherty, joined by Chief Justice Nix,
Justice Hutchinson & Justice Papadakos
o Concurrence: Justice Nix
o Dissent: Justice Zappala
Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 51–52 (Pa. 1980) (“Not
only does the [Voluntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse Statute]
exceed the proper bounds of the police power, but, in addition, it
offends the Constitution by creating a classification based on
marital status (making deviate acts criminal only when
performed between unmarried persons) where such differential
treatment is not supported by a sufficient state interest and
thereby denies equal protection of the laws.”).
o Majority: Justice Flaherty, joined by Chief Justice Eagen,
Justice Larsen & Justice Kauffman
o Concurrence: Chief Justice Eagen, joined by Justice Larsen
& Justice Kauffman
o Concurrence: Justice Larsen
o Dissent: Justice Roberts, joined by Justice O’Brien
o Dissent: Justice Nix
Kroger Co. v. O’Hara Township, 392 A.2d 266, 267, 276 (Pa. 1978)
(holding Sunday Trading Laws, which prescribe criminal
sanctions for all labor, business, and commercial activities on
Sunday, violated equal protection).
o Majority: Justice Manderino, joined by Justice O’Brien,
Justice Roberts, Justice Nix & Justice Larsen
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o Concurrence: Justice Nix
o Concurrence: Justice Larsen
o Dissent: Chief Justice Eagen, joined by Justice Pomeroy
Moyer v. Phillips, 341 A.2d 441, 443–45 (Pa. 1975) (slander and
libel exception within statutes, providing that all causes of action
or proceedings except actions for slander or libel shall survive the
death of plaintiff or defendant, constituted an arbitrary denial of
equal protection).
o Majority: Chief Justice Jones, joined by Justice Roberts,
Justice Nix, Justice Manderino, Justice Eagen & Justice
O’Brien
o Concurrence: Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Nix
o Concurrence: Justice Manderino
o Justice Pomeroy did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
Goodman v. Kennedy, 329 A.2d 224, 231 (Pa. 1974) (holding that
family status classification in the Sunday Trading Law violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
article III, section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, noting
that “[e]conomic discrimination, in and of itself, is not a
legitimate legislative objective which justifies the closing of some
stores on Sunday and not others”).
o Judgment: Justice Manderino, joined by Justice Eagen,
Justice Pomeroy (Parts I, III, and IV), Justice Nix (Parts I,
III, and IV), Chief Justice Jones (Parts II–IV) & Justice
Roberts (Parts II–IV)
o Concurrence: Justice Roberts, joined by Chief Justice Jones
o Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Justice Nix, joined
by Justice Pomeroy
o Dissent: Justice O’Brien
In re Estate of Cavill, 329 A.2d 503, 504, 506 (Pa. 1974) (statute
generally invalidating bequest in wills to religious and charitable
organizations made within thirty days of testator’s death denies
charitable beneficiaries equal protection of the laws).
o Majority: Justice Roberts, joined by Chief Justice Jones,
Justice O’Brien, Justice Nix and Justice Manderino
o Dissent: Justice Pomeroy, joined by Justice Eagen, id. at 506
(“[T]he majority comes perilously close to assuming the
posture of a super-legislature which judges the wisdom
rather than the validity of legislation.”)
State Bd. of Chiropractic Exam’rs v. Life Fellowship of Pa., 272
A.2d 478, 479–80 (Pa. 1971) (holding unconstitutional under
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article III, section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution a
provision of the Chiropractic Registration Act because the
exemptions afforded a specific organization for certain standards
of educational and professional competence were not grounded in
“sound reason and real necessity”).
o Majority: Justice Roberts, joined by Justice O’Brien
o Concurring in the result: Chief Justice Bell & Justice Eagen
o Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Justice Pomeroy,
joined by Justice Jones
o Justice Cohen did not participate in the decision of this case.

O. Art. VIII, § 1 [Tax Uniformity]
• Nextel Commc’ns Mid-Atl., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 171 A.3d 682,
685 (Pa. 2017) (finding net-loss-carryover provision in the
Pennsylvania revenue code, which restricted the amount of loss
a corporation could carry over from prior years as a deduction,
violated the uniformity clause).
o Majority: Justice Todd, joined by Chief Justice Saylor, Justice
Donohue, Justice Dougherty, Justice Wecht & Justice Mundy
o Concurrence: Justice Baer joined by Justice Donohue &
Justice Wecht
• Valley Forge Towers Apartments v. Upper Merion Area Sch. Dist.,
163 A.3d 962, 965, 980 (Pa. 2017) (holding that the uniformity
clause did not permit a school district to appeal selectively only
assessment commercial properties, such as apartment
complexes, while choosing not to appeal assessments of other
types of property, such as single-family residential homes).
o Majority: Chief Justice Saylor, joined by Justice Baer, Justice
Todd, Justice Donohue, Justice Dougherty, Justice Wecht &
Justice Mundy
• Mount Airy #1, LLC v. Pa. Dep’t of Revenue, 154 A.3d 268, 271,
273, 280 (Pa. 2016) (finding the municipal portion of the local
share assessment levied on gross slot machine revenue under the
Race Horse Development and Gaming Act imposing flat levy
above cut-off income violated the uniformity clause of the state
constitution—which the court referred to as the “provision in our
constitution [that] has been so much litigated yet so little
understood”).
o Majority: Justice Wecht, joined by Justice Baer, Justice
Donohue & Justice Dougherty
o Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Chief Justice Saylor
o Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Justice Todd
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• Mesivtah Eitz Chaim of Bobov, Inc. v. Pike Cty. Bd. of Assessment
Appeals, 44 A.3d 3, 9 (Pa. 2012) (affirming conclusion that
property owner was not an institution of a “purely public charity”
entitled to exemption from real estate taxes within the meaning
of article VIII, section 2(a)(v) of the Pennsylvania Constitution).
o Majority: Justice Eakin, joined by Justice Baer, Justice Todd
& Justice McCaffery
o Dissent: Justice Saylor, joined by Chief Justice Castille &
Justice Orie Melvin
• Clifton v. Allegheny County., 969 A.2d 1197, 1229 (Pa. 2009)
(ordinance providing for continued, indefinite use of a base year
method of valuation for property tax purposes violated the
uniformity clause as applied in Allegheny County—but not
facially—because it resulted in a form of classification that was
unreasonable and not rationally related to any legitimate state
purpose).
o Majority: Chief Justice Castille, joined by Justice Saylor,
Justice Eakin, Justice Todd, Justice McCaffery & Justice
Greenspan
o Concurrence: Justice Baer
• Downingtown Area Sch. Dist. v. Chester Cty. Bd. of Assessment
Appeals, 913 A.2d 194, 205 (Pa. 2006) (finding statutory tax
scheme 72 P.S. § 5349(d.2), which precluded uniformity challenge
if common level ratio was within 15% of the established
predetermined ratio, violated the uniformity clause of the
Pennsylvania Constitution).
o Majority: Justice Saylor, joined by Justice Castille, Justice
Newman, Justice Baer & Justice Baldwin
o Dissent: Chief Justice Cappy, joined by Justice Eakin
• Devlin v. City of Philadelphia, 862 A.2d 1234, 1248 (Pa. 2004)
(legislative provisions exempting transfers of real estate between
“life partners” from the real estate transfer tax violated the
uniformity clause).
o Majority: Justice Nigro, joined by Chief Justice Cappy,
Justice Castille, Justice Saylor, Justice Eakin & Justice Baer
o Justice Newman did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this matter.
• Cmty. Options, Inc. v. Bd. of Prop. Assessment, 813 A.2d 680, 687
(Pa. 2002) (determining that non-profit providing housing and
employment services for individuals with intellectual disabilities
was considered a “purely public charity” under article VIII,
section 2 and qualified for tax-exempt status).
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Majority: Chief Justice Zappala, joined by Justice Cappy,
Justice Castille, Justice Nigro & Justice Newman
o Concurrence: Justice Nigro
o Dissent: Justice Saylor, joined by Justice Eakin
City of Harrisburg v. Sch. Dist. of Harrisburg, 710 A.2d 49, 54 (Pa.
1998) (Resolution 276 violates the uniformity clause because it
distinguishes between lessees of public and nonpublic property,
without a reasonable and just basis for the difference in
treatment).
o Majority: Justice Newman, joined by Chief Justice Flaherty
and Justice Zappala, Justice Cappy, Justice Castille &
Justice Nigro
PICPA Found. for Educ. & Research v. Commonwealth Bd. of Fin.
& Revenue, 634 A.2d 187, 190–91 (Pa. 1993) (construing section
204(10) of the Tax Code—in light of constitutional requirement
that only institutions that are “purely public charities” be
exempted from taxes—to deny non-profit corporation’s sales tax
refund).
o Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Chief Justice Nix,
Justice Flaherty, Justice Papadokos, Justice Cappy & Justice
Montemuro
o Concurring: Chief Justice Nix, joined by Justice Cappy &
Justice Montemuro
Auto. Trade Ass’n of Greater Phila. v. City of Philadelphia, 596
A.2d 794, 797 (Pa. 1991) (“As argument before this Court focused
on the retroactivity question, we are unprepared, on this meager
record, to decide [whether the Mercantile License Tax violated
the uniformity clause]. We must, therefore, remand the matter to
the Court of Common Pleas for decision on the claim that the
Mercantile License Tax was unconstitutional, and for
determination of the appropriate remedy, if any.”).
o Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Chief Justice Nix,
Justice Flaherty, Justice McDermott, Justice Papadakos,
Justice Cappy & Justice Larsen
o Concurrence: Justice Papadakos, joined by Justice Larsen
Hosp. Utilization Project v. Commonwealth, 487 A.2d 1306, 1312,
1318 (Pa. 1985) (determining that plaintiff organization was not
entitled to sales and use tax exemptions because it was not a
“purely public charity” within the meaning of the state
constitution, and construing section 204(10) in light of
constitutional limitation “to exempt only those charitable
organizations which are institutions of ‘purely public charity’”).
o

•

•
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Majority: Chief Justice Nix, joined by Justice Larsen, Justice
Flaherty, Justice McDermott, Justice Hutchinson, Justice
Zappala & Justice Papadakos
Gilbert Assocs., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 447 A.2d 944, 945, 947 (Pa.
1982) (holding that difference in treatment of domestic and
foreign corporations in calculating franchise tax by the Board of
Finance and Revenue, solely based on their place of
incorporation, was constitutionally impermissible).
o Majority: Justice Roberts (Opinion of the Court)
Ritz v. Commonwealth, 432 A.2d 169, 171 (Pa. 1981) (determining
that husband could exclude union dues from taxable income in
light of tax uniformity clause).
o Majority: Justice Flaherty, joined by Justice Larsen, Justice
Wilkinson & Justice Kauffman
o Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Justice Roberts,
joined by Chief Justice O’Brien
o Concurring in the result: Justice Nix
Commonwealth v. Molycorp, Inc., 392 A.2d 321, 321–22, 324 (Pa.
1978) (holding that where Tentative Tax Act provided two
methods for computation of tentative tax, Commonwealth could
not systematically discriminate against taxpayers, choosing
second method by assessing additional tax against them for
underpayment of tentative tax, while allowing taxpayers using
other method to escape such additional tax).
o Majority: Justice Roberts, joined by Chief Justice Eagen,
Justice O’Brien, Justice Pomeroy, Justice Nix & Justice
Manderino
o Concurring in the result: Justice Larsen
Commonwealth v. Staley, 381 A.2d 1280, 1282–83 (Pa. 1978)
(construing phrase “payment to reimburse actual expenses” in
section 301(d)(v) so as to avoid constitutional conflict with article
VIII, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution).
o Majority: Justice Manderino, joined by Justice O’Brien &
Justice Roberts
o Concurrence: Justice Roberts, joined by Justice O’Brien
o Concurring in the result: Justice Nix, Justice Roberts &
Justice O’Brien
o Dissent: Justice Pomeroy
o Dissent: Chief Justice Eagen
Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Commonwealth, 360 A.2d
592, 597 (Pa. 1976) (treating a foreign corporation, once it is
allowed entry, differently than domestic corporations in the
o

•

•

•

•

•
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absence of any reasonable basis for separate treatment violated
the tax uniformity clause).
o Majority: Justice Roberts, joined by Chief Justice Jones,
Justice Eagen, Justice O’Brien, Justice Pomeroy & Justice
Manderino
o Concurring in the result: Justice Nix
• ITE Imperial Corp. v. Commonwealth, 365 A.2d 139, 139 (Pa.
1976) (per curiam) (Department of Revenue order sustaining an
excise tax on foreign corporations could not be enforced as it
violated the tax uniformity clause).
o Per curiam
• Amidon v. Kane, 279 A.2d 53, 60–61 (Pa. 1971) (statute purporting
to impose flat 3.5% tax but excluding from taxable income all
interest received on obligations of the Commonwealth and its
political subdivisions violated the tax uniformity clause).
o Majority: Justice Roberts, joined by Chief Justice Bell,
Justice O’Brien & Justice Barbieri
o Concurrence: Chief Justice Bell
o Concurring in part: Justice Pomeroy
o Dissent: Justice Eagen, joined by Justice Jones
III. CRIMINAL PROCESS
A. Art. I, § 8 [Search and Seizure]
• Commonwealth v. Shabezz, 166 A.3d 278, 286–87 (Pa. 2017) (held
that the passenger had automatic standing to challenge the
illegal search of his vehicle under article I, section 8).
o Majority: Justice Wecht, joined by Chief Justice Saylor,
Justice Todd, Justice Donohue & Justice Dougherty
o Concurrence: Justice Mundy, joined by Justice Baer
• Commonwealth v. Loughnane, 173 A.3d 733, 745–46 (Pa. 2017)
(rejecting automobile exception in defendant’s vehicle search,
and remanding to determine whether probable cause and exigent
circumstances existed to justify search under article I, section 8).
o Majority: Justice Donohue, joined by Justice Baer, Justice
Todd, Justice Dougherty & Justice Wecht
o Concurrence: Justice Mundy
o Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Chief Justice
Saylor
• Commonwealth v. Myers, 164 A.3d 1162, 1172, 1180–82 (Pa. 2017)
(determining that the implied consent statute did not authorize
warrantless blood test of unconscious defendant; the blood test
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violated defendant’s article I, section 8 and Fourth Amendment
rights).
o Majority: Justice Wecht, joined by Justice Donohue, Justice
Dougherty & Justice Todd in Parts I, II(A), II(B), II(D), and
mandate
o Concurrence: Chief Justice Saylor, joined by Justice Baer in
full & Justice Donohue in Part II
o Concurrence: Justice Todd
o Dissent: Justice Mundy
• Commonwealth v. Arter, 151 A.3d 149, 155–56, 167 (Pa. 2016)
(conducting an Edmunds analysis and determining that the
exclusionary rule, derived from article I, section 8 of the state
constitution, applies to parole and probation revocation
proceedings, unlike the federal exclusionary rule).
o Majority: Justice Todd, joined by Justice Baer, Justice
Donohue, Justice Dougherty & Justice Wecht
o Dissent: Chief Justice Saylor
• Commonwealth v. Enimpah, 106 A.3d 695, 702–03 (Pa. 2014)
(reasoning that the defendant had the right to compel
prosecution to prove its evidence was not obtained in violation of
defendant’s state constitutional rights under article I, section 8).
o Majority: Justice Eakin, joined by Chief Justice Castille,
Justice Baer, Justice Todd & Justice Stevens
o Concurrence: Justice Saylor, joined by Chief Justice Castille
in footnote 2, id. at 705 n.2 (“I would also note that there is a
good argument to be made that a threshold focus, before
assessing hearing burdens, should be on the sufficiency of the
suppression motion in the first instance.”)
o Former Justice McCaffery did not participate in the decision
of this case.
• Commonwealth v. Dunnavant, 107 A.3d 29, 32 (Pa. 2014) (per
curiam) (affirming by an equally divided court the superior
court’s order to suppress videotape made in defendant’s home by
a confidential informant, invoking the strong privacy interest
individuals possess in the home).
o Opinion in support of affirmance: Justice Saylor, joined by
Justice Baer & Justice Todd
o Opinion in support of affirmance: Justice Todd, joined by
Justice Baer
o Opinion in support of reversal: Chief Justice Castille, joined
by Justice Eakin & Justice Stevens
o Opinion in support of reversal: Justice Stevens
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Justice McCaffery did not participate in the decision of this
case.
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 86 A.3d 182, 187, 191 (Pa. 2014)
(following Edmunds and holding that good faith exception to
exclusionary rule enshrined in article I, section 8 would not be
adopted for purpose of admitting physical evidence seized
incident to arrest based solely on an expired arrest warrant).
o Majority: Chief Justice Castille, joined by Justice Saylor,
Justice Eakin, Justice Baer & Justice Todd
o Dissent: Justice McCaffery, joined by Justice Stevens
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 67 A.3d 736, 745 (Pa. 2013) (holding
that the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act did not empower
sentencing court to direct probation officer to conduct
warrantless, suspicionless searches of a probationer as a
condition of probation, in light of the statutory construction of
section 9912(d)(2)).
o Majority: Chief Justice Castille, joined by Justice Saylor,
Justice Eakin, Justice Baer & Justice Todd
o Dissent: Justice McCaffery
o Former Justice Orie Melvin did not participate in the
decision of this case.
Commonwealth v. Lagenella, 83 A.3d 94, 99 n.3, 105–06 (Pa. 2013)
(holding that officer could not conduct warrantless search of
immobilized and safely parked vehicle, and finding “the Fourth
Amendment and Article I, Section 8 to be coextensive”).
o Majority: Justice Todd, joined by Chief Justice Castille,
Justice Baer & Justice McCaffery
o Concurrence: Justice Saylor
o Dissent: Justice Eakin
o Former Justice Orie Melvin did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.
Commonwealth v. Marconi, 64 A.3d 1036, 1037, 1044 (Pa. 2013)
(affirming grant of motion to suppress evidence obtained when
defendant’s car was stopped at a roadside sobriety checkpoint
because sheriffs and their deputies lacked authority
independently to establish and conduct suspicionless roadside
sobriety checkpoint).
o Majority: Justice Saylor, joined by Chief Justice Castille,
Justice Baer & Justice Todd
o Concurrence: Justice Eakin
o Dissent: Justice McCaffery
o

•

•

•
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Justice Orie Melvin did not participate in the decision of this
case.
Commonwealth v. Wallace, 42 A.3d 1040, 1048, 1052 (Pa. 2012)
(confirming adoption of Gates totality-of-the-circumstances test
with respect to article I, section 8, the court held that the
anticipatory search of defendant’s home violated his
constitutional rights and granted motion to suppress seized
evidence).
o Majority: Justice Todd, joined by Justice Saylor, Justice Baer
& Justice Orie Melvin
o Dissent: Justice Eakin, joined by Chief Justice Castille
o Dissent: Justice McCaffery, joined by Chief Justice Castille
Commonwealth v. Antoszyk, 38 A.3d 816, 817 (Pa. 2012) (per
curiam) (affirming by “an equally divided vote, the Superior
Court’s holding that a search warrant is invalid if the affidavit of
probable cause included a confidential informant’s deliberate
misstatement”).
o In support of affirmance: Justice Saylor, Justice Baer &
Justice Todd (no opinion)
o Opinion in support of reversal: Justice Eakin, joined by Chief
Justice Castille & Justice McCaffery
o Justice Orie Melvin did not participate in the consideration
or decision of this case.
Commonwealth v. Grahame, 7 A.3d 810, 811, 816–17 (Pa. 2010)
(finding that the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to
conduct warrantless search of defendant’s handbag for safety
reasons based solely on the fact that defendant was in a residence
where another individual had sold illegal drugs about ten
minutes earlier outside of defendant’s presence in violation of
article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the
Fourth Amendment).
o Majority: Justice Orie Melvin, joined by Chief Justice
Castille, Justice Saylor & Justice Baer
o Concurrence: Justice Eakin, joined by Justice McCaffery
o Concurrence: Justice Todd
Commonwealth v. Mistler, 912 A.2d 1265, 1272–73 (Pa. 2006)
(finding suspicionless stop of defendants to determine if they had
engaged in underage drinking, in the absence of paramount
public interest, violated the Fourth Amendment and article 1,
section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution).
o Majority: Justice Newman joined by Chief Justice Cappy &
Justice Baer
o

•

•

•

•
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o Concurrence: Justice Baldwin
o Dissent: Justice Castille, joined by Justice Saylor
o Dissent: Justice Eakin, joined by Justice Castille
Commonwealth v. Laventure, 894 A.2d 109, 118, 119 (Pa. 2006)
(arrest warrant failed to describe unknown defendant “as nearly
as may be” requirement in article I, section 8, which “requires
more specificity than the federal particularity requirement,” and
was thus ineffective for tolling section 5552(b)’s period of
limitations).
o Majority: Justice Saylor, joined by Chief Justice Cappy,
Justice Castille, Justice Newman & Justice Baer
o Former Justice Nigro and Justice Eakin did not participate
in the consideration or decision of this case.
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 851 A.2d 870, 872, 875, 878 (Pa. 2004)
(finding defendant entitled to post-conviction relief on the same
grounds for which co-defendant was granted for his article I,
section 8 claim because certain evidence obtained should have
been suppressed).
o Majority: Justice Saylor, joined by Chief Justice Cappy,
Justice Nigro, Justice Newman & Justice Baer
o Dissent: Justice Castille
o Justice Eakin did not participate in the decision of this case.
Commonwealth v. Shaw, 770 A.2d 295, 299 (Pa. 2001) (hospital
release of blood test results was unconstitutional when done at
the request of a police trooper without a search warrant).
o Majority: Justice Zappala
o Concurrence: Justice Nigro, id. at 300 (citing to Edmunds,
argues that the majority opinion “does damage to the settled
methodology this Court has used to analyze state
constitutional provisions in comparison to their federal
counterparts to determine whether the former provide
additional protections which the latter do not”)
o Dissent: Justice Castille, joined by Justice Saylor, id. at 301
(“[A] warrantless police request [like the one at issue] is just
as reasonable, and hence as constitutionally permissible,
under Article I, § 8 as it is under the Fourth Amendment.”)
Commonwealth v. Torres, 764 A.2d 532, 540 (Pa. 2001) (affirming
grant of motion to suppress evidence collected because affidavit
of probable case did not provide substantial basis upon which to
issue a warrant).
o Majority: Justice Nigro, joined by Chief Justice Flaherty,
Justice Zappala, Justice Cappy & Justice Saylor
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o Concurrence and Dissent: Justice Castille & Justice Newman
• Commonwealth v. Freeman, 757 A.2d 903, 909 (Pa. 2000) (finding
law enforcement officer’s seizure of driver and subsequent search
of her car by obtaining her consent was the product of an illegal
detention).
o Majority: Justice Saylor, joined by Chief Justice Flaherty,
Justice Zappala, Justice Cappy, Justice Castille & Justice
Newman
o Concurring in the result: Justice Nigro
• Commonwealth v. Polo, 759 A.2d 372, 376 (Pa. 2000) (stopping of
a commercial passenger bus and detaining passengers was an
unconstitutional seizure in violation of article I, section 8).
o Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Chief Justice Flaherty,
Justice Cappy & Justice Nigro
o Concurrence and dissent: Justice Saylor, joined by Justice
Castille
o Dissent: Justice Newman
• Commonwealth v. Wimbush, 750 A.2d 807, 809, 810 n.2 (Pa. 2000)
(held that police officer’s investigatory stop violated defendant’s
article I, section 8 and Fourth Amendment rights, noting in
footnote 2 that “Pennsylvania has consistently followed Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence in stop and frisk cases”).
o Majority: Justice Nigro, joined by Chief Justice Flaherty,
Justice Cappy & Justice Saylor
o Concurrence: Chief Justice Flaherty
o Dissent: Justice Zappala
o Dissent: Justice Castille, joined by Justice Newman
• Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 750 A.2d 795, 797 n.3 (Pa. 2000)
(companion case to Wimbush, noting in footnote 3 that
Pennsylvania follows Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in stop
and frisk cases).
o Majority: Justice Nigro
o Concurrence: Justice Zappala, joined by Chief Justice
Flaherty
o Dissent: Justice Castille, joined by Justice Newman
• Commonwealth v. Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d 898, 906 (Pa. 1999)
(holding that warrantless use of infrared thermal imaging device
to scan private residence for heat from suspected marijuana
growing operation was unconstitutional search under the Fourth
Amendment and article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution).
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Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Chief Justice Flaherty,
Justice Cappy, Justice Newman, Justice Saylor & Justice
Nigro
o Concurring: Justice Nigro
o Dissent: Justice Castille
In re D.M., 743 A.2d 422, 425 (Pa. 1999) (held that police officer
did not have cause pursuant to state and federal constitutions to
stop juvenile based on an anonymous tip, citing Cook that an
officer must have “specific and articulable facts and reasonable
inferences drawn from those facts in light of the officer’s
experience”), vacated sub nom. Pennsylvania v. D.M., 529 U.S.
1126 (2000).
o Majority: Justice Cappy, joined by Chief Justice Flaherty,
Justice Zappala & Justice Nigro
o Dissent: Justice Castille, joined by Justice Newman
o Dissent: Justice Saylor
Commonwealth v. Clark, 735 A.2d 1248, 1253 (Pa. 1999) (officer
did not have probable cause to justify warrantless arrest, and
evidence seized during search incident to arrest must be
suppressed).
o Majority: Justice Nigro, joined by Chief Justice Flaherty,
Justice Zappala & Justice Cappy
o Dissent: Justice Castille, joined by Justice Newman
Commonwealth v. Ardestani, 736 A.2d 552, 556 (Pa. 1999)
(applying Brion, the court determined that police illegally
recorded defendants’ conversations with informants in their
respective homes).
o Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Chief Justice Flaherty,
Justice Cappy & Justice Nigro
o Concurrence: Justice Nigro
o Dissent: Justice Castille, joined by Justice Newman
o Justice Saylor did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 707 A.2d 1114, 1118 (Pa. 1998) (holding
that “when the prior inconsistent statement is a
contemporaneous verbatim recording of a witness’s statement,
the recording of the statement must be an electronic, audiotaped
or videotaped recording in order to be considered as substantive
evidence”).
o Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Chief Justice Flaherty,
Justice Cappy, Justice Castille & Justice Nigro
o Dissent: Justice Newman
o

•

•

•
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• Commonwealth v. Graham, 721 A.2d 1075, 1082 (Pa. 1998) (police
search of defendant’s back pockets and seizure of drugs was
beyond what was necessary to determine whether the suspect
was armed).
o Majority: Justice Nigro, joined by Chief Justice Flaherty
o Concurring in the result: Justice Zappala, Justice Cappy,
Justice Castille & Justice Newman
• Commonwealth v. Graziano-Constantino, 718 A.2d 746, 748 (Pa.
1998) (police officer did not have probable cause to stop
defendant’s truck pursuant to search warrant issued for the
premises).
o Majority: Chief Justice Flaherty, joined by Justice Cappy,
Justice Nigro & Justice Saylor
o Concurring in result: Justice Zappala
o Dissent: Justice Newman, joined by Justice Castille
• In Interest of S.J., 713 A.2d 45, 48 (Pa. 1998) (pat-down search of
juvenile pursuant to investigatory stop arising from observation
of group of males smoking marijuana on street corner was
unjustified).
o Majority: Justice Nigro, joined by Chief Justice Flaherty &
Justice Zappala
o Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Justice Cappy
o Dissent: Justice Castille, joined by Justice Newman
• Commonwealth v. Jackson, 698 A.2d 571, 573, 576 (Pa. 1997)
(Terry stop and pat-down without reasonable suspicion violated
article I, section 8 rights, which are broader than those afforded
under Federal Constitution).
o Majority: Justice Cappy, joined by Chief Justice Flaherty,
Justice Zappala & Justice Nigro
o Dissent: Justice Newman, joined by Justice Castille
• Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 692 A.2d 1068, 1071 (Pa. 1997)
(applying the rule set forth in Queen and holding that police radio
broadcast describing a man carrying a gun, and based on an
anonymous tip, did not justify the search of that person and
seizure of his weapon).
o Majority: Chief Justice Flaherty, joined by Justice Zappala &
Justice Cappy
o Concurring in the result: Justice Nigro
o Dissent: Justice Newman, joined by Justice Castille
• Commonwealth v. Selby, 688 A.2d 698, 699 (Pa. 1997) (holding
that wiretap recording in individual’s home and recording his
conversations violated his article I, section 8 rights—“an
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individual’s right to privacy in his home should remain
inviolate”).
o Majority: Chief Justice Flaherty, joined by Justice Zappala,
Justice Cappy & Justice Nigro
o Concurring in the result: Justice Nigro
o Dissent: Justice Castille
o Dissent: Justice Newman, joined by Justice Castille
Commonwealth v. Crompton, 682 A.2d 286, 290 (Pa. 1996)
(violating the knock-and-announce rule warrants suppression of
evidence as a remedy to an article I, section 8 violation).
o Majority: Justice Newman, joined by Justice Flaherty,
Justice Zappala, Justice Cappy & Justice Nigro
o Dissent: Justice Castille
o Chief Justice Nix did not participate in the decision of this
case.
Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896, 902 (Pa. 1995)
(warrantless search of vehicle did not fall into any exception to
justify a search under article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution).
o Majority: Justice Flaherty, joined by Justice Nix, Justice
Cappy, Justice Papadakos & Justice Zappala
o Concurrence: Justice Montemuro
o Dissent: Justice Castille
o Justice Papadakos did not participate in the decision of this
case.
Commonwealth v. Brion, 652 A.2d 287, 287 (Pa. 1994) (“Article I,
§ 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution precludes the police from
sending a confidential informer into the home of an individual to
electronically record his conversations and transmit them back
to the police.”).
o Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Justice Flaherty, Justice
Cappy & Justice Montemuro
o Dissent: Chief Justice Nix, joined by Justice Papadakos &
Justice Castille
Commonwealth v. Queen, 639 A.2d 443, 445–46 (Pa. 1994)
(declaring the rule that “a stop and frisk may be supported by a
police radio bulletin only if evidence is offered at the suppression
hearing establishing the articulable facts which support the
reasonable suspicion,” and holding that, after applying said rule,
the suppression court violated both the Fourth Amendment and
article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution).
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Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Chief Justice Nix,
Justice Flaherty, Justice Papadakos, Justice Cappy & Justice
Montemuro
o Justice Larsen did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
Commonwealth v. Lewis, 636 A.2d 619, 624–25 (Pa. 1994) (use of
“drug courier profile” as a law enforcement technique violated the
Fourth Amendment and article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution).
o Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Chief Justice Nix,
Justice Flaherty & Justice Cappy
o Dissent: Justice Papadakos
o Dissent: Justice Montemuro, joined by Justice Papadakos
o Justice Larsen did not participate in the decision of this case.
Commonwealth v. Schaeffer, 688 A.2d 1143, 1144 (Pa. 1993) (per
curiam) (affirming by an equally divided court that the
Pennsylvania Constitution “precludes the police from sending a
confidential informer into the home of an individual to
electronically record his conversations and transmit them back
to the police”).
o Opinion in support of affirmance: Justice Zappala, joined by
Justice Flaherty & Justice Cappy
o Opinion in support of reversal: Chief Justice Nix, joined by
Justice Larsen & Justice Papadakos
o Opinion in support of reversal: Justice Larsen
o Opinion in support of reversal: Justice Papadakos
o Justice Montemuro did not participate in the consideration
or decision of this matter.
Commonwealth v. Mason, 637 A.2d 251, 256–57 (Pa. 1993)
(knocking down apartment door with battering ram before
warrant was issued, and absent exigent circumstances, violated
article I, section 8, following Edmunds analysis).
o Majority: Justice Flaherty, joined by Justice Cappy, Justice
Zappala & Chief Justice Nix
o Concurrence: Justice Cappy
o Concurring in the result: Justice Montemuro
o Dissent: Justice Papadakos
o Justice Larsen did not participate in the decision of this case.
Commonwealth v. Means, 614 A.2d 220, 221–22 (Pa. 1992)
(forcibly entering home after waiting five to ten seconds following
announcement violated article I, section 8 knock-and-announce
rule).
o

•

•
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Majority: Chief Justice Nix, joined by Justice Flaherty,
Justice McDermott, Justice Zappala & Justice Cappy
o Concurring in the result: Justice Larsen
o Dissent: Justice Papadakos
Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 614 A.2d 1378, 1384 (Pa. 1992)
(detaining an individual near a drug raid without reasonable
suspicion violated defendant’s article I, section 8 rights under the
Pennsylvania Constitution).
o Majority: Justice Cappy, joined by Chief Justice Nix, Justice
Flaherty & Justice Zappala
o Dissent: Justice Papadakos
o Justice Larsen did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
o Justice McDermott did not participate in the decision of this
case.
Commonwealth v. Kohl, 615 A.2d 308, 315 (Pa. 1992) (chemical
tests on suspected drunk drivers, authorized by statute, violated
article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution).
o Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Chief Justice Nix,
Justice Flaherty & Justice Cappy
o Dissent: Justice Larsen, joined by Justice Papadakos
o Dissent: Justice Papadakos
o Justice McDermott did not participate in the decision of the
case.
Commonwealth v. Chambers, 598 A.2d 539, 542 (Pa. 1991) (police
officers’ failure to wait for any period of time before forcibly
entering premises to execute search warrant violated the
knock-and-announce rule under article I, section 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution).
o Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Chief Justice Nix,
Justice Flaherty & Justice Cappy
o Concurring in the result: Justice Larsen
o Dissent: Justice McDermott, joined by Justice Papadakos
Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 894, 905–06 (Pa. 1991)
(establishing new “methodology” to analyze future state
constitutional issues, then analyzing article I, section 8 to
determine there is no “good faith” exception to the exclusionary
rule).
o Majority: Justice Cappy, joined by Chief Justice Nix, Justice
Larsen, Justice Flaherty, Justice Zappala & Justice
Papadakos
o Concurrence: Justice Papadakos
o

•

•
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o Dissent: Justice McDermott
• Commonwealth v. Hashem, 584 A.2d 1378, 1382 (Pa. 1991)
(construing Pennsylvania’s Wiretap Act to meet the standard of
reasonableness, that “at a minimum, all the requirements
directed by the Legislature be met,” and finding that the
Commonwealth’s failure to obtain permission to disclose
communications in prosecution of a crime different from targeted
crime, prior to the disclosure, irreversibly tainted defendant’s
conviction).
o Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Chief Justice Nix,
Justice Larsen, Justice Flaherty & Justice Papadakos
o Dissent: Justice McDermott
o Former Justice Stout did not participate in the decision of
this case.
• Commonwealth v. Bricker, 581 A.2d 147, 150–51, 153, 155 (Pa.
1990) (holding that the failure to give corrupt source charge
regarding prosecution witness was reversible error where
evidence permitted inference that witness was accomplice—even
though trial court gave “false in one false in all” charge and
defense counsel effectively cross-examined witness, and made
closing argument alerting jury to scrutinize witness’s testimony
carefully—and sending unredacted plea agreements of
prosecution witnesses to jury was reversible error).
o Majority: Justice Cappy, joined by Justice Larsen, Justice
Zappala & Justice Papadakos
o Dissent: Justice Flaherty, joined by Chief Justice Nix &
Justice McDermott
• Commonwealth v. Grossman, 555 A.2d 896, 900 (Pa. 1989)
(holding that search warrant authorizing seizure of “all files” was
unconstitutionally overbroad).
o Majority: Justice Stout, joined by Chief Justice Nix, Justice
Larsen & Justice Flaherty
o Dissent: Justice McDermott, joined by Justice Papadakos
o Justice Zappala did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
• Commonwealth v. Melilli, 555 A.2d 1254, 1256, 1262–63 (Pa.
1989) (holding that pen register, used to investigate alleged
organized illegal gambling operation of defendant, could not be
used by law enforcement authorities without order based on
probable cause; and evidence obtained from pen registers was not
within good-faith exception to exclusionary rule).
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Majority: Justice Papadakos, joined by Justice Larsen,
Justice Zappala & Justice Stout
o Concurring in the result: Chief Justice Nix & Justice
Flaherty
o Dissent: Justice McDermott
Commonwealth v. Ionata, 544 A.2d 917, 920–22 (Pa. 1988)
(affirming by an equally divided court that the Commonwealth
failed to establish that exigent circumstances were present to
validate warrantless search of defendant’s automobile).
o Opinion in support of affirmance: Justice Flaherty, joined by
Chief Justice Nix & Justice Zappala
o Dissent: McDermott, joined by Justice Larsen
o Dissent: Papadakos, joined by Justice Larsen
Commonwealth v. McFarren, 525 A.2d 1185, 1188 (Pa. 1987)
(statute permitting police to request second blood alcohol test to
substantiate accuracy of first test was unreasonable and in
violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution).
o Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Justice Nix & Justice
Flaherty
o Concurring in the result: Justice McDermott
o Concurring in the result: Justice Papadakos
o Noting a Dissent: Justice Larsen & Justice Hutchinson
Commonwealth v. Sell, 470 A.2d 457, 468–69, 459 (Pa. 1983)
(upholding “automatic standing” principle as a matter of state
constitutional law and the Commonwealth’s greater recognition
of a right of privacy, and quoting the Supreme Court Justice in
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 502 (1977)).
o Majority: Justice Nix, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Larsen, Justice Flaherty & Justice Zappala
o Dissent: Justice McDermott
o Dissent: Justice Hutchinson
Commonwealth v. Long, 414 A.2d 113, 117 (Pa. 1980) (“[W]e
conclude that the search of the locked automobile trunk was
unreasonable, in violation of Art. I, s[ection] 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, and the evidence seized must be
suppressed.”).
o Majority: Justice Roberts, joined by Chief Justice Eagen,
Justice O’Brien, Justice Nix & Justice Manderino
o Dissent: Justice Flaherty, joined by Justice Larsen & Justice
Kauffman
o

•
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• Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283, 1291–92 (Pa. 1979)
(reversing defendant’s third-degree murder conviction on the
ground that she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in bank
record, consisting of cancelled check, and admission of the check
was prejudicial error).
o Majority: Justice O’Brien, joined by Chief Justice Eagen,
Justice Roberts & Justice Nix
o Concurrence: Justice Roberts
o Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Justice Larsen
o Dissent: Justice Manderino
o Justice Manderino filed a dissenting statement on denial of
reargument.
• Commonwealth v. Wagner, 406 A.2d 1026, 1031 (Pa. 1979)
(warrantless arrest of defendant was illegal because even though
police had probable cause to arrest on a theft charge, it was not a
crime of violence, and entry into fiancée’s premises was forcible).
o Majority: Justice Flaherty, joined by Chief Justice Eagen,
Justice O’Brien, Justice Roberts & Justice Manderino
o Concurrence: Justice Eagen
o Concurrence: Justice Roberts
o Concurrince: Justice Nix
o Dissent: Justice Larsen
• Commonwealth v. Walker, 383 A.2d 1253, 1254 (Pa. 1978) (“The
suppression court denied relief . . . even though it found that
appellant was a juvenile and was denied the right to consultation.
It did so, however, on April 24, 1974, prior to our decisions
holding that all juveniles are entitled to consultation before they
can effectively waive their constitutional rights. Under those
cases, appellant . . . is entitled to relief. We agree therefore with
appellant that all statements should have been suppressed.”).
o Majority: Justice Manderino, joined by Justice Roberts
o Concurring in the result: Justice O’Brien & Justice Nix
o Dissent: Justice Pomeroy, joined by Chief Justice Eagen &
Justice Larsen
• Commonwealth v. Knowles, 327 A.2d 19, 20, 23 (Pa. 1974) (holding
that narcotics, recovered from dollar bill abandoned by defendant
during search incident to his arrest, were fruit of the primary
illegality and that such contraband and evidence obtained from
subsequent search of defendant’s residence were inadmissible).
o Majority: Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Pomeroy, Justice
Eagen, Justice Nix & Justice Manderino
o Concurrence: Justice Pomeroy, joined by Justice Eagen
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o Concurring in the result: Chief Justice Jones
• Commonwealth v. Platou, 312 A.2d 29, 31–32, 34 (Pa. 1973)
(determining that warrant authorizing search of friend’s
apartment did not authorize search of defendant’s suitcases,
which were found on the apartment floor, where defendant had
not relinquished control over suitcases and police had been
informed that suitcases did not belong to the friend), overruled by
Commonwealth v. Reese, 549 A.2d 909 (Pa. 1988).
o Majority: Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Eagen, Justice
O’Brien, Justice Pomeroy, Justice Nix & Justice Manderino
o Dissent: Chief Justice Jones
B. PA. Const. Art. I., § 9
1. Assistance of Counsel
• Commonwealth v. Rosado, 150 A.3d 425, 433 (Pa. 2016)
(determining that a failure to file or perfect a direct appeal,
guaranteed as of right in article V, section 9, is ineffective
assistance of counsel per se because the error completely
forecloses appellate review).
o Majority: Justice Todd, joined by Justice Baer, Justice
Donohue & Justice Dougherty
o Concurrence: Justice Saylor, joined by Chief Justice Wecht &
Justice Mundy
• Kuren v. Luzerne County, 146 A.3d 715, 732 n.6, 751 (Pa. 2016)
(“We recognize for the first time in Pennsylvania a prospective
cause of action enabling indigent criminal defendants to prove
that the level of funding provided by a county to operate a public
defender’s office has left that office incapable of complying with
Gideon, creating the likelihood of a systematic, widespread
constructive denial of counsel in contravention of the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution”—noting in
footnote 6 that “[i]t is now well-settled that the right to counsel
recognized in Article I, Section 9 and in the Sixth
Amendment . . . are jurisprudentially coextensive”).
o Majority: Justice Wecht, joined by Chief Justice Saylor,
Justice Todd, Justice Donohue & Justice Dougherty
o Concurrence: Justice Baer
• Commonwealth v. Tharp, 101 A.3d 736, 771 (Pa. 2014) (finding
trial counsel’s investigation into mitigation evidence fell below
the constitutional standard of effectiveness of counsel under
Strickland performance prong).
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Majority: Justice Baer, joined by Justice McCaffery
Concurrence: Chief Justice Castille, joined by Justice Eakin
Concurrence: Justice Saylor, joined by Justice Todd & Justice
Eakin
o Concurrence: Justice Eakin
o Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Justice Stevens
Commonwealth v. Martin, 5 A.3d 177, 180, 204 (Pa. 2010) (holding
that counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to present
mitigating evidence at penalty phase of capital murder trial).
o Majority: Justice Baer, joined by Justice Todd
o Concurrence: Chief Justice Castille, joined by Justice
McCaffery
o Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Justice Saylor
o Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Justice Eakin
o Orie Melvin did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 995 A.2d 1143, 1172–73 (Pa. 2010)
(holding that defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel
during penalty phase of murder prosecution).
o Majority: Justice Eakin, joined by Chief Justice Castille,
Justice Todd & Justice McCaffery
o Concurrence: Justice Baer
o Concurrence in part and dissent in part: Justice Saylor
Commonwealth v. Sneed, 899 A.2d 1067, 1084 (Pa. 2006) (holding
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately
investigate and present mitigating evidence at sentencing).
o Majority: Justice Castille, joined by Chief Justice Cappy,
Justice Newman, Justice Saylor, Justice Eakin, Justice Baer
& Justice Baldwin
Commonwealth v. Collins, 888 A.2d 564, 584 (Pa. 2005) (finding
counsel ineffective for failing to reasonably attempt to uncover
mitigating evidence in the penalty phase. The court did not
specifically rely on state constitution in reaching its conclusion).
o Majority: Chief Justice Cappy, joined by Justice Nigro,
Justice Newman & Justice Baer
o Concurrence: Justice Saylor
o Concurrence and Dissent: Justice Castille, joined by Justice
Eakin
Commonwealth v. Halley, 870 A.2d 795, 801 (Pa. 2005) (counsel’s
“failure to file a Rule 1925(b) statement on behalf of criminal
defendant seeking to appeal his conviction,” which resulted “in a
o
o
o

•

•

•

•

•
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waiver of all claims asserted on direct appeal,” was ineffective
assistance).
o Majority: Justice Saylor, joined by Justice Cappy, Chief
Justice Castille, Justice Nigro, Justice Newman, Justice
Eakin & Justice Baer
Commonwealth v. Moore, 860 A.2d 88, 100–01 (Pa. 2004) (finding
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present any mitigating
evidence at sentencing).
o Majority: Justice Eakin, joined by Justice Cappy, Chief
Justice Castille & Justice Newman
o Concurrence and Dissent: Justice Saylor, joined by Justice
Nigro & Justice Baer
Commonwealth v. Malloy, 856 A.2d 767, 789 (Pa. 2004) (counsel
was ineffective during capital sentencing phase).
o Majority: Justice Castille, joined by Chief Justice Cappy,
Justice Nigro, Justice Newman, Justice Saylor, Justice Eakin
& Justice Baer
Commonwealth v. Brooks, 839 A.2d 245, 250 (Pa. 2003) (held
counsel was ineffective for failing to meet in person once with
defendant before a capital trial).
o Majority: Justice Nigro, joined by Chief Justice Cappy,
Justice Newman, Justice Saylor, Justice Eakin & Justice
Lamb
o Concurrence: Justice Castille, id. at 250 (arguing that
Strickland/Pierce test does not support “prophylactic” rule
by Majority of requiring face-to-face meeting)
o Concurrence: Justice Eakin
o Concurrence: Justice Lamb
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 828 A.2d 1009, 1015 (Pa. 2003)
(holding defendant’s right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment and article I, section 9 attached when trial court was
giving jury instructions, and exclusion of defense counsel violated
such rights).
o Majority: Justice Eakin, joined by Justice Cappy, Justice
Castille, Justice Nigro, Justice Newman & Justice Saylor
o Chief Justice Zappala did not participate in the opinion.
Commonwealth v. Chambers, 807 A.2d 872, 883–84 (Pa. 2002)
(held that counsel was ineffective for failure to object to jury
instruction on death penalty mitigating circumstances).
o Majority: Justice Newman, joined by Justice Zappala, Chief
Justice Cappy, Justice Saylor & Justice Eakin
o Concurrence in the result: Justice Castille & Justice Nigro
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• Commonwealth v. Rucker, 761 A.2d 541, 543–44 (Pa. 2000)
(defendant was entitled to change of counsel from
court-appointed counsel).
o Majority: Chief Justice Flaherty, joined by Justice Zappala,
Justice Cappy, Justice Castille, Justice Nigro & Justice
Saylor
o Justice Newman did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
• Commonwealth v. McAleer, 748 A.2d 670, 676 (Pa. 2000)
(defendant’s right to counsel was violated when his chosen
attorney was unable to appear for trial, and the judge failed to
grant his substitute counsel’s request for continuance).
o Majority: Justice Nigro, joined by Justice Flaherty, Chief
Justice Zappala, Justice Cappy, Justice Castille, Justice
Newman & Justice Saylor
• Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564, 572–73 (Pa. 1999)
(failure to inform defendant that “the sentencing court had no
authority to impose [a] reduced sentence” in exchange for
withdrawing his appeal constituted ineffective assistance and
relief was available under the Post Conviction Relief Act).
o Majority: Justice Saylor, joined by Chief Justice Flaherty,
Justice Zappala, Justice Cappy, Justice Castille, Justice
Nigro & Justice Newman
• Commonwealth ex rel. Buchanan v. Verbonitz, 581 A.2d 172, 175
(Pa. 1990) (holding that “the Pennsylvania Constitution
mandates a criminal defendant’s right to confrontation and
cross-examination at the preliminary hearing. In this case,
Buchanan was denied the right to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him”).
o Majority: Justice Larsen, joined by, Justice Cappy, Justice
Zappala & Justice Papadakos
o Concurrence: Justice Flaherty, joined by Justice Cappy
o Dissent: Chief Justice Nix, joined by Justice McDermott
o Dissent: Justice McDermott
• Commonwealth v. Henderson, 437 A.2d 387, 388 (Pa. 1981)
(maintaining Commonwealth’s interested-adult rule, premised
on the court’s belief that “administering of Miranda warnings to
a juvenile, without providing an opportunity to that juvenile to
consult with a mature, informed individual concerned primarily
with the interest of the juvenile, (is) inadequate to offset the
disadvantage occasioned by his youth” (alteration in original)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 372 A.2d 797, 800 (Pa. 1977))).
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Majority: Justice Roberts, joined by Chief Justice O’Brien,
Justice Nix & Justice Wilkinson
o Dissent: Justice Larsen, joined by Justice Flaherty & Justice
Kauffman
o Dissent: Justice Kauffman, joined by Justice Larsen &
Justice Flaherty
Commonwealth v. Newmiller, 409 A.2d 834, 839 (Pa. 1979)
(holding that defendant was denied effective assistance of
counsel by failing to object to counsel’s arguments about applying
the missing witness rule when defendant’s wife wasn’t called but
was present at the time).
o Majority: Justice O’Brien
o Concurrence: Chief Justice Eagen
o Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Justice Roberts
o Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Justice Nix, joined
by Justice Larsen
o Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Justice Larsen
o Justice Manderino did not participate in the decision of this
case.
Commonwealth v. Romberger, 347 A.2d 460, 463–64 (Pa. 1975)
(holding that failure of police to advise indigent defendant of his
right to free counsel before interrogating him violated his Fifth
Amendment rights and article I, section 9 rights).
o Majority: Justice Nix, joined by Chief Justice Jones, Justice
O’Brien, Justice Roberts & Justice Manderino
o Concurrence: Justice Roberts joined by Justice O’Brien &
Justice Manderino
o Concurring in the result: Justice Eagen & Justice Pomeroy
In re Adoption of R.I., 312 A.2d 601, 603 (Pa. 1973) (indigent
natural mother was entitled to be advised of her right to counsel
and to appointment of counsel, and appointment of counsel after
decree terminating rights was insufficient).
o Majority: Justice O’Brien, joined by Chief Justice Jones,
Justice Eagen, Justice Roberts, Justice Nix & Justice
Manderino
o Concurrence: Justice Pomeroy
o Concurrence: Justice Nix, joined by Justice Manderino
Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 285 A.2d 465, 471 (Pa. 1971) (holding
that a person charged with a drunk driving offense is entitled to
representation by counsel), superseded by statute, 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 9542 (1997).
o

•

•
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Majority: Justice Pomeroy, joined by Justice Jones, Justice
Eagen, Justice O’Brien, Justice Roberts & Justice Barbieri
Dissent: Chief Justice Bell

2. Law of the Land
• Commonwealth v. Noel, 857 A.2d 1283, 1284, 1287–88 (Pa. 2004)
(holding that vehicle code provision which treated horse riders
like vehicle drivers except for those provisions “which by their
very nature can have no application” was unconstitutionally
vague (quoting 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3103(a) (1977), held
unconstitutional by Commonwealth v. Noel, 857 A.2d 1283
(2004))).
o Majority: Justice Nigro, joined by Chief Justice Cappy,
Justice Castille & Justice Baer
o Concurrence: Justice Saylor, joined by Justice Newman
o Dissent: Justice Eakin
• Commonwealth v. Snyder, 713 A.2d 596, 597, 599–600, 606 (Pa.
1998) (finding article I, section 9’s phrase, “law of the land,” and
Federal Due Process provides the same protection in this case,
and defendant’s due process rights were violated for pre-arrest
delay of more than eleven years).
o Majority: Justice Newman, joined by Justice Castille, Justice
Nigro & Justice Saylor
o Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Justice Zappala,
joined by Chief Justice Flaherty & Justice Cappy
• Commonwealth v. Barud, 681 A.2d 162, 166–67 (Pa. 1996)
(Statute allowing a DUI conviction if driver’s blood alcohol
content exceeded .10% within three hours after driving was
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad).
o Majority: Justice Castille, joined by Chief Justice Nix, Justice
Flaherty, Justice Zappala & Justice Cappy
• Commonwealth v. Davis, 586 A.2d 914, 916, 917 (Pa. 1991)
(affirming by an equally divided court the Pennsylvania Superior
Court’s decision to suppress hearsay evidence that was gathered
in violation of the “due process clause of our state constitution,”
the article I, section 9 “law of the land” provision).
o Opinion in support of affirmance: Justice Flaherty, joined by
Justice Larsen & Justice Zappala
o Concurrence: Justice Larsen
o Dissent: Chief Justice Nix, joined by Justice McDermott &
Justice Papadakos
o Dissent: Justice McDermott
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Justice Cappy did not participate in the consideration or
disposition of this case.
Commonwealth v. Lewis, 598 A.2d 975, 982–83 (Pa. 1991) (holding
that failure of the trial judge to include the “no-adverseinference” charge in his jury instructions violated defendant’s
rights pursuant to article I, section 9).
o Majority: Justice Cappy, joined by Justice Flaherty, Justice
Larsen, Justice Papadakos & Justice Nix
o Concurrence: Chief Justice Nix, joined by Justice Papadakos
& Justice Flaherty
o Dissent: Justice McDermott
Commonwealth v. Slaybaugh, 364 A.2d 687, 690 (Pa. 1976)
(Section 1212 of the Motor Vehicle Code, which “mandates a
finding that the owner of a motor vehicle was driving that vehicle
at the time of a vehicle code violation, unless the ownerdefendant takes the stand and submits to examination,” was an
unconstitutional presumption in criminal cases under article I,
section 9).
o Majority: Justice O’Brien, joined by Chief Justice Jones,
Justice Roberts, Justice Pomeroy, Justice Nix & Justice
Manderino
o Concurring in the result: Justice Eagen
Commonwealth v. Devlin, 333 A.2d 888, 892 (Pa. 1975) (holding
that proof that defendant committed the crime of which he was
convicted on some date within a fourteen-month period was
insufficient to fix the date of the crime with certainty required by
due process).
o Majority: Chief Justice Jones, joined by Justice Eagen,
Justice O’Brien, Justice Roberts, Justice Nix & Justice
Manderino
o Justice Pomeroy did not participate in the consideration or
decision in this case.
Commonwealth v. Young, 317 A.2d 258, 260 (Pa. 1974) (“We hold
that appellant was denied a fair trial, guaranteed by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, because the trial court failed to instruct the jury
with a full and adequate charge on reasonable doubt.”).
o Majority: Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Eagen, Justice
O’Brien, Justice Pomeroy, Justice Nix & Justice Manderino
o Dissent: Chief Justice Jones
o

•

•
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• Moore v. Jamieson, 306 A.2d 283, 284, 292 (Pa. 1973) (rule
prohibiting an attorney to take any additional criminal defendant
clients if he has ten or more criminal cases which are over a year
old was defective as too vague and overbroad for lack of any
standard as to assigning responsibility for the delay and for
failure to provide any adequate standard or procedure).
o Majority: Justice Nix, joined by Justice Eagen, Justice
O’Brien & Justice Pomeroy
o Concurring in the result: Chief Justice Jones & Justice
Roberts
o Concurrence: Justice Manderino
3. Additional Rights of the Accused
• Commonwealth v. Cooley, 118 A.3d 370, 375 n.8, 379–80, (Pa.
2015) (holding that interrogation of defendant by parole agents
violated his right against self-incrimination under the Fifth
Amendment—and article I, section 9 affords no greater
protection than the Federal Constitution).
o Majority: Justice Eakin, joined by Justice Baer, Justice Todd
& Justice Saylor
o Dissent: Justice Stevens
o Former Chief Justice Castille and former Justice McCaffery
did not participate in the decision of this case.
• Commonwealth v. Molina, 104 A.3d 430, 452 (Pa. 2014) (finding
defendant’s right against self-incrimination was violated by the
use of his pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence of
guilty: “After reviewing article I, section 9 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution pursuant to Edmunds, we conclude that the factors
weigh in favor of diverging from the currently asserted
minimum standard of federal protection of the right against
self-incrimination in regard to the use of pre-arrest silence as
substantive evidence”).
o Majority: Justice Baer, joined by Justice Saylor & Justice
Todd
o Concurrence: Justice Saylor, joined by Justice Todd
o Dissent: Justice Castille
o Dissent: Justice Eakin
o Justice Stevens did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
o Former Justice McCaffery did not participate in the
consideration of this case.
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• Commonwealth v. Sloan, 907 A.2d 460, 468 (Pa. 2006) (construing
Rule 600(E)’s mandatory remedy of nominal release after 180
days in light of article I, section 14, to hold that it is not the same
as unconditional release—instead, “[r]elease may be conditioned
on terms that not only give adequate assurance that the accused
will appear for trial, but also assures that victims, witnesses, and
the community will be protected”).
o Majority: Justice Baer, joined by Chief Justice Cappy, Justice
Castille, Justice Newman, Justice Saylor & Justice Eakin
o Former Justice Nigro did not participate in the consideration
or decision of this matter.
• Commonwealth v. Robins, 812 A.2d 514, 516, 526–27 (Pa. 2002)
(holding that inculpatory statements made by a non-testifying
coconspirator offended defendant’s right of confrontation).
o Majority: Justice Cappy, joined by Chief Justice Zappala &
Justice Nigro
o Concurring: Justice Saylor
o Dissent: Justice Castille, joined by Justice Newman
o Dissent: Justice Eakin, joined by Justice Castille & Justice
Newman
• Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 738 A.2d 406, 409, 424 (Pa. 1999)
(counsel’s prior testimony from ineffectiveness hearing was
inadmissible at second trial and violated defendant’s right
against compelled self-incrimination and right to effective
assistance of counsel).
o Majority: Justice Saylor, joined by Justice Flaherty, Chief
Justice Zappala, Justice Cappy & Justice Nigro
o Dissent: Justice Castille, joined by Justice Newman
• Commonwealth v. Franciscus, 710 A.2d 1112, 1121 (Pa. 1998)
(admission of incriminating statements that defendant made to
jailhouse informant violated right to counsel guaranteed by the
Federal and Pennsylvania Constitutions—conducting two
separate analyses).
o Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Chief Justice Flaherty,
Justice Cappy & Justice Nigro
o Dissent: Justice Castille, joined by Justice Newman
• Commonwealth v. Louden, 638 A.2d 953, 957 (Pa. 1994)
(interpreting statutes to limit the use of testimony videotaped in
closed circuit television so as to comport with article I, section 9
right to “face to face” confrontation).
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Majority: Justice Papadakos, joined in Part A by Justice
Zappala & Justice Cappy; joined in Part B by Chief Justice
Nix & Justice Flaherty
o Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Justice Flaherty,
joined by Justice Nix
o Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Justice Zappala,
joined by Justice Cappy
o Justice Larsen and Justice McDermott did not participate in
the decision of this case.
• Commonwealth v. LaRosa, 626 A.2d 103, 107–09 (Pa. 1993)
(holding that admission of prior recorded testimony of an
unavailable witness, that implicated defendant and exculpated
the codefendant, was reversible error given the only justification
for jury’s verdict was that they disbelieved codefendant’s
testimony and at same time used witness’s prior recorded
testimony against defendant, despite trial court’s instructions
not to do so).
o Majority: Justice Papadakos, joined by Justice Larsen,
Justice Flaherty, Justice Zappala & Justice Cappy
o Concurring in the result: Chief Justice Nix
o Justice McDermott did not participate in the decision of this
case.
• Commonwealth v. Hess, 617 A.2d 307, 315 (Pa. 1992)
(determining that state forfeiture statute violates article I,
section 9 “insofar as it applies to the payment of attorney’s fees
for legitimate criminal defense representation prior to
conviction,”—not any federal constitutional provision).
o Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Chief Justice Nix,
Justice Flaherty & Justice Cappy
o Justice Larsen & Justice Papadakos did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this matter.
o Justice McDermott did not participate in the decision of this
matter.
• Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 594 A.2d 281, 281–82, 285 (Pa. 1991)
(use of closed-circuit television to transmit child’s testimony
violated defendant’s article I, section 9 right to a “face to face”
confrontation, choosing not to follow the U.S. Supreme Court in
Maryland v. Craig), superseded by constitutional amendment, PA.
CONST. art. V, § 10(c); 2003 Pa. Laws 459.
o Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Justice Larsen, Justice
Papadakos & Justice Cappy
o
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Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Justice
McDermott
o Dissent: Chief Justice Nix, joined by Justice Flaherty
o Dissent: Justice Flaherty, joined by Chief Justice Nix
Commonwealth v. Lohman, 594 A.2d 291, 292 (Pa. 1991) (follows
Ludwig, holding that the use of closed-circuit testimony violates
defendant’s face-to-face confrontation right under article I,
section 9).
o Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Justice Larsen, Justice
Papadakos & Justice Cappy
o Concurrence: Justice Flaherty
o Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Justice
McDermott
o Dissent: Chief Justice Nix
Commonwealth v. Africa, 569 A.2d 920, 921, 926 (Pa. 1990)
(holding that twenty-seven-month delay between arrest and trial
violated speedy trial rule under both Federal and Pennsylvania
Constitutions).
o Majority: Justice Papadakos, joined by Chief Justice Nix,
Justice Flaherty & Justice Zappala
o Dissent: Justice Larsen
o Dissent: Justice McDermott
Commonwealth v. Green, 581 A.2d 544, 564 (Pa. 1990) (“The
inability of Appellant to cross-examine this inmate was
particularly blatant error here because Appellant’s right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, as
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and Article 1, Section 9, of
the Pennsylvania Constitution, was effectively denied.”).
o Majority: Justice Papadakos, joined by Justice Larsen,
Justice Flaherty & Justice McDermott
o Concurring in the result: Chief Justice Nix & Justice Zappala
D’Elia v. Pa. Crime Comm’n, 555 A.2d 864, 872 (Pa. 1989) (holding
that statutory use and derivative use immunity granted
individual subpoenaed to appear before Pennsylvania Crime
Commission was not coextensive with state constitutional
protection against self-incrimination).
o Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Chief Justice Nix,
Justice Larsen, Justice Flaherty, Justice McDermott, Justice
Papadakos & Justice Stout
o Concurrence: Justice Papadakos, joined by Chief Justice Nix,
Justice Flaherty & Justice McDermott
o
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• Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 567 A.2d 1357, 1359 (Pa. 1989) (“We now
hold under the confrontation clause of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, that the appellant in the instant action was denied
his right to confrontation when his attorney was denied access to
the contents of the victim’s psychotherapeutic records.”).
o Majority: Justice McDermott, joined by Chief Justice Nix,
Justice Flaherty & Justice Zappala
o Dissent: Justice Larsen, joined by Justice Papadakos
o Former Justice Stout did not participate in the decision of
this case.
• Commonwealth v. Uhrinek, 544 A.2d 947, 948 (Pa. 1988)
(“Because the trial court excluded evidence of the intoxication of
the deceased pedestrian, which was relevant to appellant’s
theory of the cause of the accident, we reverse his homicide by
vehicle conviction and remand for a new trial.”).
o Majority: Justice Stout, joined by Chief Justice Nix, Justice
Flaherty & Justice Zappala
o Dissent: Justice Larsen
o Dissent: Justice Papadakos, joined by Justice McDermott
• Commonwealth v. Evans, 512 A.2d 626, 631 (Pa. 1986) (holding
that pursuant to article I, section 9, the defendant should have
been allowed to cross-examine the Commonwealth’s key witness
about other charges then pending against witness, not just his
role in crime in question, and error in restricting scope of
cross-examination of key witness was not harmless).
o Majority: Justice Flaherty, joined by Chief Justice Nix,
Justice Larsen, Justice McDermott & Justice Zappala
o Concurrence: Justice Papadakos
o Dissent: Justice Hutchinson
• Commonwealth v. Majorana, 470 A.2d 80, 81, 85 (Pa. 1983)
(interpreting Rape Shield Law in light of article I, section 9 to
admit evidence that offers an explanation of an alternative
account of alleged rape, given an accused’s fundamental right to
present in defense his own version of the facts).
o Majority: Hutchinson, joined by Chief Justice Roberts,
Justice Flaherty & Justice Zappala
o Concurring specially: Justice McDermott
o Concurring in the result: Justice Nix
o Dissent: Justice Larsen
• Commonwealth v. Turner, 454 A.2d 537, 540 (Pa. 1982) (“[W]e
decline to hold, under the Pennsylvania Constitution, that the
existence of Miranda warnings, or their absence, affects a
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person’s legitimate expectation not to be penalized for exercising
the right to remain silent.”).
o Majority: Justice Flaherty, joined by Chief Justice O’Brien,
Justice Roberts & Justice Larsen
o Dissent: Justice Nix
o Dissent: Justice McDermott, joined by Justice Hutchinson
Commonwealth v. Pounds, 417 A.2d 597, 603 (Pa. 1980) (holding
that the trial court’s refusal of a request to instruct the jury on
the defense of alibi was reversible error and sufficient prejudice
to require a new trial).
o Majority: Chief Justice Eagen, joined by Justice O’Brien,
Justice Roberts, Justice Nix & Justice Flaherty
o Dissent: Justice Larsen, joined by Justice Kauffman
Commonwealth v. Rolon, 406 A.2d 1039, 1040 (Pa. 1979) (“We
agree with appellant that the court of common pleas deprived
appellant of his right of compulsory process by accepting the
unsupported claim of privilege against self-incrimination of
appellant’s witness.”).
o Majority: Justice Roberts, joined by Chief Justice Eagen,
Justice O’Brien & Justice Larsen
o Dissent: Justice Nix
o Justice Manderino did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
Commonwealth v. Frazier, 369 A.2d 1224, 1228, 1230 (Pa. 1977)
(defendant’s right to be tried by an impartial jury, as guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment and by article I, section 9, was violated
because the nature of the pretrial publicity was such that one
exposed to it would be unable to serve as an impartial juror, and
virtually every prospective juror in the county was exposed to it).
o Majority: Justice Manderino, joined by Justice Eagen, Justice
Roberts & Justice Pomeroy
o Concurring in the result: Justice O’Brien
o Dissent: Justice Nix
o Chief Justice Jones did not participate in the consideration
or decision of this case.
Commonwealth v. Brenizer, 356 A.2d 784, 785 (Pa. 1976)
(determining that comments made by the district attorney “as to
possible ‘explanations’ of appellant’s plea of not guilty, when
coupled with the fact that appellant did not take the stand
or offer any evidence in defense, constitutes impermissible
and prejudicial comment on appellant’s Fifth Amendment
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right . . . and Art. I, s[ection] 9 . . . not to have any adverse
comment on his not taking the witness stand”).
o Majority: Justice O’Brien, joined by Chief Justice Jones,
Justice Eagen, Justice Roberts, Justice Nix & Justice
Manderino
o Dissent: Justice Pomeroy
Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 359 A.2d 174, 175, 177 (Pa. 1976)
(construing Rule of Criminal Procedure, which requires that trial
commence within 270 days of a complaint, to affirm trial court’s
dismissal of all charges, despite contention that entry of nolle
prosequi tolled running of 270-day time period specified by rule).
o Majority: Justice Manderino, joined by Chief Justice Jones,
Justice O’Brien, Justice Roberts, Justice Pomeroy & Justice
Nix
o Concurring in the result: Justice Eagen
Commonwealth v. Roundtree, 364 A.2d 1359, 1364 (Pa. 1976)
(defendant was deprived of effective assistance of counsel when
defense counsel failed to raise pretrial motion asserting his
speedy trial claim without any reasonable strategic basis to not
do so).
o Majority: Chief Justice Jones, joined by Justice Eagen,
Justice O’Brien, Justice Roberts, Justice Pomeroy, Justice
Nix & Justice Manderino
Commonwealth v. Triplett, 341 A.2d 62, 64 (Pa. 1975) (“[A]ny
statement of a defendant declared inadmissible for any reason by
a suppression court cannot be used for the purpose of impeaching
the credibility of a defendant who elects to testify on his own
behalf at trial.”), superseded by constitutional amendment PA.
CONST. art. 1, § 9 (1984).
o Majority: Justice O’Brien, joined by, Justice Nix & Justice
Manderino
o Concurrence: Justice Pomeroy
o Concurring in the result: Justice Roberts
o Dissent: Chief Justice Jones
o Dissent: Justice Eagen
In re Silverberg, 327 A.2d 106, 113 (Pa. 1974) (holding that use of
prior claim of privilege against self-incrimination during a
disciplinary proceeding, which raised impermissible inference of
inconsistency in testimony of two of the subjects, required
reversal and new disciplinary hearing at which no use of prior
claim of privilege against self-incrimination would be permitted).
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Majority: Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Eagen, Justice
O’Brien, Justice Niz & Justice Manderino
o Concurrence: Justice Nix, joined by Justice Roberts
o Dissent: Chief Justice Jones, joined by Justice Pomeroy
o Dissent: Justice Pomeroy, joined by Chief Justice Jones
Commonwealth v. Williams, 327 A.2d 15, 15, 18 (Pa. 1974)
(three-and-a-half-year delay between arrest and trial denied
defendant his constitutionally guaranteed right to speedy trial).
o Majority: Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Pomeroy, Justice
Nix & Justice Manderino
o Concurring in the result: Justice Eagen & Justice O’Brien
o Chief Justice Jones did not participate in the consideration
or decision of this case.
Commonwealth v. McCloud, 322 A.2d 653, 656 (Pa. 1974) (holding
the use of an autopsy report in the absence of the medical
examiner who made the autopsy, used “as direct evidence in
establishing the Cause of death (an element of the crime) denied
appellant
the
fundamental
constitutional
right
of
confrontation”).
o Majority: Justice Roberts, joined by Justice O’Brien, Justice
Nix & Justice Manderino
o Concurring in the result: Chief Justice Jones, Justice Eagen
& Justice Pomeroy
Commonwealth v. Davis, 305 A.2d 715, 720–21 (Pa. 1973) (holding
prosecutor’s persistent references in his closing argument, over
objection, to evidence against defendant being “uncontroverted”
violated defendant’s rights against self-incrimination where he
did not testify and offered no other witnesses or evidence at trial).
o Majority: Justice Roberts, joined by Justice O’Brien
o Concurrence: Justice Pomeroy
o Concurring in the result: Justice Eagen
o Dissent: Chief Justice Jones
Commonwealth v. Dixon, 311 A.2d 613, 613–15 (Pa. 1973)
(reading Rule 118 with Rule 119, where the preliminary
arraignment is meant to guarantee a citizen the same rights to
which he is entitled under the Pennsylvania Constitution).
o Majority: Justice Manderino, joined by Justice O’Brien,
Justice Roberts & Justice Nix
o Dissent: Justice Pomeroy, joined by Chief Justice Jones &
Justice Eagen
Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 297 A.2d 127, 128, 133 (Pa. 1972)
(defendant was denied right to a speedy trial under both federal
o

•

•

•

•

•

2018]

STILL LIVING

453

and state constitutions when almost six years passed from when
the authorities lodged a detainer against him to when he
petitioned to dismiss the indictment).
o Majority: Justice Nix, joined by Chief Justice Jones, Justice
Eagen, Justice O’Brien, Justice Roberts, Justice Pomeroy &
Justice Manderino
• Commonwealth v. Dillworth, 246 A.2d 859, 861–62 (Pa. 1968)
(construing statute to determine the legislature never intended
to authorize a determination of paternity by a judge alone, to
avoid analysis of article I, sections 6 “and/or” 9, the right of jury
trial).
o Majority: Justice O’Brien, joined by Chief Justice Bell,
Justice Cohen & Justice Eagen
o Concurrence: Justice Roberts
o Concurring: Chief Justice Bell & Justice Cohen
o Dissent: Justice Musmanno & Justice Jones
C. PA. Const. Art. I, § 10 [Double Jeopardy]
• Commonwealth v. Ball, 146 A.3d 755, 759, 770 (Pa. 2016)
(defendant could not be retried in court of common pleas after
being acquitted by magisterial district judge for a driving under
influence charge under the double jeopardy clauses of the U.S.
and Pennsylvania Constitutions: The Fifth Amendment and
article I, section 10 respectively).
o Majority: Justice Wecht, joined by Chief Justice Saylor,
Justice Todd, Justice Donohue & Justice Dougherty
o Concurrence: Justice Wecht (writing separately to offer
response to concerns voiced in the dissent)
o Dissent: Justice Baer
• Commonwealth v. States, 938 A.2d 1016, 1026–27 (Pa. 2007)
(holding double jeopardy and collateral estoppel barred the
Commonwealth from retrying defendant on homicide and other
charges, and that the Commonwealth’s constitutional right to a
jury trial under article I, section 6 is not violated by so holding).
o Majority: Justice Fitzgerald, joined by Chief Justice Cappy &
Justice Baldwin
o Concurrence: Justice Saylor (joins majority opinion except for
n.8)
o Dissent: Justice Castille, joined by Justice Baer
o Dissent: Justice Eakin
• Commonwealth v. Gibbons, 784 A.2d 776, 779 (Pa. 2001) (holding
that the verdict of acquittal entered by the municipal court
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constituted an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes, thus
barring the state’s appeal).
o Majority: Justice Nigro, joined by Justice Flaherty, Justice
Zappala, Justice Saylor & Justice Cappy
o Concurrence: Justice Saylor
o Dissent: Justice Castille
o Justice Newman did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
Commonwealth v. Martorano, 741 A.2d 1221, 1223 (Pa. 1999)
(retrying defendants after they were granted a new trial on the
ground of pervasive prosecutorial misconduct would violate
double jeopardy clause).
o Majority: Justice Newman, joined by Chief Justice Flaherty,
Justice Zappala & Justice Cappy
o Dissent: Justice Saylor, joined by Justice Castille & Justice
Nigro
Commonwealth v. Comer, 716 A.2d 593, 594, 599 (Pa. 1998)
(defendant’s convictions and sentences for involuntary
manslaughter and homicide by vehicle, based upon same conduct
that caused a single death, violated state and federal double
jeopardy clauses).
o Majority: Justice Zappala, joined by Chief Justice Flaherty,
Justice Cappy & Justice Nigro
o Dissent: Justice Castille, joined by Justice Newman
Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321, 325 (Pa. 1992) (“Because
the prosecutor’s conduct in this case was intended to prejudice
the defendant and thereby deny him a fair trial, appellant must
be discharged on the grounds that his double jeopardy rights, as
guaranteed by the Pennsylvania Constitution, would be violated
by conducting a second trial.”).
o Majority: Justice Flaherty, joined by Chief Justice Nix,
Justice Zappala, Justice Papadakos & Justice Cappy
o Justice Larsen did not participate in the consideration or
disposition of this case.
o Justice McDermott did not participate in the disposition of
this case.
Commonwealth v. Goldhammer, 489 A.2d 1307, 1316 (Pa. 1985)
(defendant who, through successful appeal, had some of his
convictions vacated on ground that counts were barred by statute
of limitations, could not be resentenced to increased terms on his
remaining convictions without violating double jeopardy
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clauses), rev’d sub nom. Pennsylvania v. Goldhammer, 474 U.S.
28 (1985).
o Majority: Chief Justice Nix, joined by Justice Larsen, Justice
Flaherty, Justice Hutchinson, Justice Zappala & Justice
Papadakos
o Dissent: Justice McDermott
Borough of West Chester v. Lal, 426 A.2d 603, 606 (Pa. 1981)
(holding that Commonwealth Court’s order subjected defendant
to double jeopardy in violation of both the federal and state
constitutions).
o Majority: Justice Larsen, joined by Chief Justice O’Brien,
Justice Flaherty & Justice Kauffman
o Concurrence: Justice Roberts
o Concurring in the result: Justice Nix
Commonwealth v. Hude, 425 A.2d 313, 320, 326–27 (Pa. 1980)
(construing section 110(2) narrowly to comport with
constitutional double jeopardy requirements, but holding that as
applied to the instant case, the question of defendant’s credibility
was litigated so as to prevent relitigation of that issue).
o Majority: Justice Nix
o Concurring in part: Chief Justice O’Brien, Justice Roberts &
Justice Flaherty
o Chief Justice O’Brien & Justice Larsen concurring in the
result as to the first defendant.
o Justice Larsen concurring in the result as to further
prosecution of the second defendant.
o Justice Flaherty, Chief Justice O’Brien & Justice Roberts
concurred in part and dissented in part as to second
defendant.
Commonwealth v. Tome, 398 A.2d 1369, 1377 (Pa. 1979) (holding
that increase in sentence on murder indictment constituted
double jeopardy).
o Majority: Justice O’Brien, joined by Chief Justice Eagen,
Justice Roberts & Justice Manderino
o Dissent: Justice Nix
o Dissent: Justice Larsen
Commonwealth v. Peluso, 393 A.2d 344, 346–47 (Pa. 1978) (double
jeopardy clause of both constitutions was violated when
defendant’s prior trial had resulted in a determination that there
was no evidence to prove he knew or had reason to know that a
certain rifle was in fact stolen, but second trial resulted in a
conviction from the same facts).
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Majority: Justice O’Brien, joined by Chief Justice Eagen,
Justice Roberts, Justice Pomeroy, Justice Nix, Justice
Manderino & Justice Larsen
• Commonwealth v. Brown, 314 A.2d 506, 507, 509 (Pa. 1974)
(finding that the court’s amendment to defendant’s sentence
three days later, increasing the maximum term to 20 years
(compared to his original 8.5–10 years) violated the double
jeopardy clause), overruled by Commonwealth v. Jones, 554 A.2d
50 (Pa. 1989).
o Majority: Chief Justice Jones, joined by Justice Roberts,
Justice O’Brien, Justice Manderino, Justice Eagen & Justice
Pomeroy
o Concurrence: Justice Roberts, joined by Justice O’Brien &
Justice Manderino
o Concurring part and dissenting in part: Justice Nix
• Commonwealth v. Lee, 312 A.2d 391, 394 (Pa. 1973) (defendant
could not be sentenced for a crime for which he was not indicted
without proper notice pursuant to article I, section 10).
o Majority: Justice Manderino, joined by Chief Justice Jones,
Justice Eagen, Justice O’Brien, Justice Robert, Justice
Pomeroy & Justice Nix
o Concurrence: Justice Eagen, joined by Chief Justice Jones &
Justice O’Brien
• Commonwealth v. Campana, 304 A.2d 432, 434 (Pa. 1973) (“All
charges resulting from the criminal ‘episode’ of each appellant
should have been consolidated at one trial, and consequently the
second prosecutions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause” of the
federal and state constitutions.).
o Majority: Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Eagen, Justice
Jones, Justice Nix & Justice Barbieri
o Concurrence: Justice Eagen, joined by Chief Justice Jones
o Concurrence: Justice Nix
o Dissent: Justice Pomeroy
o Chief Justice Bell & Justice Roberts absent in No. 21.
o

